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Abstract 
 
This thesis examines Hannah Arendt’s argument for a council democracy and its relevance 
for contemporary democratic practices. References to the councils in Arendt’s work are often 
ignored or dismissed by her interpreters as a utopian commitment. Against the tendency to 
neglect this aspect of her thought, I argue that the councils play a crucial role in her work as 
the institutional embodiment of her principle of political freedom. Tracing the development of 
the council concept in Arendt’s thought, I offer a significant reinterpretation of her political 
theory as situated within the radical democratic tradition of Rosa Luxemburg. I contend that 
Arendt’s key contribution to democratic theory is her championing of a federal system of 
participatory and empowered councils as the central political institutions of a council 
republic. 
 
Arendt’s argument for a council democracy draws from historical examples of councils from 
the French Revolution to the 1956 Hungarian Revolution. However, Arendt mischaracterises 
the nature of the councils and the intentions of council delegates. She inserts them in the 
framework of her own political categories and disregards the delegates’ socialist ideology and 
socio-economic concerns. Arendt’s distortion of the councils gives rise to the need for a 
historical re-examination of their political practices. I return to the political struggles of the 
post-First World War council movements in Germany and Russia in order to place the 
councils in historical perspective and challenge the biases of Arendt’s account. My analysis 
reveals that the councils were concerned with both political and economic affairs. I revise 
Arendt’s depiction in arguing that the councils were transformative organs of democratisation 
that sought to introduce democratic conditions into all spheres of social organisation. 
 
Situating the councils in relation to contemporary democratic practices, my principal 
argument is that they offer a critical perspective on the limits of current liberal democratic 
regimes. Although the councils do not present a model that could be replicated today, council 
delegates engaged in significant political practices that are instructive for current attempts at 
political transformation. In particular, they reveal the insufficiencies of electoral institutions 
for enabling widespread political participation and holding elites accountable. I argue that the 
historical significance of the councils is their exemplary role as institutions through which 
working-class forces organised to restrain elites, dismantle hierarchical systems and equalise 
power between citizens.  
 5 
Declaration  
 
This thesis contains no material which has been accepted for the award of any other degree or 
diploma at any university or equivalent institution and, to the best of my knowledge and 
belief, this thesis contains no material previously published or written by another person, 
except where due reference is made in the text of the thesis. 
 
 
James Muldoon 
  
 6 
Acknowledgements 
 
Thank you to my three supervisors, Alison Ross, Michael Saward and Fabienne Peter for their 
invaluable support over the course of writing the thesis. 
 
I would also like to thank Olivier Ruchet for inspiring the initial project and Andrew 
Benjamin and Michael Janover for their guidance over the past years. 
 
Finally, I am forever grateful to my friends and family for their continuing love and support. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 7 
 Hannah Arendt and Council Democracy 
 
 
Hannah Arendt offers one of the most trenchant criticisms of liberal representative 
democracy, yet one aspect of her critique remains neglected and misunderstood. While her 
criticisms of the oligarchic structure of political parties and the disempowering effects of 
representative institutions have been thoroughly addressed, relatively little attention has been 
dedicated to her argument for a council democracy.1 References to a council system in 
Arendt’s work are often dismissed by scholars as a naïve political ideal or a hopelessly 
unrealistic proposal.2 They question the strength of her support for the councils and the extent 
to which her readers should view them as a practical proposal for reform.3 Indeed, Arendt’s 
own ambivalence towards council democracy has added to the doubt and ambiguity. She 
confessed that she had a certain “romantic sympathy” for this “people’s utopia” and doubted 
whether the system was at all relevant in the American context with its disintegrating cities, 
loss of civic virtue and dwindling public life.4 In spite of these reservations, a re-examination 
                                                
1 For a brief selection of the closest studies of the council system in Arendt’s work see John Sitton, “Hannah 
Arendt’s Argument for Council Democracy,” Polity (1987) 20 (1), 80–100; Andreas Kalyvas, Democracy and 
the Politics of the Extraordinary: Max Weber, Carl Schmitt, and Hannah Arendt (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2008) 254–292; Mike McConkey, “On Arendt’s Vision of the European Council Phenomenon: 
Critique from an Historical Perspective,” Dialectical Anthropology (1991) 16 (1), 15–31; John Medearis, “Lost 
or Obscured? How V. I. Lenin, Joseph Schumpeter and Hannah Arendt Misunderstood the Council Movement,” 
Polity (2004) 36 (3), 447–476; James Muldoon, “The Lost Treasure of Arendt’s Council System,” Critical 
Horizons (2011) 12 (3), 396–417; Lisa Disch, “How could Hannah Arendt Glorify the American Revolution and 
Revile the French? Placing On Revolution in the Historiography of the French and American Revolutions,” 
European Journal of Political Theory (2011) 10 (3), 350–371; Joel Olson, “The Revolutionary Spirit: Hannah 
Arendt and the Anarchists of the Spanish Civil War,” Polity (1997) 29 (4), 461–488; Wolfhart Totschnig, 
“Arendt’s Argument for the Council System: A Defense,” European Journal of Cultural and Political Sociology 
(2014) 1 (3), 266–282; Steve Buckler, Hannah Arendt and Political Theory: Challenging the Tradition 
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2011) 104–126; Shmuel Lederman, “Councils and Revolution: 
Participatory Democracy in Anarchist Thought and the New Social Movements,” Science & Society (2015) 79 
(2), 243–263. 
2 Although neglected, they appear at the margins of most major studies of Arendt as a remainder or 
irreconcilable aspect of her thought. Margaret Canovan, Hannah Arendt: A Reinterpretation of Her Political 
Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992) 232–238; Seyla Benhabib, The Reluctant Modernism 
of Hannah Arendt (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003) 42, 142–146; Richard Bernstein, Hannah Arendt and 
the Jewish Question (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996) 117–118, 134–135; George Kateb, Hannah Arendt: Politics, 
Consciences, Evil (Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Allanheld, 1983) 118–121, Bikhu Parekh, Hannah Arendt and the 
Search for a New Political Philosophy (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: New Humanities, 1981) 170–171; John 
McGowan, Hannah Arendt: An Introduction (Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1998) 81–86; 
Michael Gottsegen, The Political Thought of Hannah Arendt (Albany, SUNY Press, 1994) 127. 
3 Canovan, Hannah Arendt: A Reinterpretation of her Political Thought, 235. 
4 Hannah Arendt, “On Hannah Arendt,” in Melvyn A. Hill (ed.), Hannah Arendt: The Recovery of the Public 
World (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1979) 327; Hannah Arendt, Crises of the Republic (New York: Harvest 
Books, 1969) 189; Hannah Arendt, “The Impotence of Power,” roundtable at Theatre for Ideas in New York, 22 
May 1969, Arendt Papers, 014410. Yet at other points Arendt was critical of “realists” who viewed the councils 
“as though they were a romantic dream” or little more than the “hopelessly romantic yearnings of the people.” 
She chides these observers for having taken “their own bearings from the party system, assuming as a matter of 
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of Arendt’s books, essays and archival material reveals that it plays a crucial role throughout 
her career: from her earliest writings on Jewish politics to her later political theory of action, 
freedom and revolutions. Arendt describes the council system as the formation of a federal 
state composed of a network of councils organised into a pyramidal structure.5 Lower 
councils are territorially based and operate at a grass-roots level from which delegates are 
elected to sit on progressively higher councils ending in a council parliament. An image of 
council democracy consistently guided Arendt’s thinking and provided her with a benchmark 
for the possibilities of modern politics. Many of her interpreters are content with highlighting 
its obvious practical difficulties, but the task of a deeper examination of her enigmatic 
position on the council system remains. The aim of this thesis is to reconsider the role of 
council democracy in Hannah Arendt’s political thought and to demonstrate its relevance for 
contemporary democratic practices. 
 
Arendt’s interest in the councils was connected to her reflections on the troubled state of 
liberal representative democracy. Her return to a lost council tradition was set against the 
failings of the democratic governments of her time, many of which, according to some 
indications, have since further deteriorated.6 Contemporary democratic regimes are plagued 
by a widening gap between ordinary citizens and the political system. Evidence suggests that 
many citizens feel increasing dissatisfaction with their politicians and democratic 
institutions.7 Representative institutions are perceived to be facilitating the disempowerment 
                                                                                                                                                   
course that there existed no other alternative for representative government and forgetting conveniently that the 
downfall of the old regime had been due, among other things, precisely to this system.” Hannah Arendt, On 
Revolution (New York: Penguin, 2006) 255.  
5 These councils should be distinguished from current local governments at the municipal level within liberal 
democracies. As I will demonstrate, they can also be distinguished from the former bureaucratic organs of the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.  
6 Arendt believed that American democracy was facing a “’credibility gap,’ which means that those in power are 
no longer believed – quite apart from whether one agrees with them or not.” Hannah Arendt, Crises of the 
Republic (New York: Pelican Books, 1973) 183. Claims of a “crisis of democracy” go back at least to a report to 
the Trilateral Commission in 1975. See Michael Crozier, Samuel Huntington, and Joji Watanuki, The Crisis of 
Democracy: Report on the governability of Democracies to the Trilateral Commission (New York: New York 
University Press, 1975). The notion of a “democratic deficit” troubling contemporary liberal democracies is of 
course contested by scholars, but this thesis proceeds on the basis that growing citizen dissatisfaction with 
democratic governments is evidence of unresolved tensions with current liberal representative democratic 
regimes. See Jürgen Habermas, “The European Nation-State – Its Achievements and Its Limits. On the Past and 
Future of Sovereignty and Citizenship,” in Gopal Balakrishnan and Benedict Anderson (eds.), Mapping the 
Nation (London: Verso, 1995) 281–294; Simon Tormey, The End of Representative Politics (Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 2015).  
7 Although, this evidence is not entirely uniform and varies considerably across countries and regions. Pippa 
Norris, Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Government (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1999); Susan Pharr and Robert D. Putnam, Disaffected Democracies: What's Troubling the Trilateral Countries? 
(Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2000); Russell Dalton, Democratic Challenges, Democratic 
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of citizens by concentrating real decision-making power in closed and inaccessible 
institutions.8 In particular, two inter-related problems have emerged. Firstly, disaffected 
citizens sense that representative institutions are dominated by a narrow circle of elites that 
control decision-making, which results in outcomes that are not in the interests of the majority 
of citizens.9 There are only a limited number of accountability measures available to citizens 
to control these elites, with an increasing number of scholars suggesting that elections provide 
only a minimal measure of accountability.10 Secondly, participation in formal political 
processes has declined across the board in most advanced industrial countries.11 There are few 
institutionalised spaces in which citizens can engage in meaningful participation in their 
democracies. Problems of the elite domination of political processes and a dwindling 
participation of ordinary citizens in politics are part of a broader legitimacy deficit facing 
democratic regimes. Although belief in democracy as an ideal has risen, the institutions of 
contemporary democratic regimes are failing to embody many of its central values such as 
self-government and political freedom.12 The central political issue to which this thesis 
responds is the inability of liberal democracy to provide realistic avenues for redressing these 
criticisms and weaknesses. My contention is that examining Arendt’s argument for a council 
democracy assists us in understanding such deficiencies and exploring possibilities for their 
reform. 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
Choices: The Erosion of Political Support in Advanced Industrial Democracies (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2004). 
8 Theda Skocpol, “Voice and Inequality: The Transformation of American Civic Democracy,” Perspectives on 
Politics (2004) 2 (1), 3–20; Martin Gilens and Benjamin I. Page, “Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, 
Interest Groups, and Average Citizens,” Perspectives on Politics (2014) 12 (3), 564–581. 
9 For example, 80% of American respondents to a recent global survey considered that their country was “run by 
a few big interests looking out for themselves.” Steven Kull et al., World Public Opinion on Governance and 
Democracy (Washington: PIPA, 2008). 
10 Robert Goodin, Innovating Democracy: Democratic Theory and Practice after the Deliberative Turn (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2008); Archon Fung and Erik Olin Wright, “Deepening Democracy: Innovations in 
Empowered Participatory Governance,” Politics and Society (2001) 29 (1), 5–41; Mark Warren, “Governance-
Driven Democratization,” Critical Policy Analysis (2009) 3 (1), 3–13.  
11 Over the past three decades wealth inequalities have increased and participation in elections, political parties 
and trade unions have diminished. See Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of 
American Community (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000). 
12 Dalton, Democratic Challenges, Democratic Choices: The Erosion of Political Support in Advanced Industrial 
Democracies, 47; Monica Ferrin, et al., European’s Understandings and Evaluations of Democracy: Topline 
Results from Round 6 of the European Social Survey (London: European Social Survey ERIC, 2014); Matt 
Henn, Mark Weinstein and Sarah Forrest, “Uninterested Youth? Young People’s Attitudes towards Party Politics 
in Britain,” Political Studies (2005) 53 (3), 556–578. Cf. Pippa Norris, Democratic Deficit: Critical Citizens 
Revisited (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Jürgen Habermas, “The Postnational Constellation 
and the Future of Democracy,” in Max Pensky (ed.), The Postnational Constellation: Political Essays, trans. M. 
Pensky (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001) 58–112. 
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This thesis pursues two principal investigations. In the first instance, I examine the neglected 
role of the councils in Arendt’s work in order to recast her theory in a more empowered and 
participatory light as a resource for democratic theory. Acknowledging the importance of the 
councils offers a new perspective that displaces the view of Arendt as an anti-democratic 
elitist and connects her to a radical democratic tradition in the line of Rosa Luxemburg. I 
contend that Arendt’s critique of liberal representative democracy is more sustained and 
thoroughgoing than is widely acknowledged, even by her sympathetic commentators. While 
her appropriators within democratic theory push liberal democracy to its deliberative, 
agonistic and radical edges, Arendt champions a federal system of participatory and 
empowered councils as the central political institutions of a council republic. Rejecting the 
organising principles of sovereignty and the nation-state, Arendt envisions a decentralised 
council republic that channels the insurgent political activities of ordinary citizens within a 
pluralised political space. 
 
The second part of the thesis seeks to reposition and extend Arendt’s analysis through a 
historically focussed examination of the democratic councils. Arendt conceives of the 
councils from the perspective of her own political categories and analytic distinctions. In so 
doing, she conceals their socialist ideology and ignores their socio-economic activities. To 
rectify Arendt’s misrepresentations, I return to the historical practices of council delegates in 
post-First World War Russia and Germany.13 Council delegates challenged the institutional 
structure of liberal democracies, drawing attention to the insufficiencies of national elections 
for holding elites to account and ensuring widespread participation. Contrasting the actions of 
the council delegates with our own regimes reveals underappreciated aspects of democratic 
practices. In particular, the councils direct attention to questions of unequal power relations 
between citizens and the importance of controlling recalcitrant elites from subverting the 
public interest to their own private ends. I conceptualise the councils’ distinctive mode of 
democratic action as a resistance to forms of elite domination. 
 
Building on Arendt’s work, but modifying the terms of her analysis, I return to the councils as 
a means of contesting the widely held presumption that current forms of liberal democratic 
government are the most adequate realisation of democratic principles. I connect the two 
principal objects of study – Arendt’s political theory and the councils as an historical 
                                                
13 I will argue against Arendt that the post-First World War councils were the main historical instance of council 
democracy and that the previous examples she refers to do not fit the same model. 
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exemplar – within a theoretical framework in which both elements provide resources that can 
be brought to bear on contemporary democratic politics.14 Arendt’s institutional sketches of a 
council system, although instructive, do not provide a coherent and plausible alternative 
model of democracy. Instead, her writings on democracy reveal some of the limitations of 
current institutions and offer an alternative set of principles to guide thinking of political 
transformation. Meanwhile, historical reflections on the political struggles of the councils 
open our political imagination to a new horizon of possibilities by drawing from debates and 
events at an important historical juncture before the dominance of current forms of liberal 
democracy. This thesis interrogates current democratic institutions from the perspective of 
Arendt’s political theory and the political practices of the council movements. 
 
 
Arendt and Democratic Theory 
 
Arendt’s thought is often recognised as posing a challenge to traditional conceptions of 
democracy. However, any reading of her as a radical democrat must contend with the 
perception of a deep anti-democratic strain in her thought. Early interpreters cast Arendt as an 
anti-modernist Grecophile whose work stood in tension with modern democratic values.15 
Sheldon Wolin has written the most damning critique of Arendt as an aristocratic writer who 
was critical of the central principles of democracy.16 He argues that as democracy attempts to 
override the distinction between “the social” and “the political” by redressing socio-economic 
inequalities through political struggle, it runs counter to the main categories of Arendt’s 
thought.17 He characterises an Arendtian politics as an agonistic striving for glory between 
individuals within a political space purified of material interests and socio-economic 
concerns.18 While Wolin retains a predominantly negative view of Arendt’s elitist attitude 
towards democracy, Margaret Canovan attempts to gain insight into a tension between the 
                                                
14 I return at the end of the introduction to theorise the role historical exemplars can play in political theory. 
15 See Kateb, Hannah Arendt: Politics, Conscience, Evil, 31; Benhabib, The Reluctant Modernism of Hannah 
Arendt, xxxix; Hanna Pitkin, “Justice: On Relating Private and Public,” in Lewis Hinchman and Sandra 
Hinchman (eds.), Hannah Arendt: Critical Essays (Albany, SUNY Press, 1994) 271–272; Patricia Springborg, 
“Arendt, Republicanism, and Patriarchalism” History of Political Thought (1989) 10 (3), 499–523, 520–521. 
16 Sheldon Wolin, “Hannah Arendt: Democracy and the Political,” Salmagundi (1983) 60, 3–19. 
17 Wolin allows for a slight turn in her work in the 1960s towards a less hostile position to democracy through 
the modification of some of her central categories, which is evident in the final chapter of On Revolution. 
However, even in this more democratic phase, Wolin suggests Arendt’s support for the capitalist and centralising 
ambitions of the American Founding Fathers remains suspect as it undercuts local and deliberative forms of 
politics. 
18 In Wolin’s interpretation, her political ideals are based on a distorted account of Periclean Athens combined 
with a Homeric emphasis on the production of memorable deeds.  
 12 
participatory and elitist aspects of Arendt’s thought.19 She argues that claims for Arendt as a 
radical democrat are troubled by her persistent Nietzschean contempt for mass society and a 
dismissal of the tastes and preferences of labourers.20 For Canovan, the most dominant image 
of politics throughout Arendt’s work is of a small aristocracy of free men who must defend 
their freedom against the conformity and necessity of mass society. Nonetheless, Canovan 
notes that Arendt celebrates direct and participatory forms of politics and the revolutionary 
spirit of free and spontaneous action. She perceives a fundamental ambivalence in Arendt’s 
writings that allows it to be read in different and at times contradictory ways.  
 
It is undoubted that there are certain troubling elements in Arendt’s thought, including those 
passages that paint the portrait of a nostalgic and conservative thinker. However, the emphasis 
on such passages has been challenged by a second group of interpreters who have drawn on 
Arendt’s work as a resource for democratic theory.21 For these scholars, she is viewed as a 
valuable corrective to what they perceive as a dominant privatised view of public life, which 
entails a denigration of politics. The two dominant appropriations of her thought within 
contemporary democratic theory are the deliberative and agonistic models of democratic 
politics.22 Jürgen Habermas and Seyla Benhabib’s deliberative model of democracy is based 
on a communicative conception of action in which a discursive political community aims for 
consensus over its basic norms and principles through rational dialogue between free and 
equal individuals.23 The aim of this communicative approach is to overcome the threat posed 
by instrumental rationality to political institutions by revealing the inherent dialogical 
rationality contained in speech. Benhabib emphasises the co-operative and dialogical accounts 
                                                
19 Margaret Canovan, “The Contradictions of Hannah Arendt’s Political Thought,” Political Theory (1978) 6 (5), 
5–25. For other interpretations on Arendt’s “two politics” see Peter Fuss, “Hannah Arendt’s Conception of 
Political Community,” in Hill (ed.), Hannah Arendt: The Recovery of the Political World, 157–176; Bhikhu 
Parekh, Hannah Arendt and the Search for a New Political Philosophy (London: Macmillan, 1981) 177. 
20 Canovan, “The Contradictions of Hannah Arendt’s Political Thought,” 5–25. On an aristocratic strand in 
Arendt’s thought see also Jean-Philippe Deranty and Emmanuel Renault, “Democratic Agon: Striving for 
Distinction or Struggle against Domination and Injustice?” in Andrew Schaap (ed.), Law and Agonistic Politics 
(Farnham: Ashgate, 2009). 
21 Jeffrey Isaac, for example, contends that although Arendt is a critic of mass democracy, she is not against 
democracy per se. On the contrary, Arendt advances a participatory vision of grassroots politics based in civil 
society that would rejuvenate rather than supplant democratic government. I will later examine whether we could 
consider Arendt’s writings on democracy to be primarily concerned with questions of civil society. Jeffrey Isaac, 
“Oases in the Desert: Hannah Arendt on Democratic Politics,” American Political Science Review (1994) 88 (1), 
156–168, 156. 
22 See Seyla Benhabib (ed.), Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political (Princeton, 
New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1996). Although, this division creates a limiting framework of binary 
concepts (such as deliberation versus conflict) that unnecessarily divides Arendt’s thought into oppositional 
terms. See Schmuel Lederman, “Agonism and Deliberation in Arendt,” Constellations (2014) 21 (3), 327–337.  
23 Benhabib, The Reluctant Modernism of Hannah Arendt; Benhabib, Democracy and Difference, 68; Jürgen 
Habermas, “Hannah Arendt’s Communications Concept of Power,” Social Research (1977) 44 (1), 3–24. 
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of politics in Arendt, which is important for the deliberative project by enabling a systematic 
distinction between instrumental and communicative action. She draws from Arendt’s 
narrative structure of action, the role of political judgment and the importance of the 
discursive practices of political speech and promises in her account of politics.24 Benhabib 
ultimately finds Arendt’s theory of political action lacking in strong normative foundations 
and recommends supplementing her work with the normative framework provided by 
Habermas’ political philosophy.25 Honig, on the other hand, insists on Arendt’s agonistic 
account of politics that highlights the unruliness of action and the productive value of political 
conflict and contestation.26 Action does not require external normative limitations, since it 
contains its own self-limiting and self-correcting character. For Honig, every political practice 
and institution should be open to debate and continually called into question as part of the 
political process.27 Although Honig rejects claims that Arendt is in need of supplements and 
correctives, she seeks to radicalise Arendt’s politics by blurring the strict distinction between 
public/private and social/political in order to proliferate the sites in which political 
contestation takes place.28 
 
These two influential readings of Arendt present contrasting pictures of her importance for 
democratic theory. Although each interpretation rightly emphasises a number of important 
aspects of Arendt’s theory and puts forward a defensible picture of her thought, I seek to 
challenge the shared underlying interpretive framework of a liberal representative conception 
of democracy within a sovereign nation-state.29 What unites all the above-mentioned 
                                                
24 Seyla Benhabib, “Judgment and the Moral Foundations of Politics in Arendt’s Thought,” Political Theory 
(1988) 16 (1), 29–51; Benhabib, The Reluctant Modernism of Hannah Arendt, 125, 173. 
25 Benhabib, Democracy and Difference, 70; Seyla Benhabib, Situating the Self: Gender, Community and 
Postmodernism in Contemporary Ethics (New York: Routledge, 1992) 93; Seyla Benhabib, “Hannah Arendt and 
the Redemptive Power of Narrative,” Social Research (1990) 57 (1), 167–196; Seyla Benhabib, “Models of 
Public Space: Hannah Arendt, the Liberal Tradition, and Jürgen Habermas,” in Craig Calhoun (ed.), Habermas 
and the Public Sphere (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1992) 73–98; Benhabib, “Judgment and the Moral Foundations 
of Politics in Arendt’s Thought”. 
26 Bonnie Honig, Political Theory and the Displacement of Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993); 
Bonnie Honig, “The Politics of Agonism,” Political Theory (1993) 21 (3), 528–533; Dana R. Villa, “Beyond 
Good and Evil: Arendt, Nietzsche and the Aestheticization of Politics,” Political Theory (1992) 20 (2), 274–308. 
27 Honig, Political Theory and the Displacement of Politics, 115. 
28 Ibid., 115–124; Bonnie Honig, “Toward an Agonistic Feminism,” in Bonnie Honig (ed.), Feminist 
Interpretations of Hannah Arendt (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995) 135–166; 
Bonnie Honig, “Humanism from an Agonistic Perspective: Themes from the work of Bonnie Honig,” 
Contemporary Political Theory (2014) 13 (2), 168–217, 210. 
29 In defence of Honig and Benhabib, it could be argued that the agonistic and deliberative models are less 
accepting of liberal democratic institutions (especially the party system) and more favourably disposed to 
“council style” participatory structures than given credit in this thesis. Nevertheless, I contend there is evidence 
that in spite of their efforts to make liberal democracies more participatory and deliberative, these models 
remained tied to the basic institutional structure of liberal representative democracies. 
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interpreters is their failure to acknowledge one of Arendt’s most radical and challenging of 
positions: her critique of the basic framework of liberal representative democracy and 
argument for a form of council democracy.30 The presumption that Arendt’s conception of 
politics should be understood within the horizon of contemporary nation-states and party 
politics risks mischaracterising her position and misunderstands one of her central thematic 
concerns.31 As a result of her interpreters’ framework, important categorical distinctions that 
Arendt draws such as those between the party system/council system and a sovereign nation-
state/federal council state are disregarded or circumvented. Arendt’s argument for council 
democracy cuts diagonally across the agonistic and deliberative debates. Seen from an 
Arendtian standpoint, both Benhabib and Honig represent forms of parliamentary/party 
politics, which stand in opposition to Arendt’s proposition of an entirely “new form of 
government,” council democracy.32 Perhaps the clearest enunciation of the shared limitation 
of these interpreters is signalled by Benhabib in her introduction to the edited collection of 
essays, Democracy and Difference.33 Here, she states that their mutual conception of politics: 
 
focuses on the negotiation, contestation and representation of difference within the public sphere of 
liberal democracies … The essays in this volume, in discussing the democratic politics of difference 
share the assumption that the institutions and culture of liberal democracies are sufficiently complex, 
supple and decentred so as to allow for the expression of difference without fracturing the identity of 
the body politic or subverting existing forms of political sovereignty.34  
 
This interpretation of Arendt’s work is explicable as a response to the post-Cold War 
renaissance of liberal scholarship that saw her as the voice of Eastern European dissidents and 
                                                
30 See Andreas Kalyvas, Democracy and the Politics of the Extraordinary: Max Weber, Carl Schmitt, and 
Hannah Arendt (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008); James R. Martel, “Amo: Volo ut sis: Love, 
Willing and Arendt’s Reluctant Embrace of Sovereignty,” Philosophy and Social Criticism (2008) 34 (3), 287–
313; James R. Martel, “Can There Be Politics Without Sovereignty? Arendt, Derrida and the Question of 
Sovereign Inevitability” Law, Culture and the Humanities (2010) 6 (2), 153–166. 
31 To be sure, Benhabib is interested in “a plurality of modes of association” within “a public sphere of 
interlocking and overlapping networks and associations of deliberation contestation and argumentation,” rather 
than a purely state-centric model of politics. However, she still sets her conception of the public sphere within 
the institutions of a liberal democracy and a sovereign nation-state. Benhabib, Democracy and Difference, 74. 
Similarly, Honig believes in “reclaiming the practice of politics from representative, state-centered and state-
centering institutions,” but in practice she views the institutions of liberal democracy as the basic framework 
within which political contestation and “resistability” occur. See Honig, Political Theory and the Displacement 
of Politics, 125. Her claim that “institutions and individuals are always incomplete, forever calling out for 
augmentation and amendment” presupposes the background structure of “sustaining liberal democratic values 
and institutions.” Honig, Political Theory and the Displacement of Politics, 115; Bonnie Honig, Democracy and 
the Foreigner (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001) 108. 
32 Arendt, On Revolution, 249. 
33 This book includes a contribution from Bonnie Honig. Benhabib, Democracy and Difference. 
34 Ibid., 4–5.  
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the burgeoning civil society movements.35 Her influence in political theory rose dramatically 
following the fall of communism and the seeming triumph of political mobilisations of non-
violent collective action. Jonathan Schell has argued that it would be appropriate to call the 
third wave of democracy, which includes the democratisation of much of Eastern Europe 
through a series of largely peaceful revolutions, “Arendtian revolutions.”36 He maintains that 
her thought embodies the spirit of these non-violent and citizen-led processes of 
democratisation. Within this context in the 1990s, Arendt was used to support a series of 
positions internal to liberal democratic theory: deliberative democracy against a “general 
agonistics” of discourse, communitarianism against liberalism and agonistic politics against 
Rawlsian justice. Arendt was put to work to criticise various weaknesses of the liberal 
circumscribing of politics, but only rarely in a manner that would call into question the basic 
institutions of liberal democracy. For these theorists, Arendt’s thought is considered as a 
supplement to or corrective of traditional liberal democratic institutions and practices.37 
However, this interpretation obscures her value for contemporary reflections on democracy by 
blunting her critique of liberal representative democracy and displacing her distinctive 
argument for a council democracy. The return to council-styled political movements in 
Occupy Wall Street and the Spanish and Greek indignados provides impetus for a 
reorientation of our perspective on Arendt’s democratic councils.38 
 
Without denying the complexity of her writings or moments of ambiguity, I argue that there is 
a clear and persistent radical democratic current in Arendt’s work that is most visible in her 
argument for a council democracy.39 In revisiting a number of her marginal texts, we discover 
that Arendt has more to say concerning democracy and is more openly partisan of democratic 
                                                
35 Bruce Ackerman, The Future of Liberal Revolution (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992) 1; Canovan, 
Hannah Arendt: A Reinterpretation of her Political Thought, 1–2; Benhabib, The Reluctant Modernism of 
Hannah Arendt, xlv; Dick Howard, “Keeping the Republic: Reading Arendt’s On Revolution after the Fall of the 
Wall,” Democratiya (2007) 9, 122–140. 
36 Jonathan Schell, “Introduction,” in Arendt, On Revolution, xi–xxix. 
37 Margie Lloyd, “In Tocqueville’s Shadow: Hannah Arendt’s Liberal Republicanism,” The Review of Politics 
(1995) 57 (1), 31–58. 
38 The extra-parliamentary and radically democratic structure of the general assemblies of the most recent wave 
of political movements presents interesting parallels with the council movement. However, one should not 
overemphasise their similarities as the council movement has a number of distinctive characteristics. In chapter 
two, I provide a definition of the councils and compare them to other similar historical movements and 
institutions. 
39 A radical interpretation of Arendt, albeit from a republican rather than a democratic perspective, has also been 
provided by Andreas Kalyvas, Democracy and the Politics of the Extraordinary. For a more critical angle see 
Ferdinando G. Menga, “The Seduction of Radical Democracy: Deconstructing Hannah Arendt’s Political 
Discourse,” Constellations (2014) 21 (3), 313–326. 
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forms of politics than some scholars have acknowledged.40 Contrary to Wolin’s insistence 
that she never directly addresses the topic, Arendt articulates her understanding of democratic 
politics as consisting of “active participation in public matters, and not only the protection of 
certain fundamental rights.”41 She argues that the councils were a “direct regeneration of 
democracy,” although, perhaps not in the state-centric and representative way it has 
traditionally been understood.42 For Arendt, “the councils have always been undoubtedly 
democratic, but in a sense never seen before and never thought about.”43 Upon closer 
examination, references to the councils can be located throughout Arendt’s writings.44 The 
recurring theme of the council system gives us cause to reconsider its role in her work. Rather 
than a curious anomaly that is best overlooked, the council system ought to occupy a central 
position in our understanding of Arendt’s political thought.  
 
The turn to the council system in this thesis follows a more general trend from a focus on 
Arendt’s theory of political action towards the institutional dimensions of her thought.45 
Previously, democratic theorists have been inclined to view Arendt’s account of political 
action as the cornerstone of her work, even if they disagreed over how this should be 
understood. As a result, Arendt’s writings on political institutions have been partly 
overlooked and misconstrued.46 Benhabib, for example, criticises Arendt for holding a free-
floating and “institutionally unanchored” conception of politics in need of the addition of a 
Habermasian theory of the public sphere in order to ground it.47 Others have interpreted 
Arendt as preoccupied with a model of an undifferentiated ancient city-state, eliding the 
complexities of modern civil society and political institutions.48 More recently, however, there 
has been a greater appreciation for the value of Arendt’s institutional writings, resulting in the 
                                                
40 Wolin, “Hannah Arendt: Democracy and the Political,” 3. 
41Hannah Arendt, “Nationalstaat und Demokratie,” HannahArendt.net (2006) 1 (2), available at 
http://www.hannaharendt.net/index.php/han/article/view/94/154. 
42 Arendt, On Revolution, 255. 
43 Hannah Arendt, “Totalitarian Imperialism: Reflections on the Hungarian Revolution,” Journal of Politics 
(1958) 20 (1), 5–43, 30. 
44 Hannah Arendt, The Jewish Writings (New York: Schocken Books, 2007) 343–374, 388–401; Hannah Arendt, 
The Human Condition (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1958) 215–220, Arendt, On Revolution, 247–
273; Arendt, Crises of the Republic, 189–191, Arendt, “Totalitarian Imperialism: Reflections on the Hungarian 
Revolution”; Hannah Arendt, Men in Dark Times (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1970) 52; Arendt, 
“On Hannah Arendt,” in Hill (ed.), Hannah Arendt: The Recovery of the Public World, 327; Arendt, “The 
Impotence of Power,” Arendt Papers, 014410.  
45 See in particular the articles collected in Marco Goldoni and Christopher McCorkindale (eds.), Hannah Arendt 
and the Law (Oxford and Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing, 2012). 
46 George Kateb, “Political Action: its Nature and Advantages,” in Dana R. Villa (ed.), The Cambridge 
Companion to Hannah Arendt (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000) 130–148. 
47 Benhabib, The Reluctant Modernism of Hannah Arendt, 198. 
48 Jean Cohen and Andrew Arato, Civil Society and Political Theory (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992). 
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decline of a perception of Arendt’s “polis envy” and her rejection of modern forms of 
organisation.49 Jeremy Waldron has highlighted the importance of a stable institutional 
framework in Arendt’s political theory and its relation to a constitution, legislation, judiciary, 
voting and civil liberties.50 The focus on the councils that I pursue here reveals that it is not 
merely the stabilising power of institutions that Arendt valued. Rather, she admired the 
councils as institutions of decentralised self-governance that cultivated political participation 
and formed new centres of power. As her most preferred institutional arrangement for modern 
politics, the council system should be weighted equally alongside Arendt’s theory of action 
and political freedom, for it is only through their concrete embodiment in the institutions of a 
council republic that these concepts can be properly understood.  
 
Uncovering the importance of the councils gives rise to a need to reassess our view of 
Arendt’s position in contemporary political theory. If any form of consensus could be said to 
exist over such a heterodox thinker, it is that Arendt is best placed in the classical republican 
tradition.51 This is due to her preference for the figure of the active citizen over the rights-
holder, her emphasis on strong institutions and the rule of law and her passionate commitment 
to political action and the public realm.52 However, the extent to which this republicanism 
undergoes a council communist inflection has not been fully appreciated.53 Arendt is neither a 
classical republican in the line of Aristotle or Cicero nor, strictly speaking, a modern 
republican such as Montesquieu or the Federalists. It is well understood that Arendt rejects 
the dominant tradition in political theory of a sovereign state logic from Hobbes to 
Rousseau.54 But Arendt’s turn to a counter-tradition includes the figures of Luxemburg and 
the council communists, as much as the earlier modern republicans. The resulting 
amalgamation is at times an unstable coalition of thinkers, resulting in a productive tension in 
her work. This allows it to be read in ways that she may not have authorised or predicted. It 
was not just any form of republicanism that Arendt thought desirable, but a “soviet republic,” 
                                                
49 In remarks presented for a panel on Hannah Arendt at the American Political Science Association Jean 
Elshtain suggested that Arendt glorified Athenian democracy and overlooked its many faults weaknesses. 
50 Jeremy Waldron, “Arendt’s Constitutional Politics,” in Villa (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Hannah 
Arendt, 201–219; Arendt, On Revolution, 166. 
51 Canovan, Hannah Arendt: A Reinterpretation of her Political Thought, 201–206; Maurizio Passerin 
d’Entrèves, The Political Philosophy of Hannah Arendt (London and New York: Routledge, 1994) 2; Patricia 
Springborg, “Hannah Arendt and the Classical Republican Tradition,” in Gisela Kaplan and Clive S. Kessler 
(eds.), Hannah Arendt: Thinking, Judging, Freedom (Sydney: Unwin Hyman, 1989) 9–17.  
52 Arendt, “On Hannah Arendt,” in Hill (ed.), Hannah Arendt: The Recovery of the Public World, 331–333. 
53 I intend my interpretation of Arendt as a “council republican” to complement rather than contradict my 
broader reading of her strong affinities with a “radical democratic (or socialist)” tradition of Rosa Luxemburg. I 
address the issues of Arendt’s ambiguous relation to the council communist tradition below in chapter one. 
54 Arendt, The Human Condition, 234–236. 
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a “republic … founded upon the principles of the council system.”55 Her argument for the 
“foundation of a new body politic” was based upon “a new type of republican government” 
rather than a strict return to a conservative republican tradition.56 Arendt forges new ground in 
her conception of a council republicanism based on the institutional form of the council 
system, an institution completely foreign to most republican thinkers.  
 
One potential objection that could be raised against this reading of Arendt’s work is that she 
never intended the councils to be conceived of as an alternative to contemporary liberal 
institutions. In this vein, Jeffrey Isaac has argued that Arendt’s council system should be 
understood as a call for greater civic participation, which constitutes a complement to rather 
than a replacement of the central institutions of a liberal representative democracy.57 He 
argues against a number of her critics that it is wrong to read Arendt as wishing to put an end 
to liberal democracy. Along these lines, Margaret Canovan also imagines that the council 
system would be “an extension downwards of the separation and balancing of power she 
valued so much in the US Constitution,” which would leave the institutions of Congress in 
place.58 There are some moments at which Arendt could be interpreted in this way, such as 
where she states that the councils were “the best instruments, for example, for breaking up the 
modern mass society, with its dangerous tendency toward the formation of pseudo-political 
mass movements.”59  
 
Yet, the main thrust of Arendt’s argument is aligned with an alternative perspective. Arendt is 
unequivocal that the councils were “a new form of government rather than a mere reform of it 
or a mere supplement to the existing institutions.”60 Arendt elaborates on the matter further in 
one of her interviews: 
 
I see the possibility of forming a new concept of the state. A council-state of this sort, to which the 
principle of sovereignty would be wholly alien, would be admirably suited to federations of the most 
various kinds, especially because in it power would be constituted horizontally and not vertically.61 
 
                                                
55 Arendt, On Revolution, 258. 
56 Ibid., 265, 259. 
57 Isaac, “Oases in the Desert: Hannah Arendt on Democratic Politics,” 156–168. 
58 Canovan, Hannah Arendt: A Reinterpretation of her Political Thought, 236. 
59 Arendt, On Revolution, 271. 
60 Ibid., 247. 
61 Arendt, Crises of the Republic, 191. 
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She states that the two systems were “utterly unalike and even contradictory to each other” 
and were based on completely opposed principles and structures. The party system is based 
on a top-down oligarchic structure whereas the council system is a bottom-up system of 
participation. The majority of Arendt’s examples of the council system such as Russia and 
Germany in 1917-1918 and Hungary in 1956 were not projects of liberal civic-mindedness, 
but attempts at the transformation of state political apparatuses. Admittedly, there is some 
ambiguity surrounding this point. But the most plausible explanation of Arendt’s position – 
given her many criticisms of the party system and her support for a new form of council 
system – is that her writings on the councils were directed towards imagining the 
transformation of the sovereign nation-state into a federal council state. 
 
However, this statement requires some qualification. I do not claim that Arendt intended her 
writings on the councils as a straightforward remedy to current democratic malaise. Arendt 
drew from a variety of different epochs, traditions, practices and institutions in her work from 
the ancient and modern world. To argue that Arendt proposed a simple model of democracy 
based entirely on the democratic councils would be an untenable reduction of the multiplicity 
of different perspectives from which Arendt addressed the problems of modern politics.62 
There is no single dominant source to which we must return in order to provide a blueprint for 
modern political institutions. Arendt’s retrieval of the councils is part of a strategy to disrupt 
modern triumphalist narratives and open a dialogue with the past in which we can engage 
with both the strengths and weaknesses of previous political experiences. A simple return to 
the councils as a model of politics would be an inadequate response to current pressing issues, 
just as Arendt’s political theory in itself does not provide a ready manual for democratic 
politics today. Instead, her argument for a council democracy serves as a critical lens through 
which we can constructively engage with contemporary democratic politics.  
 
 
Retrieving the Councils 
 
                                                
62 This thesis aims to focus specifically on the question of council democracy in Arendt’s work. This results in 
some major aspects of Arendt’s thought falling outside the scope of examination. One major omission is the 
philosophical influences of Heidegger and Jaspers on Arendt’s work. On the influence of Heidegger see Dana 
Villa, Arendt and Heidegger: The Fate of the Political (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997) 113–143. 
On the influence of Jaspers see Lewis P. Hinchman and Sandra K. Hinchman, “Existentialism Politicized: 
Arendt’s Debt to Jaspers,” The Review of Politics (1991) 53 (3), 435–468. 
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Arendt traces the origins of the council movement back to its forerunners in the townships 
and wards of pre-revolutionary America and the sociétés populaires of the French Revolution. 
Starting with these nascent grass-roots organisations, she narrates the rise and fall of the 
councils through the Paris Commune, the Russian and German revolutions and the 1956 
Hungarian Revolution.63 However, Arendt’s characterisation of the councils as emerging at 
the birth of modern politics in the French Revolution overstretches the historical reality of the 
council form. The majority of working examples of councils developed through the 
awakening of revolutionary hopes and a flurry of political activity during and in the aftermath 
of the First World War.64 As imperial forces collapsed during the two “red years” after the 
war, Europe was set ablaze with mass strikes, factory occupations, soldier mutinies and the 
strongest organisation of socialist forces since 1848.65 The councils arose in Russia, Germany, 
Austria, Hungary and Italy in a power vacuum left by crippled old regimes. They were 
bolstered by a wave of rising expectations for social and political transformation across 
Europe. Organising in opposition to capitalist alienation, authoritarian political control and 
the bureaucratic state, the councils were fiercely resisted by established institutions as a direct 
threat to their power.66 This emerging council movement represented the democratic impulses 
of the working class striving towards workers’ control over the production process and the 
formation of radically democratic political institutions. Although there were a number of 
different experiences of workers’ councils and a broad range of settings in which they arose, 
the classic image of council democracy was a pyramidal structure of voluntary associations 
organised through workplaces and barracks with a national executive council composed of 
directly elected and recallable delegates.67  
 
As innovative democratic organs of working-class struggle, the councils were remarkable 
institutions that deserve close attention in their own right. However, the question of council 
democracy has exercised little to no influence on mainstream democratic thought.68 This is 
                                                
63 Arendt, On Revolution, 254.	  
64 Oskar Anweiler, The Soviets: The Russian Workers, Peasants, and Soldiers Councils, 1905–1921 (New York: 
Pantheon Books, 1974) 5. 
65 Albert S. Lindemann, The Red Years: European Socialism Versus Bolshevism, 1919–1921 (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1974) xiii.	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67 In chapter two, I engage more thoroughly with historiographical debates concerning the structure and function 
of council institutions.	  
68 John Dryzek, “Democratic Political Theory,” in Gerald F. Gaus and Chandran Kukathas (eds.), Handbook of 
Political Theory (London: SAGE Publications, 2004) 143–154. There are still echoes of the ideal of council 
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surprising given its historical significance. In spite of their political defeat across the 
continent, the councils achieved remarkable lasting successes, including contributing to 
ending the First World War, bringing down the Russian and German monarchies, introducing 
the eight-hour workday and instituting women’s suffrage.69 They were the only institutions of 
the time that could genuinely be said to represent the interests of the working classes.70 They 
thereby facilitated the entrance of the workers as historical actors on the political stage in their 
own right. The councils symbolise one of the first attempts by the working classes to 
autonomously re-organise the structural conditions of their existence. As an institutional form, 
they provided an open and flexible organisational structure that promoted revolutionary 
initiative and adapted reasonably well to changing circumstances. Although the councils 
suffered from significant internal weaknesses and were ultimately unsuccessful in many of 
their political goals, both the accomplishments and the challenges of the councils provide 
useful material for reconsidering contemporary democratic practices. In neglecting the council 
movements, political theory risks failing to capitalise on the many resources available through 
a closer study of this significant historical period.  
 
As democracy continues to be hollowed out by a neoliberal rationality of governance, 
reflections on the democratic actions of the councils offer possible avenues of resistance to 
democracy’s erosion.71 The councils shed light on how to deepen and extend democratic 
values and practices in the face of institutional opposition and resistance. They serve as an 
example of how political collectives can mobilise to challenge entrenched power structures 
and implement a transformative democratic program in the interests of ordinary citizens. The 
councils’ significance for contemporary political theory resides in their role as transformative 
organs of democratisation that sought to introduce democratic conditions at the most 
fundamental level of social organisation. An analysis of these forms of democratic action 
inspires reflection on ways they could be reclaimed in the present.  
 
Drawing from Arendt, but going beyond the letter of her writings, I intend to deploy the 
councils as an historical exemplar in a specific sense. According to Arendt, an example is a 
                                                                                                                                                   
Participation and Democratic Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970); C. B. Macpherson, The 
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singular and concrete instantiation of a more general principle that cannot be explicitly 
formulated or determined as a rule.72 An historical act or event can be seen as an example 
containing an “exemplary validity,” a way “to see in the particular what is valid for more than 
one case.”73 An example is a particular that reveals a generality that can in no other way be 
defined – in the sense for Arendt that “courage is like Achilles.”74 Arendt’s appreciation of the 
force of examples has been built upon in the recent work of Aletta Norval, which I find 
instructive as guidance on the use of exemplarity within political theory.75 Turning to the 
writings of Jacques Rancière and Stanley Cavell, Norval articulates the two-fold disruptive 
and disclosive function of historical examples. On the one hand, examples serve as a critical 
tool against existing institutions, demonstrating the contingency of the current order and 
countering the effects of dominant political narratives.76 The demands raised by certain 
historical examples go beyond that which the present order can assimilate. Their role is to 
unsettle and provoke us. In this sense, the presentation of the striking differences between the 
council system and current forms of democratic politics reveals our troubling distance from a 
more substantive vision of political freedom and democracy. On the other hand, examples 
open up a new horizon of imagination and provide us with an expanded scope of the 
possibilities for transformation.77 Without losing their singular or historical character, 
examples represent concrete instances of different forms of action and organisation that 
nonetheless gesture beyond themselves and call for emulation in a non-imitative sense. Rather 
than consider the councils as a replicable organisational model for the present, an analysis of 
their political struggles provides guidance for how to transform contemporary democratic 
institutions. 
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Chapter Overview 
 
Chapter One reconsiders the position of council democracy in Hannah Arendt’s political 
theory. It traces the origins and development of the council system to two primary sources in 
Arendt’s work: a council communist tradition of Rosa Luxemburg and Arendt’s participation 
in Jewish politics in the 1930s and 1940s concerning different organisational forms of a 
Jewish homeland. I demonstrate the importance of this neglected aspect of Arendt’s political 
thought and reveal its significance in each of Arendt’s main texts. I claim that the Hungarian 
Revolution of 1956 marks a turning point in Arendt’s reflections on the councils and provides 
a practical confirmation of the continuing significance of the council form. Next, I scrutinise 
the contradictions of her apprehensive appropriation of the councils from the labour 
movement and explicate the reasons behind her complex disavowal of a socialist council 
tradition. The analysis reveals that Arendt’s republicanism undergoes a council communist 
inflection, which has not yet been fully appreciated. Her distinct variety of council 
republicanism emphasises the participatory and popularly empowered nature of council 
institutions. 
 
Chapter Two examines the historical context of the councils in order to reveal the biases of 
Arendt’s interpretation and situate her analysis within a richer historical portrait. Arendt 
writes a mythology of the councils, which distorts our understanding of them and gives rise to 
a need for a historical reassessment. I return to the political experiences of the councils 
through an account of their emergence in Russia and Germany amidst the political crisis of 
the immediate post-First World War period. These two case studies present valuable historical 
material relating to the political struggles of the councils and provide several important 
modifications to Arendt’s interpretation. While Arendt presents the council system as a new 
form of government, the councils were more frequently understood by participants as 
oppositional institutions that sought to control governing bodies and further the aims of the 
revolutionary movement. Contra Arendt, the councils also undertook extensive economic 
planning, social welfare activities and sought to democratise workplaces and barracks. 
 
Chapter Three addresses the idiosyncratic role Arendt’s concept of political “principles” plays 
in her attempt to retrieve lost experiences and meanings of politics. Arendt argues that 
 24 
attending to the importance of principles in politics offers new possibilities for reconnecting 
with the past and transforming contemporary practices. Arendtian principles contain a 
transformative potential insofar as they are able to disrupt modern narratives and open up a 
broader horizon of political ideas. I propose a new interpretive framework for understanding 
their political logic and the varied contexts within which they appear in Arendt’s work. 
Secondly, I reconstruct the three main principles of Arendt’s council system: political 
freedom, empowerment and federalism. In this way, I continue to develop my analysis of a 
radical democratic current in Arendt’s work by providing an interpretation of her political 
theory from the perspective of the council system. I argue that her purpose is to contribute to a 
debate over desirable forms of democratic government and to question the hegemony of 
current forms of liberal representative democracy. 
 
Chapter Four critically appraises Arendt’s institutional design of a council democracy. 
Arendt’s own institutional arrangements are most intelligible when viewed as a response to 
the perceived shortcomings of modern representative democracies. As a consequence, the 
chapter begins with Arendt’s critique of current democratic regimes. I then analyse Arendt’s 
institutional sketches and argue that the intended transformations of her council system are 
more radical and far-reaching than many of her interpreters have recognised. Arendt argues 
for the transformation of state institutions towards a federal council state. However, there are 
a number of tensions and contradictions in Arendt’s theoretical contributions. I pay particular 
attention to the Habermasian criticism of the practical implausibility of the councils in a 
complex modern society and Arendt’s ambiguous concept of political representation. I 
conclude that Arendt is not able to overcome several crucial contradictions that present 
themselves when attempting to conceptualise the practical functioning of her council system. 
 
Chapter Five reconsiders the historical role of council democracy and its relevance for 
contemporary democratic practices. The councils were exemplary of a form of democratic 
action in which council delegates attempted to equalise power relations between citizens and 
control political and economic elites. They extended democratic principles outside of the 
traditional sphere of liberal institutions into the workplace, army and bureaucracy. Central to 
this practice, I contend, was a concern for democratic forms of organisation in the economic 
sphere, which expands the horizons of what is traditionally considered relevant for liberal 
democracy. I contrast this mode of democratic action with two opposing poles of democratic 
theory: deliberative democracy and the democratic politics of Jacques Rancière.  
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Chapter 1: The Origins of the Council System 
 
 
The council system appears to some of Arendt’s interpreters as an unrealistic utopian schema 
that is little more than an aberration in her work. Of the many dismissive remarks from her 
commentators, it is Margaret Canovan that best captures the dominant view on Arendt’s 
writings on the council system: they “are something of an embarrassment, a curiously 
unrealistic commitment in someone who laid particular stress on realism in politics.”78 The 
councils are viewed as a utopian political project that is completely unworkable in practice. 
Perhaps such a system could have been possible in a small city-state such as Athens with 
slavery, restricted citizenship and a greater emphasis on public life, but it is certainly not 
feasible in our complex post-industrial societies. Benhabib concurs, “Hannah Arendt’s model 
is flawed, because more often than not, it seems to fly in the face of the realities of the 
modern world.”79 As a result, the significance for Arendt of the council system has been 
largely ignored within Arendt scholarship. The concentration of Arendt’s main references to 
the council system in her later work, namely, in the final chapter of On Revolution and in an 
interview published in Crises of the Republic, has enabled interpreters to dismiss this 
institutional proposal as an afterthought, a failed attempt to translate theoretical insights into a 
practical institutional proposal. Ultimately, such interpretations are possible because of a lack 
of an adequate understanding of the importance of the council system to Arendt’s political 
theory. It has appeared to some critics that Arendt’s councils are a misguided attempt to 
transform the experiences of Athenian democracy or the Roman Republic into modern 
institutions.80 Such a line of interpretation reads Arendt’s discussion of the council system in 
On Revolution as an attempt to imagine under modern conditions her predominantly Greek 
conception of political action presented in The Human Condition.81 In order to counter this 
received view, in this chapter I analyse the origins and development of the idea of a council 
system in Arendt’s work and reveal its connections to broader political traditions. 
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There are two primary sources for Arendt’s early conception of the council system. Most 
crucially, it is connected with a council communist tradition of Rosa Luxemburg that she is 
exposed to as a child and to which she was then reintroduced through her husband, Heinrich 
Blücher. It is from modern workers’ struggles rather than ancient Athens that Arendt draws 
her main examples of council systems.82 Secondly, Arendt comes to the idea of the councils 
through her participation in Jewish politics in the 1930s and 1940s. This can be seen both 
from her practical experiences of kibbutzim on a trip to Palestine in 1935 and in her 
theoretical engagement with the political problems of different organisational forms of a 
Jewish homeland. By the late 1940s the idea of a federal, locally-based council system as the 
theoretically most defensible form of politics for modern societies is firmly established in her 
thought. The councils can be read as implicitly contained in her analysis of totalitarianism as a 
second and parallel “new form of government” alongside totalitarian forms, which could be 
added to the theoretical tradition of Western politics. The complete failure of her proposal for 
a Jewish homeland and the ensuing war following the creation of a Jewish nation-state left 
Arendt in despair about the possibilities of modern politics. However, the Hungarian 
Revolution of 1956 marks a turning point in Arendt’s conception of the council system. The 
spontaneous emergence of revolutionary councils immediately following the breakdown of 
the old communist regime provides Arendt’s vision with a practical confirmation of the 
continuing significance of the council form. Arendt writes in enthusiastic support of the 
nascent institutions developed by the Hungarian revolutionaries on the anniversary of the 
uprising.83 This event also provides Arendt with the inspiration for a broader theoretical 
project. In On Revolution, Arendt narrates the history of modern politics as a struggle between 
the embattled council system and what she terms “the party system.” The council system is 
placed within a framework of revolution and political freedom stretching back to the French 
and American revolutions. She offers a history and defence of the council system, evocatively 
describing its heroic struggle and tragic demise at the hands of the party system throughout 
the modern period.  
 
However, Arendt’s project of a retrieval of the council system is marked by a basic 
contradiction that runs throughout her work. Arendt attempts to deracinate the council system 
from its theoretical roots in Marxism and its deep connections to working class struggles. 
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While Arendt must rely on the labour movement for nearly all of her examples of practical 
realisations of councils, she simultaneously attempts to extract them from their socialist 
origins and to overlook their economic functions. Using Luxemburg as her key figure, Arendt 
seeks to read the history of the councils from a republican rather than a socialist perspective. 
She turns to the popular societies of the French Revolution and to Jefferson’s late writings on 
a republic of wards as anticipating the council form of the early twentieth century. The 
councils’ economic activities are ignored or declared counterproductive and ineffective. 
Jefferson, rather than Pannekoek, becomes the paradigmatic theorist in her development of 
the council form.84 However, Arendt’s strategy of reading down and excluding undesirable 
elements from her account is not entirely successful. She is forced at a number of points 
throughout her work to confront the councils’ joint economic and political functions and their 
persistent socialist intentions and goals.85 The councils thus represent an exemplary moment 
of the failure of Arendt’s attempts to enforce a separation of politics from socio-economic 
concerns. Interpreted along strictly Arendtian lines, we distort and misunderstand the tradition 
of the councils.86 Arendt grasps the councils as a source for the rejuvenation of democratic 
agency, but she unduly restricts their sphere of operation. Instead of writing her own tradition 
of the council system, Arendt would have done better to listen more attentively to the voices 
and experiences of the political actors themselves. To fill this lacuna, in the next chapter I 
undertake a historical re-examination of the councils to provide a more grounded analysis of 
their structure and goals. 
 
 
Heinrich Blücher and the Council Tradition 
 
There is a strong claim for the profound influence that “Arendt’s Socrates,” her husband 
Heinrich Blücher, had over the development of her political thought.87 Arendt writes to her 
friend and mentor, Karl Jaspers, that it was from Blücher that she “learned to think 
politically.”88 Until Arendt met Blücher in 1936, she had been primarily concerned with “the 
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Jewish Question.”89 It was Blücher who turned her attention to revolutionary politics and gave 
her a renewed interest in Marx, Lenin and Trotsky, as well as the writings of one of Blücher’s 
former comrades, Rosa Luxemburg.90 Young-Bruehl surmises from the available evidence 
that “the stories he told her of his political past shaped her vision, both critical and 
constructive, her understanding of resistance and revolution, and her theory of 
republicanism.”91 This critical influence of Blücher is often quickly passed over and 
diminished in conservative readings of Arendt. Margaret Canovan merely points to an early 
“radical populist orientation” in Arendt’s writings prior to 1950 and emphasises that Arendt 
herself was never a Marxist.92 But with the publication of their correspondence, we have 
reason to believe that the influence of Blücher went much deeper. Arendt herself notes that 
“in marriage it is not easy to tell the partners’ thoughts apart.”93 Blücher was a member of the 
Spartakusbund, which following the Russian Revolution began advocating for the political 
organisation of workers’ councils in Germany on the model of the Russian soviets. After the 
failure of the Spartacist Uprising and the murder of Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht, 
Blücher remained a member of the German Communist Party (KPD) in a minority faction that 
defended the strategy of workers’ councils against the growing intrusion of centralising forces 
from Moscow.94 The organisational form of local, “bottom-up” workers’ councils remained 
an integral part of Blücher’s politics. His account of the separation of the leadership of the 
party from the grass-roots councils had a lasting effect on Arendt. Young-Bruehl states that: 
 
The decline and fall of the German Communist party, as Blücher recounted it, provided Hannah Arendt 
with a clear image – one she never failed to refer to – of what any revolution cannot be without: 
spontaneously organized, locally based councils or Räte, which are controlled neither by existing party 
councils – in this case, those of the Social Democratic party – nor any external, foreign organizations, in 
this case the Moscow party.95  
 
Blücher’s stories of his involvement in these events would have been powerful for Arendt as 
they evoked her own experiences as a young girl. Arendt’s family home during the First 
World War was a meeting place for enthusiastic political discussion among her parents’ social 
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democratic friends. Although many of these were opposed to the more radical Spartacus 
League, Arendt’s mother was a great admirer of Rosa Luxemburg. Arendt’s mother took her 
to the discussions of the Königsberg circle about the Spartacist Uprising of early 1919, 
informing her daughter, “you must pay attention, this is a historical moment!”96  
 
Blücher’s experience in revolutionary politics opened Arendt to a theoretical tradition of 
overlapping and intertwined radical Left tendencies including council communism, anarcho-
syndicalism and revolutionary socialism. However, Arendt’s relationship to this tradition is 
complex as it involves a simultaneous dependence and disavowal.97 While Arendt must turn 
to the revolutionary tradition for the majority of practical examples of functioning council 
systems, she retains a great ambivalence towards their Marxist ideology and their deep 
concern with economic and social issues. When Arendt details the concrete political forms of 
the council system in On Revolution, the examples she refers to are all workers’ movements: 
the Parisian Commune of 1871, the 1905 Russian Revolution, the February 1917 Russian 
Revolution, the 1918-1919 revolution in Germany, in which she includes the soldiers’ and 
workers’ councils in Berlin and the short-lived Bavarian Räterepublik, and lastly, the 
Hungarian 1956 Revolution.98 It is within a working class tradition that the council system 
has received its most thorough theoretical explorations and its most viable practical forms. 
However, at every turn she attempts to limit or read down both the role of workers as a class 
and the economic nature of their activity in the councils. The clearest example of this is in her 
analysis of the labour movement in The Human Condition, which will be discussed below. 
 
Furthermore, Arendt turns a blind eye to theoretical discussions of workers’ councils within 
the revolutionary tradition. For Arendt to claim that the emergence of council systems has “no 
tradition” and that it has been “neglected to the point of oblivion” is disingenuous, since by 
the time she was writing On Revolution there was a relatively small but significant body of 
literature on the council system.99 For instance, it was not difficult for the student and 
workers’ movements of the late 1960s to immediately connect their own struggles with those 
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of the 1917–1919 era and look to the council system for guidance.100 For a study that appears 
to be an analysis and defence of the council system, the final chapter of On Revolution 
contains surprisingly few references to the literature within the revolutionary tradition, which, 
contra Arendt, has incorporated the council form into its political thought, albeit in a minor 
tendency. The writings of Antonio Gramsci, Karl Korsch, Anton Pannekoek and Otto Rühle, 
to name but a few of the central thinkers, remain noticeably absent from Arendt’s 
bibliography.101 Arendt makes passing reference to the anarchists, Proudhon and Bakunin, 
only to summarily dismiss them as “singularly unequipped” to adequately conceptualise the 
council system.102 The problem with Arendt’s reading is not only that it distorts our 
understanding of the council tradition, but also that it prevents a more thorough engagement 
with this tradition that would draw from its resources and lead to a richer and more sustained 
debate. It is possible that Arendt was perhaps unaware of the depth of the writings on the 
council form, but what is more likely is that she deliberately avoided making reference to 
them so that she could recast the council system in a non-Marxist form. To be sure, Arendt 
attempts a double move. First, she fails to note the socialist literature on the councils, which 
enables her to write her own history unencumbered by the revolutionary socialist tradition. In 
a second step, she pushes the council system back to the revolutionary era of America and 
France, making Jefferson its first, and perhaps most illustrious, spokesperson. This minimises 
the socialist influence by shifting attention away from Marxist theorists and transforming the 
socialist workers’ councils of the 1917–1919 period into merely one instance of a broader 
movement of “ward republics” and “town hall meetings” throughout the modern era. 
 
For her analysis of the practical functioning of the council system Arendt relied heavily on 
Oskar Anweiler’s study, Die Rätebewegung in Russland 1905–1921.103 Her references and 
bibliography reveal that Anweiler’s text was Arendt’s main, almost solitary, source for the 
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history of the council system, a study to which she declared herself “much indebted.”104 Some 
of Anweiler’s methodological choices and political commitments help explain aspects of 
Arendt’s own position. However, Arendt also departs from Anweiler’s interpretation, 
extracting the council system from its history of class struggle. Firstly, Anweiler isolates the 
council system as a unique and independent form of government with its own principles and 
history, distinguishing between the emergence of the soviets on the one hand and Bolshevism 
as a political ideology on the other. This distinction enables Arendt to be simultaneously pro-
council system and anti-Bolshevik. She is able to hold on to the councils as an institutional 
form in spite of their later transformation by the Bolshevik Party.105 This demarcation is 
important for Arendt, who continuously emphasises that the council system represented an 
entirely new form of government and a distinct political phenomenon. Although Anweiler’s 
study is primarily concerned with the Russian councils, he identifies a more general concept 
of the councils, a “Rätegedanken” that is not limited to its particular manifestation in Russia. 
Anweiler defines the basic principle of the council system to be the “striving towards a 
possible direct, broad and unrestricted participation of individuals in public life.”106 This 
principle of participation in public life is essential to how Arendt understands political 
freedom and explains why she believes it is so adequately embodied in the council system. In 
addition, Anweiler provides three characteristics that are shared by all councils: their 
commitment to a determinate and repressed social class, their radical democratic form and 
their origins in revolutionary uprisings.107 Of the three, Arendt subscribes only to the latter 
two. She does not view the councils as representing a particular class. Instead, she argues for 
the participation of all citizens in the council system. In this way, she replaces a politics of 
class struggle with one of democratic republicanism. Anweiler also presents three different 
types of councils that have arisen in modern societies: councils as organs of “the people” 
organised as a state authority, temporary revolutionary councils, and workers’ councils. In On 
Revolution Arendt almost exclusively discusses the first, emphasising that the type of council 
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to which she refers is a permanent organ of government and not a temporary formation or a 
more limited expression of class interests. Throughout his study, Anweiler highlights the 
political over the economic nature of the councils, disregarding the important economic role 
that they played. This perspective allows Arendt to further marginalise the economic aspects 
of the councils in her own interpretation. Anweiler also portrays Marx and Lenin as betrayers 
of the council system insofar as they held lofty ideals of council systems in theory but in 
practice treated them as mere temporary organs of the revolution. This is a position that 
Arendt develops in her discussion of the fraught relationship between Marxism and the 
councils. In addition to Anweiler’s study, Arendt’s other main source within the tradition is 
the writings of Rosa Luxemburg, which Arendt knew well and referred to a number of times 
throughout her career. Luxemburg is an important figure in Arendt’s relationship to the 
council system because her reading of Luxemburg is emblematic of her treatment of the entire 
council communist tradition. 
 
 
Arendt and Luxemburg 
 
Arendt sees a kindred spirit in Rosa Luxemburg, a pariah and moral dissenter who was 
passionately committed to public affairs and political freedom.108 For Arendt, Luxemburg was 
a pivotal historical figure whose death in 1919 marked the transition between two eras in 
Germany. Her death signified the failure of the German Communist Party and the moral and 
political decline of the Left. More so than any other individual of the period, Arendt considers 
Luxemburg to represent the institutional proposal of the council system. In November 1918, 
Luxemburg’s reflections on strategic and organisational questions led her to support workers’ 
and soldiers’ councils as the best model of revolutionary class struggle.109 As a leading 
member of the Spartakusbund, Luxemburg argued in their manifesto that “the first step” in 
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any future revolution “will be the formation of workers and soldiers’ councils.”110 Her failure 
to gain significant recognition either as a political theorist or politician is, for Arendt, 
representative of the failure of the council system and the dissipation of the revolutionary 
spirit. Her death is particularly striking in this regard since she is killed not by the Right, but 
while interned under the watch of the Social Democratic Party – a metaphor for the crushing 
of the local and spontaneous organising of the masses by the party system. In spite of 
Arendt’s critical stance towards the Marxist tradition, there is a surprising confluence between 
the two thinkers. They share a faith in the political capacities of ordinary citizens and a 
vigorous critique of attempts to replace active participation with the representative claims of 
an elite. They are also both critical of the institutions of liberal democracy for failing to 
enable participation and promote public freedom. Although this connection has not received 
much attention in the scholarly literature, Arendt’s strong affinity with Luxemburg was noted 
by many of her contemporaries. In a roundtable discussion with Arendt in 1967, Chomsky 
remarked on a certain “Luxemburgian and anarchist conception” of politics that “apparently 
Dr. Arendt and I agree about.”111 The similarities should not be overstated, however, as there 
is a limit to how far Arendt could be described as some kind of Luxemburgian. Luxemburg 
remained committed to a program of revolutionary socialism in which a revolutionary party 
played a strategic leadership role in organising the masses towards the transformation of 
capitalist relations of production into a democratically controlled socialist economy. Arendt 
draws from Luxemburg, in particular on the points of popular participation and the 
institutional model of the councils, but the elements of class struggle, party leadership and 
socialist objectives remain absent from Arendt’s politics.  
 
Luxemburg can be placed at a pivotal moment in the development of Arendt’s thought. The 
narrative structure of the last chapter of On Revolution makes it appear that the council 
system is ultimately derived from the American revolutionary experience and the writings of 
Thomas Jefferson, which is then followed by the French Revolution, the Parisian Commune 
and 20th century revolutions.112 However, in terms of its theoretical origins in Arendt’s 
thought, the order needs to be reversed. There is both a chronological and conceptual priority 
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of Luxemburg over Jefferson in Arendt’s understanding of the council system. Firstly, it was 
through reflecting on Luxemburg’s The Russian Revolution that Arendt conceived of the 
project of On Revolution and came to the idea of a thorough reading of the American 
Founding Fathers.113 Secondly, it was the theoretical schema of Luxemburg’s analysis that 
gave Arendt the rough outline of her argument and established the framework within which it 
would develop. Arendt’s analysis of the division between the government and the people, the 
representatives and the represented, and the leadership and the membership of a movement 
are taken from reflections on the failure of the 1919 uprising and Luxemburg’s theories, 
rather than directly from the experiences of the American Revolution.114  
 
The structure of Arendt’s argument in the last chapter of On Revolution indicates a strong 
Luxemburgian influence on her work. In her analysis of the position of the councils in modern 
political thought, Arendt avoids establishing the typical East versus West paradigm of her 
time, which would involve a dichotomy between communism and liberal democracy. Instead, 
Arendt demonstrates that there are aspects unconducive to freedom within both communist 
and liberal democratic regimes. The true opposition for Arendt is not between the liberal 
freedom of democracy and the dictatorship of communism. Rather, it is between the 
bureaucracy, centralism and paternalism of the party system (both liberal democratic and 
communist) and the democratic participatory model of the council system. This schema can 
be seen as a reflection of Luxemburg’s final chapter of The Russian Revolution in which she 
highlights the false dichotomy of “democracy or dictatorship” presented by both the reformist 
democrats (Kautsky) and the Russian communists (Lenin, Trotsky). The former support 
bourgeois democracy and forever push the possibility of a socialist revolution into the future, 
while the latter reject the empty formalities of democracy and demand a dictatorship of the 
party in order to achieve socialism. For Arendt, Luxemburg’s choice of “dictatorship over 
democracy” must be understood not as a rejection of democratic principles, but as a demand 
for their radical extension beyond the limits of liberal bourgeois democracy. Although they 
differ in their understanding of how democracy should be radicalised, they agree on the 
inadequacies of liberal democratic institutions for the effective participation of citizens in 
public life. Their democratic politics call for the deepening of democracy through the active 
participation of the masses in political institutions. 
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Of particular importance for Arendt was Luxemburg’s defence of the core democratic 
principles of civil liberties and free speech against their suppression by the Bolshevik Party. A 
critical turning point of the Russian Revolution for Luxemburg was in the Bolshevik’s 
decision to dissolve the Constituent Assembly, which in her eyes had been based on “the most 
democratic suffrage in the world.”115 To reject the peoples’ representatives in this assembly 
and to institute illiberal and repressive measures such as banning free speech, the freedom of 
association and a free press was unjustifiable for Luxemburg because “the only way to a 
rebirth is the school of public life itself, the most unlimited, the broadest democracy and 
public opinion.”116 If it could be said that the institutions no longer represented the will of the 
people, the true question is why could new elections not be called. For Luxemburg, the path 
to socialism must be based upon the extension rather than the reduction of liberal rights 
available in bourgeois democracies. 
 
Without general elections, without unrestricted freedom of press and assembly, without a free struggle 
of opinion, life dies out in every public institution, becomes a mere semblance of life, in which only the 
bureaucracy remains as the active element. Public life gradually falls asleep, a few dozen party leaders 
of inexhaustible energy and boundless experience direct and rule.117 
 
The crucial ingredient is “the active participation of the masses” through which the “social 
inequality and lack of freedom hidden under the sweet shell of formal equality and freedom” 
would be overcome and bourgeois democracy would be transformed into a socialist 
democracy.118 What Luxemburg refers to as the dictatorship of the proletariat is in fact “the 
most active, unlimited participation of the mass of the people, of unlimited democracy.”119 All 
of this will only be possible “subjected to the control of complete public activity; it must arise 
out of the growing political training of the mass of the people.”120 While there are good 
reasons to doubt Arendt’s revolutionary credentials,121 she does draw extensively from 
Luxemburg’s politics of mass participation, independent political action and spontaneous 
forms of organisation. Additionally, in spite of her criticisms of representative democracy, 
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Arendt refuses to reject the basic principles of constitutional guarantees and civil rights. For 
Arendt, civil rights were not to be taken for granted, for “the distance between tyranny and 
constitutional, limited government is as great as, perhaps greater than, the distance between 
limited government and freedom.”122 However, the negative liberties of liberal representative 
democracies are not the same as the active participation of individuals in a council system. 
She stressed that there “should be no reason for us to mistake civil rights for political 
freedom.”123 
 
Luxemburg’s most important contribution to political theory for Arendt is the claim that 
political action precedes and creates political organisation and not vice versa. It relates to an 
insight into the necessity of the active participation of the masses within democratic 
institutions in order to retain their strength and vitality. Luxemburg learns from the Russian 
Revolution of 1905 and the soviets that the organisation of revolutionary activity cannot be 
directed by party officials and handed down to passive rank and file members. The demand 
for action must come from below through the workers organising themselves into 
participatory institutions in which they can act. The most effective and robust institutions are 
created through political action and are a direct result of its labour. Although political action 
precedes institutions, Luxemburg does not wish to dissolve all democratic representative 
institutions into a more fluid movement that could be directed by a party elite. Active 
organisations will require some form of representation so that large groups of people can co-
ordinate action through delegates. Luxemburg defends the “mechanism of democratic 
institutions” and is critical of Trotsky’s claim of “the inadequacy of any popular 
representation whatsoever.”124 What distinguishes good democratic institutions from non-
democratic ones is the degree to which they are able to represent the views of those they 
claim to represent. In Luxemburg’s view, democratic institutions should be infused with the 
spirit and the will of the people and be responsive to their demands. Luxemburg counters 
Trotsky’s criticisms of the Russian Constituent Assembly as unrepresentative of the current 
revolutionary mood of the people by stating that while no human institution is perfect, 
democratic institutions possess a powerful corrective, namely “the living movement of the 
masses, their unending pressure. And the more democratic the institutions, the livelier and 
stronger the pulse-beat of the political life of the masses, the more direct and complete is their 
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influence.”125 Luxemburg expresses the radical democratic desire to have a close relationship 
between democratic institutions and the people they represent in which ordinary citizens 
remain passionately connected with public life and involved in the public affairs of their 
community. She imagines institutions which house the political energies of their people and 
facilitate engagement and participation such that “the living fluid of the popular mood 
continuously flows around the representative bodies, penetrates them, guides them.”126 
 
Arendt’s reading of Luxemburg is symptomatic of her stance on the council tradition as a 
whole. Although she draws on many of Luxemburg’s ideas, she reads Luxemburg as a 
republican rather than a socialist. Arendt attempts to drive a wedge between Marx and 
Luxemburg, arguing that Luxemburg’s theoretical criticisms of orthodox Marxism suggest 
that “it might be doubted that she was a Marxist at all.”127 Relating to her practical activities, 
Arendt argues that “her involvement with European politics outside the immediate interests of 
the working class, and hence completely beyond the horizon of all Marxists” is due to what 
Arendt views as her “repeated insistence on a ‘republican program.’”128 Arendt seeks to save 
Luxemburg from certain aspects of Marxist ideology and recoup her for Arendt’s own 
republican project. Arendt argues that it is the issue of republicanism that “separated her most 
decisively from all others.”129 This is an unusual claim given the repeated references to 
Marxism, revolutionary socialism and class struggle throughout Luxemburg’s work. It is true 
that Luxemburg, like Marx, Engels and most other revolutionaries, stood for a democratic 
republic against forms of monarchism, but this was as a means for carrying out class struggle 
and pursuing the ultimate goal of a transformation from capitalism to socialism.130  
 
Arendt’s assertion that republicanism was “one of the main points of her famous 
Juniusbroschüre” is not defensible.131 Luxemburg describes the essay, which became the 
manifesto for the Spartacus League, as the “socialist programme of the proletariat.”132 The 
few moments at which republicanism is mentioned are mainly in relation to bourgeois France 
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and could hardly be counted as evidence against Luxemburg’s entire corpus of revolutionary 
socialism. Luxemburg was no orthodox Marxist, but to describe her as a republican (and not 
also a Marxist/socialist) is to distort the clear historical evidence of her commitment to 
revolutionary socialism. Arendt places much emphasis on Luxemburg’s rejection of orthodox 
Marxist economics, arguing that on this point she could be distinguished from others in the 
Marxist camp. Luxemburg’s The Accumulation of Capital, which Arendt drew from in her 
analysis of imperialism in Origins, argues that capitalist growth is dependent on continual 
primitive accumulation from pre-capitalist economies, which results in capitalism being able 
to sustain its growth and not collapse on its own accord, at least not until it has exploited the 
entire world of its resources. In one sense, this is a revision of Marx’s thesis of the internal 
contradictions of capitalism and its inevitable collapse according to the irrationality of its own 
logic. However, Luxemburg saw this as a correction rather than a rejection of Marxism 
altogether. Arendt underestimates the extent to which Luxemburg, despite her criticisms of 
aspects of Marx’s economic theses, remains steadfastly committed to most of his political 
program. Luxemburg is a revolutionary socialist who, in a speech shortly before her death, 
stated that “the immediate task of the proletariat is to make socialism a living reality and to 
destroy capitalism root and branch.” She called for mass participation in class struggle in 
which her party would be “once more advancing under [Marx’s] flag.”133 
 
The contradictions evident in Arendt’s reading of Luxemburg are indicative of a thinker torn 
between an attraction to valuable insights and a deep suspicion of what undercurrents may lie 
beneath the surface. Arendt’s unfinished project that she began after Origins was entitled 
“The Totalitarian Elements in Marxism” and it is undoubtedly the case that Arendt’s 
misgivings about Marx influenced her reading of Luxemburg. Indeed, it was precisely 
because of certain undesirable aspects of Luxemburg’s work that Arendt ultimately turns to 
the American Founding Fathers and places Jefferson rather than Luxemburg as the 
centrepiece of the final chapter of On Revolution. In a passage that would have struck Arendt 
as greatly concerning, Luxemburg explains the inner compulsion of a revolution:  
 
The “golden mean” cannot be maintained in any revolution. The law of its nature demands a quick 
decision: either the locomotive drives forward full steam ahead to the most extreme point of the 
historical ascent, or it rolls back of its own weight again to the starting point at the bottom; and those 
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who would keep it with their weak powers half way up the hill, it drags down with it irredeemably into 
the abyss.134 
 
Nothing could be more foreign to Arendt’s thought, or more problematic, given her ideas of 
the freedom and spontaneity of human action and her concern that automatic natural forces 
threaten to overwhelm human affairs. But in spite of passages like this, Arendt maintains a 
deep respect for Luxemburg. She has a certain romantic sympathy for her and an admiration 
for her passion for politics and her commitment to the public realm. Arendt’s political theory 
remains indebted to Luxemburg and the council communist tradition. Her theory of the 
council system is, in substance, far more Luxemburgian than the conservative republican 
leanings of the American tradition. It is evident from the above discussion that Luxemburg’s 
legacy leaves a series of ambiguous traces in Arendt’s work. While Arendt’s preference for a 
territorially-based rather than a workplace-based division of councils brings her closer to 
Jefferson, her support for insurgent and spontaneous political action is more appropriately 
connected to the revolutionary socialist tradition. Her attempts at wedding the council 
tradition with a history of republicanism draw Arendt far closer to a Luxemburgian position 
than many of her interpreters, or perhaps even Arendt herself, would care to admit. 
  
 
Councils in a Jewish Homeland 
 
During this same period, Arendt’s thought was also strongly affected by her involvement in 
Jewish politics.135 From her work with Youth Aliyah in Paris in the 1930s to her political 
writing in America in the 1940s, Arendt grappled with the possibility of founding a new state 
in Palestine where her people could establish their homeland.136 For Arendt, this state was 
never to be modelled on the example of the nation-states of Europe, which she so vehemently 
criticised in The Origins of Totalitarianism. The question of which form this state would take 
led Arendt to contemplate some of the central practical problems of the operation of political 
institutions in the modern world. Her preferred option throughout the 1940s, influenced by the 
writings of Judah Magnes, was the model of a bi-national, federal state composed of local 
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councils in which Arabs and Jews would enjoy equal political and civil rights. Her writings of 
this period, particularly in the late 1940s, are revealing because they demonstrate that even in 
the face of the harsh reality of deep disagreement and opposing political forces, Arendt still 
viewed a federal council system as the most desirable institutional model. 
 
Arendt’s first recorded tentative steps towards a federal council system can be found in her 
trip to Palestine in 1935. Working for Youth Aliyah, Arendt was charged with accompanying 
a group of students to Palestine on a trip during which she witnessed the operation of Jewish 
kibbutzim. These communities made a great impression on Arendt, who years later described 
them as “the most promising of all social experiments made in the twentieth century, as well 
as the most magnificent part of the Jewish homeland.”137 Young-Bruehl states that Arendt 
“praised the new communities she had visited” as “she saw in these communities political 
experiments she admired and supported.”138 The kibbutzim are local, democratic and 
egalitarian communities of individuals who live and work together with strong elements of 
socialist and Zionist ideology. Although these were on a relatively small-scale, the kibbutzim 
were attempts at an alternative model of social and political organisation. The particular 
conditions under which they gestated allowed them to “realize new laws … new institutions,” 
since they were “unhampered by any government” and “undisturbed by the more noxious 
ideologies of our times.”139 A decade on, Arendt continued to see political possibilities in 
these institutions, arguing that they were not simply of local significance, but may well offer 
“hope of solutions that will be acceptable and applicable” to “the large mass of men 
everywhere whose dignity and very humanity are in our time so seriously threatened by the 
pressures of modern life and its unsolved problems.”140 Even amidst the darkness of the 
Second World War and the continuing dangers of totalitarianism, Arendt viewed the 
kibbutzim as pointing towards the principles and outlines of an alternative form of political 
life.  
 
However, Arendt also expressed doubts about the many shortcomings of these communities. 
Her major criticism related to their inwardness, closure and lack of interest in international 
politics or the broader struggle of their people. She argued that the pioneers were “completely 
content within the small circle where they could realize their ideals for themselves” and did 
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not attempt to influence Jewish politics or do anything to prevent the growing waves of 
Jewish terrorism against the local Arab population.141 In a letter to Mary McCarthy, Arendt 
recalls her “first reaction” to the kibbutzim: they were “a new aristocracy” who were too pure 
for the messy reality of politics. They preferred to work towards their lofty ideals within small 
utopian communities, remaining oblivious to the broader political landscape.142 In a more 
pessimistic mindset she chastises the “unpolitical character of the new movement” and 
laments their failure to translate social transformation into political gains.143 Yet, when 
searching for political alternatives, she still retains much admiration and respect for the 
unrealised possibilities of what the kibbutzim could have achieved if implemented on a larger 
scale and with a more politically minded ideology. 
 
Upon migrating to the United States in 1941, Arendt attempted to influence the direction of 
Jewish politics through her numerous essays and columns. In two important essays of the 
period, “Zionism Reconsidered” and “To Save the Jewish Homeland,” Arendt considered the 
possible forms in which the Jewish people could organise their collective political existence. 
The most important influence on this aspect of Arendt’s work were the efforts of Judah 
Magnes, an American Jew and President of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, who worked 
tirelessly towards greater Jewish and Arab understanding and peace in the region. Magnes’ 
essay, “Toward Peace in Palestine,” published in January 1943 in Foreign Affairs, struck a 
chord with Arendt’s conception of the Palestinian problem.144 Magnes proposed a bi-national 
solution to the conflict whereby the competing claims of a specifically Jewish or Arab 
Palestine were both rejected in favour of a confederation in which both people would enjoy 
complete civil and political equality. The cornerstone of this proposal was a series of 
associated economic and political federations beginning with a bi-national Palestine and 
extending up to a union of Arab nations, and finally, an agreement between this union and an 
Anglo-American union as part of a greater association of free nations. Magnes remained a 
minority voice on the issue and his Ikhud Party, founded in August 1942 in Palestine, failed to 
have a significant influence on the direction of Jewish politics. Arendt approved of Magnes’ 
rejection of nineteenth century ideals of nationalism and the nation-state but thought that his 
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idea of an agreement with an Anglo-American alliance and an imposed solution by the United 
States were politically problematic.145 The establishment of a Jewish state against the will of 
the Arab population in the region would make it impossible for the state to continue to exist 
without a large amount of ongoing political and financial support from abroad, which would 
most likely lead to conflict and war.146 
 
In “Zionism Reconsidered” Arendt asserts that with the decline of the nation-state the 
political organisation of the Jewish people will likely be a choice between federations and 
empires.147 The former, Arendt believed, is the only real option that avoids a possible 
resurgence of the dangers of imperialism and gives small peoples like the Jews “a reasonably 
fair chance for survival.”148 In this essay, Arendt connects the idea of federalism with the 
political structure of the United States and argues that it represents a different political model 
than the European system of nation-states. For this reason, Arendt believed that the influence 
of American Jews would be essential for the survival of the Jewish people and would avoid 
the dominance of a petty nationalism in the emigrants to Palestine. In her influential study of 
Arendt, Margaret Canovan argues that Arendt’s interest in the American Founding Fathers 
can be dated to at least 1955.149 It is likely that the importance of the principle of federalism 
emerges even earlier, in the early 1940s, through her reflections on the rise of imperialist and 
totalitarian elements in Western politics and in her considerations of the future political 
organisation of a Jewish commonwealth.150 After reading Magnes’ article on a solution to the 
Palestinian problem, Arendt traced the federal principle back to the writings of James 
Madison who saw it naturally arising in pre-revolutionary America and believed it to be 
crucial for the foundation of large republics. The influence of the American federal political 
tradition became important to Magnes’ and Arendt’s reflections on the possibilities for 
Palestine, to such a degree that in a 1948 article for Commentary, Magnes came to call the 
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proposed confederation the “United States of Palestine.”151 It is in this period that one can 
trace the origins of the significance of federalism for Arendt’s conception of a federal council 
system. 
 
Arendt’s most sustained reflections on the political form of a Jewish commonwealth are 
found in her 1948 article, “To Save the Jewish Homeland,” written following the declaration 
of the state of Israel by the United Nations. She supports Magnes’ model of a federal state as 
the most preferable solution, but adds to this one crucial ingredient: local councils. These 
councils, modelled on the twentieth century workers’ councils of Luxemburg’s era and the 
Jewish kibbutzim already existing in Palestine, are Arendt’s main contribution to Magnes’ 
proposal. Arendt argues that “a federated structure, moreover, would have to rest on Jewish-
Arab community councils, which would mean that the Jewish-Arab conflict would be 
resolved on the lowest and most promising level of proximity and neighborliness.”152 Arendt 
emphasises the benefits of decentralisation, community participation in public affairs and 
bottom-up forms of political organisation. These institutions create conditions on the ground 
for greater co-operation and a reduction of feelings of mutual hostility and suspicion. To this 
she adds: “a federated state, finally, could be the natural stepping-stone for any later, greater 
federated structure in the Near East and the Mediterranean area.”153 Agreeing with Magnes’ 
earlier suggestion, Arendt envisions a Palestinian federal political body as forming part of a 
broader network of associations, moving up to a regional and finally to an international 
level.154 She concurs with Magnes’ life-long belief in the importance of the intermingling and 
co-operation of Arab and Jewish communities in Palestine and imagines that community 
councils could provide a practical means by which such co-operation could be carried out. As 
her final of five key “axioms” for a solution to the conflict, Arendt recommends that “local 
self-government and mixed Jewish-Arab municipal and rural councils, on a small scale and as 
numerous as possible, are the only realistic political measures that can eventually lead to the 
political emancipation of Palestine.”155 Arendt places great weight on the political 
possibilities inherent in the local council form. Her proposition anticipates her later emphasis 
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of Jefferson’s proposal to divide the American republic into wards in order to ensure the 
political freedom of its citizens.156 
 
Arendt worked in close collaboration with Judah Magnes during 1948, serving as the 
chairperson of an American organisation established by Magnes for lobbying American 
politicians and the United Nations.157 But after the assassination by Israeli terrorists of the UN 
mediator in Palestine, Count Bernadotte, and the shock of Magnes’ death on 27 October 1948, 
Arendt’s involvement in Jewish politics greatly diminished. She noted that she had neither the 
inclinations nor the abilities of a political actor. At this point, Arendt also witnessed the swift 
decline of the possibility of anything like a bi-national or federal state in Palestine.158 Her 
writings on a council system during this period remain important because they demonstrate 
how, at a crucial period in the development of Palestinian politics, Arendt held out the council 
system as a practical alternative to the principle of state sovereignty and partition. Local, 
participatory and radically democratic experiments in Palestine were the kernel from which 
larger political institutions were imagined – designed as serious alternatives in a complex and 
divided modern world. 
 
 
Totalitarianism and The Councils: Two New Forms of Government 
 
Arendt’s withdrawal from political action coincided roughly with the publication of her first 
and still most widely read and controversial book, The Origins of Totalitarianism. At the time 
of its writing in the late 1940s, Arendt was considering a number of interrelated sets of 
problems: on the one hand, how could the atrocities of totalitarian rule have arisen through the 
crystallisation of certain underground elements of Western civilisation? On the other, what 
principles and institutions would be able to guide a shattered world in the wake of such 
calamity and disaster? As a work primarily concerned with the former question, Origins can 
be read in a very bleak light. Arendt came to the conclusion that totalitarianism, which 
included both Nazi Germany and Stalinist Russia, constituted a new form of government, 
distinct from every other in the tradition of Western political thought. This new form of 
government found its essence in the use of terror embodied in concentration camps and relied 
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upon ideology as a total explanation of reality according to supposedly logical and scientific 
laws. Critics have viewed the book as a one-sided criticism and rejection of the political 
institutions of modernity. Sheldon Wolin points to her focus on the subterranean tendencies of 
modern politics that developed into anti-Semitism, imperialism and totalitarian movements 
and her lack of any references to democracy as evidence of her bias.159 However, Arendt did 
not have a completely negative or deterministic view of modernity. The persistence of a belief 
in new approaches to politics is visible in Arendt’s statement in the preface of Origins that: 
 
human dignity needs a new guarantee which can be found only in a new political principle, in a new 
law on earth, whose validity this time must comprehend the whole of humanity while its power must 
remain strictly limited, rooted in and controlled by newly defined territorial entities.160 
 
This was not a utopian yearning, but the statement of a practical dilemma of someone who 
valued “balanced judgment and measured insight” over the twin dangers of “reckless 
optimism and reckless despair.”161 Her reflections on the failures of the nation-state and the 
party system do not lead to an anti-modern or an anti-democratic position. It may appear that 
Arendt perceives totalitarianism to be the only novel and unprecedented political form of 
organisation of the twentieth century. But her examination of totalitarianism, particularly in 
her additional final chapter, “Ideology and Terror,” points to another possibility: a second 
novel form of government, which, in certain key respects, is the inverse of totalitarian rule.162 
There is a peculiar connection between the two forms of government, since Arendt will later 
argue that the councils are the supreme antidote to the potential of totalitarian rule. She argues 
that the councils are “the best instruments, for example, for breaking up the modern mass 
society, with its dangerous tendency toward the formation of pseudo-political mass 
movements.”163 In the early 1950s, then, through her analysis of the political logic of 
totalitarianism, Arendt retained an implicit image of another political possibility: the council 
system. This remains the case even if at this time she thought that its failure to gain traction 
anywhere in the world after the war meant that it was no longer a realistic prospect. That 
Arendt had this clearly in view is demonstrated by a passage from The Human Condition: 
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What is so easily overlooked by the modern historian who faces the rise of totalitarian systems, 
especially when he deals with developments in the Soviet Union, is that just as the modern masses and 
their leaders succeeded, at least temporarily, in bringing forth in totalitarianism an authentic, albeit all-
destructive, new form of government, thus the people’s revolutions, for more than a hundred years now, 
have come forth, albeit never successfully, with another new form of government: the system of 
people’s councils to take the place of the Continental party system, which, one is tempted to say, was 
discredited even before it came into existence.164 
 
The event that completely reoriented Arendt’s politics and made her reconsider the potential 
of the council system was the appearance of councils in the Hungarian Revolution of 1956. 
The sudden emergence of this form of government filled Arendt with “a certain hopefulness” 
that made her question whether “the only clear expression of the present age’s problems up to 
date has been the horror of totalitarianism.”165 The extraordinary courage of the Hungarian 
citizens and the persistence of the political form of the councils reignited the practical 
possibilities of a functioning council system. The history of the publication of Origins reveals 
Arendt’s trajectory. While the councils were completely absent from the first edition of 1951, 
an epilogue on the councils of the Hungarian Revolution was added to the second English 
edition in 1958. However, this was later removed from all future editions, since Arendt soon 
realised that her work on the council system did not constitute merely an addendum to her 
analysis of totalitarianism. Rather, it was the beginning of an entirely new project, one that 
she finally completed in 1963 with On Revolution.  
 
Despite its focus on the nature of totalitarianism, Arendt’s final chapter of Origins sheds 
much light on her conception of a council system. One of the central themes of Arendt’s 
analysis is the way in which different regimes embody a particular relationship between 
movement and stability, and action and laws. The fundamental problem of totalitarian 
governments is not their lawless or arbitrary nature, but the fact that they subordinate the 
entirety of human life to the supposed movement of the laws of Nature or History. Arendt 
highlights that totalitarianism is not tyranny in the traditional sense of the term because there 
is no arbitrary will of a dictator that animates the regime. Totalitarianism defies traditional 
modes of understanding government not because of its lawless nature, but because it 
understands law as a force that must be unleashed on the world. One of the first tasks of 
totalitarian governments is to remove the hindrances and boundaries of laws that provide a 
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space for action and establish both boundaries and channels of communication between 
human beings. Political space is already in danger as it is continually invaded by the birth of 
new citizens and threatened by the boundlessness and potentially destructive dimensions of 
human action. There is an unusual parallel between totalitarian movements and human action 
insofar as they both represent a limitless, unending and potentially uncontrollable movement 
that is threatening and transgressive. But in spite of their similarities, Arendt distinguishes 
between the automatic, metabolic and seemingly natural movement of totalitarian government 
and the free, spontaneous and eruptive movement of human action. At certain moments, the 
two are even set as opposites. Arendt states that it is only the unconstrained capacity of action 
to start a “new beginning” that can hinder and prevent the supra-human force of 
totalitarianism.166 Terror will always attempt to destroy spaces of freedom where action can 
appear as it views its unpredictable and untameable nature as an obstacle to total domination.  
 
It is here that Arendt’s implicit analysis of the council system, as the institution of human 
action par excellence, becomes apparent. If totalitarianism reduces all man-made laws to an 
unstoppable movement of natural forces, then the council system would retain the 
institutional integrity of such laws as a means of preserving an open space for political action. 
The principle of movement that animates a council system is not an automatic force but the 
continual striving of its citizens for freedom. Arendt argues that “the stability of the laws 
corresponds to the constant motion of all human affairs” in the same way in which she will 
later argue that the institutional structure of the council system corresponds to the 
spontaneous nature of human action.167 Whereas totalitarian regimes attempt to constrict 
space and reduce humanity to “One Man [of] gigantic dimensions,” the council system 
institutionalises a public realm where plural human beings can coexist in their differences and 
retain their capacity for independent action.168 The council system is more than merely lawful 
government or a constitutional guarantee of negative liberties. Lawful government without the 
proper institutionalisation of a space for political action and participation in government in 
which citizens would be inspired by a “love for freedom” would amount to “the banishment 
of the citizens from the public realm.”169 Limited, constitutional government is in itself 
insufficient to establish a free republic. Unlike the council system, many other forms of 
democracy based on the tradition of the nation-state and the party system fail to preserve an 
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open institutional space for the free political action of their citizens and become sterile 
systems run by bureaucrats and political parties. The council system is the only modern form 
of government that combines the stability of a lawful government with the principle of 
freedom as that which inspires its citizens. 
 
 
The Labour Movement 
 
Following from The Origins of Totalitarianism, the influence of the council system can be 
traced to Arendt’s next major published work, The Human Condition. Arendt’s one and only 
reference to the council system in The Human Condition presents an interesting paradox, 
which can be explicated through an examination of the architecture of the text. The reference 
is situated within a chapter entitled “The Labour Movement,” which itself is located in a most 
unusual place – at the heart of Arendt’s section on action. In a book in which one of Arendt’s 
main tasks is to distinguish between the “three fundamental human activities: labour, work 
and action,” why would Arendt place a chapter on the labour movement at the centre of her 
discussion of action?170 The chapter on the labour movement (and the one before it on homo 
faber) marks the point at which the text folds back on itself. Here, Arendt confronts the 
dependence and interrelationship of the three concepts by retracing the progression of the text 
and returning, first to work, and finally to labour, before continuing her analysis of action. 
The problem is that far from seamlessly continuing her examination of action, Arendt is 
forced into a bind by attempting to extricate the social and economic functions of the labour 
movement from its political legacy.  
 
By the time Arendt reaches the chapter on the labour movement she has already demonstrated 
the intimate connections between work and action through the dependence of the actor on 
homo faber for both the construction of the stability of a common world of things and for the 
remembrance of action in works of art. Animal laborans, on the other hand, is granted no such 
distinctions. Whereas the activities of homo faber are connected to the public space of 
appearances and are at worst merely “unpolitical,” labouring is described as outright 
“antipolitical” and destructive of the political qualities of identity, plurality and political 
community.171 The opening paragraphs of the chapter rehearse Arendt’s phenomenological 
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analysis of labouring. She describes it as essentially an isolating activity that creates a 
“sameness” and a “loss of identity” amongst workers and which stands with life and death as 
“non-worldly, antipolitical, truly transcendent experiences.”172 The question is, then, why at 
this point in the text must Arendt return to the concept of labour, only to repeat an analysis 
already seen that offers no new insights as to labour’s possible connection to action? The 
answer appears in the following paragraph. It is due to the “extraordinarily productive role 
which the labor movements have played in modern politics,” one in which the “European 
working class” wrote “one of the most glorious and probably the most promising chapter of 
recent history.”173 In short, because of the council system – her most celebrated institutional 
realisation of political action in the modern world. The contradiction that Arendt is forced to 
confront is that throughout its history this institution has been enacted primarily by labourers 
for the purpose (at least in part) of organising labour. Arendt’s attempted solution to what she 
euphemistically names, this “discrepancy,” goes to the core of her political theory. 
 
Arendt’s strategy is to untangle two different trends of the working class and to divide them 
into distinct moments. Although Arendt concedes that “the line between political and 
economic demands, between political organizations and trade unions, was blurred enough,” 
she states that a distinction can still be made and that “the two should not be confused.”174 Her 
breakdown of the various differences is represented in Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1. Two trends of the working class 
 
Element Political Economic 
Members The people as a whole (not 
restricted to members of the 
working class) 
Members of the working class 
Interests The people’s political 
aspirations 
Interests of the working class 
Organisation 
type 
Unguided citizens who form 
political organisations/ political 
parties (some of the time) 
Trade unions/ political parties (most 
of the time) 
 
Mode of 
politics 
Revolutionary: transformation of 
political institutions and 
foundation of a new public 
space with new political 
Reformist: seek incorporation into 
society, social prestige and wage 
increases etc. 
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standards 
Political 
system 
People’s councils Continental party system 
Fate Historically defeated  
(but the Hungarian Revolution 
demonstrates that the élan has 
not yet died) 
Historically victorious 
 
Arendt’s discussion of these two trends suggests a clear and distinct separation between two 
moments that must be held apart. There is a steadfast division throughout most of Arendt’s 
work between what she considered properly political concerns and social or economic issues. 
As a result, her attempt to separate two trends of the working class can be mapped on to the 
distinction between the social and the political in both The Human Condition and On 
Revolution. This raises one of the fundamental problems that scholars have found with 
Arendt’s political ontology: it appears to require a division between a realm of freedom and a 
realm of necessity through the elimination of the pursuit of social welfare from the sphere of 
politics.175 It is difficult for Arendt’s supporters to avoid some version of this claim, since she 
argues that the very idea of attempting to liberate people from poverty by political means is 
misguided and dangerous.176 There are points at which she gestures towards less radical 
positions, such as where she notes that “the dividing line between the two [trends of the 
working class] is not a matter of extreme social and economic demands but solely on the 
proposition of a new form of government.”177 To read Arendt charitably, one could argue that 
it is not the presence of economic demands within a movement, whether reformist or radical, 
but rather the manifestation of a distinctive political program that aims at a fundamental 
transformation of the political institutions of a state that is decisive. It could be argued that 
economic demands and a general reorganisation of the economy can accompany political 
reforms so long as the vital political aspect remains the guiding ideal.  
 
However, Arendt’s characteristic separation of the social and the political reasserts itself in 
her discussion of the councils, which provides a paradigmatic case of her attempt at a 
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fundamental division. In her discussion of the labour movement the dominant line of 
argument endeavours to minimise the class aspects of the movement. She argues the labour 
movement “was never restricted to the ranks of the working class” and could “represent the 
people as a whole.”178 In what amounts to an extremely tenuous position, Arendt praises the 
achievements of the “political labor movement” while simultaneously denying that this was 
based on the organisation of a particular class of the population. At first glace, Arendt’s claim 
that the labour movement could represent the people as a whole could be read as reflecting the 
young Marx’s argument that the proletariat was a universal class insofar as its emancipation 
would usher in the end of class society. However, Arendt’s position is anything but Marxist. 
Rather than beginning with a class analysis of society in order to reveal capitalism’s 
contradictions and the possibility of its overcoming, Arendt bypasses any reference to class in 
order to argue for the institution of radically democratic councils open to all citizens. 
 
These tensions come to the fore in Arendt’s account of the Hungarian Revolution. Arendt’s 
brief comments on Hungary in the chapter on the labour movement in The Human Condition 
are based on an extended analysis that appeared the same year in an article entitled 
“Totalitarian Imperialism.”179 In spite of its failure, the Revolution was for Arendt a “true 
event.”180 The uprisings were completely unexpected and seemed to embody Luxemburg’s 
concept of a spontaneous revolution, an autonomously organised rebellion of an oppressed 
people without the leadership of political parties or trade unions. Arendt notes how quickly 
and efficiently the country organised itself into a council system, with a plan for a co-
ordinating national revolutionary council already underway within a matter of days.181 A 
particularly striking aspect of Arendt’s article is her appeal to the “events themselves” rather 
than “historical trends” or “questionnaires and motivation research” as that which should 
guide an understanding of politics.182 This appeal to what Arendt elsewhere refers to as 
“factual truth” or the “brutally elementary data” of human events sits uneasily at the 
beginning of what could only be described as a very Arendtian narration of events.183 
Arendt’s analysis of Hungary mirrors, in certain respects, her reading of Luxemburg. In this 
article, Arendt admits that the council system “had been almost a monopoly of the working 
class,” but that it was Hungary that stood out as an instance where class divisions and labour 
                                                
178 Ibid., 219. 
179 Arendt, “Totalitarian Imperialism: Reflections on the Hungarian Revolution”. 
180 Ibid., 5. 
181 The United Nations, Report of the Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary (New York, 1957) 154. 
182 Arendt, “Totalitarian Imperialism: Reflections on the Hungarian Revolution,” 8. 
183 Hannah Arendt, Between Past and Future (New York: Viking Press, 1961) 239.  
 52 
did not play a primary role.184 Putting to one side Arendt’s reversal over her claims about the 
non-economic nature of the councils, this is a misleading statement on the Hungarian 
Revolution, which misrepresents the intentions and actions of the Hungarian revolutionaries.  
 
Arendt argues that the council system that arose spontaneously following the outbreak of the 
revolution was naturally divided into two forms of councils: the Revolutionary Councils, 
charged with political tasks, and the Workers’ Councils, which were to manage economic 
affairs. She shows little interest in the latter and focuses her attention on what she views as the 
more important of the two. In spite of the extensive evidence of the combined economic and 
political demands of the Hungarian people as documented in their manifestos, flyers and 
declarations, Arendt claims that the revolutionaries’ motives were “exclusively Freedom and 
Truth” and that they were not driven by material interests.185 To support this claim Arendt 
refers to a quote in the “truly admirable” United Nations’ “Report of the Special Committee 
on the Problem of Hungary.” However, the central conclusion of the UN Report is that the 
councils’ “chief purpose was to ensure for the Hungarian people real, and not merely nominal, 
control of local government and of factories, mines, and other industrial enterprises.”186 It 
states that the emergence of the councils represented the “first practical step to restore order 
and to reorganize the Hungarian economy on a socialist basis.”187 The numerous political 
declarations and policies of Hungarian groups annexed to the report document the broad 
economic demands of the councils and their concern for both new political institutions and a 
restructuring of workplaces. Arendt’s curt dismissal of the Workers’ Councils is unjustified. 
Her doubt that it would even be “possible to run factories under the management and 
ownership of the workers” flies in the face of countless historical examples of their success.188 
Arendt ultimately fails to convincingly separate these two trends and enforce her 
social/political binary on the council system. Her fluctuating approach highlights the 
weakness of her position: at one point claiming the councils were not concerned with social 
welfare or economic activities, while at another stating that if they were, it failed miserably.189 
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In this sense, her encounter with the councils highlights the untenable nature of her strict 
distinction between the social and the political. 
 
 
The Lost Treasure of the Council System 
 
The extraordinary events of the Hungarian Revolution forged new connections in Arendt’s 
mind and produced a ferment from which emerged a larger and more ambitious project: 
Arendt aimed to write the theory of the council system. The scope and complexity of Arendt’s 
undertaking is seldom acknowledged by her commentators. It is entwined within a number of 
overlapping ideas in On Revolution and overshadowed by her controversial distinction 
between the social concerns of the French Revolution and the political nature of the American 
Revolution. If the Jacobin revolutionary tradition of the party system finds its most lucid and 
influential theorist in Karl Marx, then the lost treasure of the council system must be brought 
back from the depths and given a clear theoretical articulation by Arendt herself. Arendt’s 
project is one of both recollection and invention as she constructs a tradition that she argues, 
as an historical fact, has never really existed. For Arendt, the council system is the forgotten 
institutional framework of modern politics, immediately overtaken by the party system and 
ruthlessly stamped out whenever it arose during revolutions and uprisings. Arendt’s 
realisation of the continued relevance of the council system gives rise to a desire to narrate the 
history of their struggle. The true tragedy of the councils is that their failure to be 
institutionalised is immediately followed by their erasure from memory and eclipse by other 
political ideas. This process is aided by the fact that the councils have not had their basic 
political principles and concepts adequately theorised. For Arendt, it is only through the 
digestion of political events in conceptual form that political accomplishments can be passed 
down to the next generation. She considered it important to translate the experience of the 
“revolutionary spirit” into “the less direct but more articulate language of political 
thought.”190 Writing the tradition of the council system from its birth in the modern concepts 
of revolution and freedom is, for Arendt, the crowning achievement of On Revolution and the 
culmination of her political thought of the 1950s. 
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Arendt is encouraged by the seeming naturalness, spontaneity and persistence of the council 
form. She frequently remarks on the similarities and striking resemblances of various councils 
across history that arose in completely different contexts and with little to no knowledge of 
one another. There is “no tradition” in Arendt’s mind that “can be called to account for the 
regular emergence and re-emergence of the council system ever since the French 
Revolution.”191 While this claim is not entirely accurate, it is true that the council system is 
not a well-known or understood political institution. For Arendt, the councils “sprang up as 
the spontaneous organs of the people” and made “their appearance in every genuine 
revolution throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.”192 She argues that because of 
this re-emergence the institutional outline of the councils seems to correspond to the 
elementary grammar of political action.193 Arendt makes a vague but persistent appeal for a 
relationship between the institutional form of the councils and an ontological fact of plurality 
based in the human condition. The repetition of the council form throughout modern history 
speaks to the natural tendencies of human action when left unhindered by governmental and 
centralising forces in times of emergency or crisis. She observes that the council system 
appears to be a natural product of the unconstrained organisational tendencies of plural human 
beings. In this sense, she grounds her political argument in a weak ontological claim 
concerning human beings’ natural characteristics and inclinations. 
 
As Arendt restructures her thought in the wake of the Hungarian uprisings, the councils are 
incorporated into a broader narrative of the fate of political freedom in modernity. Her 
readings on the American Revolution at the Department of American History and Civilisation 
at Princeton in 1959 allowed her to extend her frame of reference. The emergence of the 
councils is traced back to the revolutionary experiences of America and France. She began to 
see Jefferson’s proposals of a republican ward system and the emergence of popular societies 
in the French Revolution as anticipating the later appearance of revolutionary councils. For 
Arendt, the European councils “resembled in an amazing fashion Jefferson’s ward system.”194 
That which first appeared to Arendt as an isolated phenomenon with a few sporadic instances 
at the beginning of the twentieth-century in Russia and Germany, became a basic experience 
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intrinsic to modern politics. Though rarely actualised, the possibility of the council form 
arises simultaneously with the modern experiences of revolution and political freedom. The 
Hungarian Revolution taught Arendt that revolution was not only a “new experience that 
revealed man’s capacity for novelty,” but that it was also the natural birthplace of the council 
system.195 Arendt mentions the “intimate connection between the spirit of revolution and the 
principle of federation” and argues that “the councils, as distinguished from parties, have 
always emerged during the revolution itself, they sprang from the people as spontaneous 
organs of action and order.”196 The ultimate aim of political revolutions for Arendt is the 
constitution of a space of freedom that is embodied in the council system. While the history of 
modern politics is conventionally told as a struggle between the competing ideologies of 
liberalism, socialism and conservatism, from Arendt’s standpoint, it can be presented as: 
 
the conflict between the modern party system and the new revolutionary organs of self-government. 
These two systems, so utterly unlike and even contradictory to each other, were born at the same 
moment. The spectacular success of the party system and the no less spectacular failure of the council 
system were both due to the rise of the nation-state, which elevated the one and crushed the other, 
whereby the leftist and revolutionary parties have shown themselves to be no less hostile to the council 
system than the conservative or reactionary right.197 
 
Every modern revolution for Arendt can be viewed from the perspective of the struggle 
between the spontaneous development of the council system and the imposition of a party 
system by established powers. Arendt views liberalism and Marxism – representative 
parliamentary democracy and revolutionary political parties – as two sides of the same coin. 
The true conflict of modern politics is not between liberals and conservatives, but between the 
people and those who claim to represent them, be it a parliamentary body or a vanguard party. 
 
Arendt’s dramatic reshaping of the history of modern politics is intriguing, although not 
entirely convincing. A number of readers have been sceptical of Arendt’s methodology, 
taking umbrage at her odd mixture of history, biography and fable.198 First, there is the 
question of historical accuracy. There is a tendency within some Arendt scholarship to claim 
                                                
195 Ibid., 34. 
196 Ibid., 258, 263. 
197 Ibid., 239. 
198 Hobsbawm, “Hannah Arendt on Revolution,” in Revolutionaries, 201–208; Shklar, “Hannah Arendt as 
Pariah,” in Political Thought and Political Thinkers; Disch, “How could Hannah Arendt Glorify the American 
Revolution and Revile the French? Placing On Revolution in the Historiography of the French and American 
Revolutions”; Cf. James Miller, “The Pathos of Novelty: Hannah Arendt’s Image of Freedom in the Modern 
World,” in Hill (ed.) Hannah Arendt: The Recovery of the Public World, 177–208. 
 56 
that since Arendt was not attempting to write a historian’s account of events, the historical 
accuracy of her narratives is somehow beside the point.199 I find this interpretation question-
begging. Arendt draws extensively from historical material and frequently makes relatively 
straightforward claims about historical events, several of which in the case of the councils are 
plain wrong. Arendt’s epic narrative of the struggle between the party and council system 
throughout modernity overlooks the fact that the party system was largely unknown prior to 
1850, and that the councils arose predominantly in the early twentieth century, following the 
collapse of imperial powers during the First World War.200 At other points, such as her 
account of the Hungarian revolution or her denial of the economic role of the councils and 
their socialist roots, Arendt systematically distorts historical evidence to fit her own argument. 
One of her most scathing critics, Eric Hobsbawm, admonishes Arendt for her lack of 
commitment to historical evidence and her creative use of the past, locating her style in the 
“vague terrain which lies between literature, psychology, and what, for want of a better word, 
is called social prophecy.”201 From the perspective of standard practices in the social sciences, 
it is undoubted that Arendt leaves much to be desired.  
 
However, Arendt never claimed to be writing traditional historical scholarship, which raises 
the further issue of how Arendt’s efforts could be judged against her own methodological 
commitments. Of the few scant remarks on her own method, Arendt intimates the necessarily 
tentative and provisional nature of political inquiry.202 Theories and political concepts must 
always be reconsidered in light of historical events.203 This principle forms part of what could 
be considered Arendt’s phenomenological mode of political theory, an attempt to return to the 
experiences of politics that lie behind the abstractions of theoretical constructs.204 As Canovan 
remarks, one of the perplexing issues for Arendt’s readers is that she combines her 
phenomenological approach with a “fragmentary historiography,” which she inherits form 
                                                
199 Kristie M. McClure, “The Odor of Judgment: Exemplarity, Propriety, and Politics in the Company of Hannah 
Arendt,” in Craig J. Calhoun and John McGowan (eds.), Hannah Arendt and the Meaning of Politics 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1997) 53–84. 
200 Bernard Manin, The Principles of Representative Government (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1997) 194; Anweiler, The Soviets, 6. 
201 Hobsbawm, “Hannah Arendt on Revolution,” in Revolutionaries, 202. 
202 For a recent attempt to reconstruct Arendt’s methodology see Steve Buckler, Hannah Arendt and Political 
Theory. Buckler offers an eloquent defence of Arendt as an engaged political theorist whose writing is 
experientially sensitive and appropriately adapted to the terrain of politics. He claims Arendt adopts a distinctive 
voice in her writing that eschews traditional philosophical and historical approaches in order to gain a greater 
proximity to the contingent and plural nature of political life. 
203 Arendt, “Totalitarian Imperialism: Reflections on the Hungarian Revolution,” 8. 
204 Arendt, “On Hannah Arendt,” in Hill (ed.), Hannah Arendt: The Recovery of the Public World, 308; Lewis P. 
Hinchman and Sandra K. Hinchman, “In Heidegger's Shadow: Hannah Arendt's Phenomenological Humanism,” 
The Review of Politics (1984) 46 (2), 183–211.  
 57 
Walter Benjamin.205 In an essay on Benjamin, Arendt alludes to his predilection for collecting 
aphorisms and fragments, likening his activity to a “pearl diver” who brings to the surface 
“new crystalized forms and shapes.”206 For Canovan, there is a tension in her work between 
the need to be true to authentic experiences and a desire to rescue “forgotten treasures” of the 
past, which may be of use to contemporary politics. The latter method involves a “deliberately 
arbitrary use of fragments recovered from the past,” which is likely to distort a 
straightforward portrayal of actors’ political experiences.207 As a result, we can question 
whether Arendt successfully returns to the “underlying phenomenal reality” of the councils.208 
If Arendt’s objection to the tradition of political philosophy was its distortion of the 
experiences of political actors, then parts of her own enterprise must be judged to have 
succumbed to a similar fate.209 In the case of the councils, Arendt systematically 
misrepresents the intentions and actions of the participants of the councils in order to advance 
her own interpretation.  
 
In spite of these criticisms, there are also strengths of Arendt’s distinctive approach that 
deserve closer examination. The power of Arendt’s method is based on what Judith Shklar 
views as Arendt’s “monumental” style of writing history in the Nietzschean sense of 
retrieving lessons from past acts and events that may be put in service of the present. This 
style of argument will necessarily entail certain omissions and exaggerations in the retrieval 
of partially forgotten experiences of politics. Arendt is not interested in history for its own 
sake that remains stuck in the past. Instead, she intends to intervene in prevailing horizons of 
thought through a selective and artistic use of historical material in order to highlight certain 
valuable and praise-worthy historical events. In doing so, Arendt focuses our attention on the 
irreparable break in the tradition of the modern age and acknowledges the enormous gulf that 
separates us from the past. Her project is therefore not a simple task of reclamation and 
renewal. It must first involve a rupturing of our complacency and a shaking of the familiarity 
of the present. To this effect, the revelation of the distance between a council system and 
contemporary party politics highlights the failure of current practices to fully realise the 
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democratic ideals they purport to embody. I explore this aspect of Arendt’s project in chapter 
three in relation to her unique concept of political principles and the council system. 
 
First, however, in the next chapter, I will address the historical inaccuracies of Arendt’s 
interpretation of council democracy. Shklar notes that there is an inevitable tension between 
Arendt’s work and a more critical form of history aimed at recreating “what really went on” 
in the past. For a critical historian, if Arendt wished to draw on historical events as a way of 
intervening in the present, her interpretations should be accompanied by a commitment to a 
faithful account of these events. In The Human Condition, Arendt places particular emphasis 
on the technique of storytelling in order to preserve and relay significant actions and events. 
But as Quentin Skinner notes, “history (notwithstanding a fashionable attitude among 
philosophers) cannot simply consist of stories: a further feature of historical stories is that 
they are at least supposed to be true.”210 Arendt’s account distorts our understanding of the 
councils and necessitates a more rigorous and historically accurate re-evaluation of the history 
of the councils, a task that will be undertaken in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 2: The Councils in Historical Context 
 
 
In the opening pages of the final chapter of On Revolution, Arendt announces that she intends 
to narrate “a strange and sad story that remains to be told.”211 At this point, Arendt turns from 
a comparative analysis of the French and American revolutions to provide an account of the 
democratic councils. She describes the councils as the regular emergence of a new form of 
government, a spontaneous institution that sprang directly from the peoples’ political 
activities and posed an alternative to the central institutions of liberal parliamentary 
democracy. However, a significant limitation of Arendt’s retrieval of the council system is her 
distorted historical narrative, which severely misrepresents the history of the councils. In 
reality, Arendt writes what could be described as a mythology rather than a history. In 
Arendt’s account, the councils are depicted as the ideal institutions for the appearance of 
freedom in modern societies and the natural result of spontaneous organisational impulses of 
ordinary citizens. Yet, Arendt addresses few of their internal structural weaknesses and fails 
to answer possible criticisms and objections. As a result, the councils take on a quasi-mythical 
character as ideal yet precarious political institutions that appear destined to be overwhelmed 
by the centralising flows of state power. Responding in an interview to the possibility of a 
revival of the councils, Arendt bleakly notes the prospects were “very slight, if at all. And yet, 
perhaps, after all – in the wake of the next revolution.”212 
 
The problem with Arendt’s mythology is that, ultimately, it cuts both ways. On the one hand, 
the historical rarity of the councils makes them appear unattainable. They occupy an 
enigmatic position in her writings as an elusive horizon of modern politics, invariably 
receding from our political vision as a viable institutional form. They seem to embody all that 
is good and organic in politics, but arise only for fleeting moments before they are crushed by 
the party system.213 The tragic tone of her interviews further compounds this picture, 
permitting her readers to assume that the councils were simply an historical curiosity.214 On 
the other hand, her idealised description overlooks the councils’ flaws and loses the historical 
specificities of their political struggles in the process. Her recovery of council democracy 
offers valuable insight, but the terms of her analysis tend to obscure as much as they 
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illuminate. The “fabulist” nature of her historical illustrations overwrites rather than 
contributes to a council tradition. Although Arendt draws from historical examples, her 
retelling abstracts from the concrete details of the councils’ struggles and positions her 
interpretation through a lens of preconceived political categories. In misconstruing the actions 
and intentions of the historical actors, Arendt warps our understanding of the councils.  
 
The distinctive presentation of Arendt’s argument for a council system has also led to a 
weakness in the treatment of this topic within Arendt scholarship. Commentators have tended 
to view the final chapter of On Revolution as the outline of an abstract theoretical model 
without due consideration of the historical manifestation of councils.215 As a result, many 
analyses of Arendt’s councils simply repeat her historical errors and remain trapped in the 
same confusions. This ahistorical approach of many of her interpreters is understandable 
given Arendt’s denial of a council tradition and her insistence on their “spontaneous” 
recurrence. These abstractions, however, ignore the extent to which the emergence of councils 
relied upon a long history of organisation and education of workers preceding the 
revolutionary outbreaks. To attribute the councils’ repeated appearance to a political 
naturalism of peoples’ basic tendencies and inclinations neglects the necessary organisational 
dimension of building and sustaining political movements and institutions. The emergence of 
councils can only be understood within the context of their development within a highly 
organised working class. Her critics’ charge of the council system as a utopian schema has 
more purchase on Arendt’s argument when taken as an abstract model, rather than as an 
allusion to the historical examples of councils that emerged in Europe in the wake of the First 
World War. The councils were not utopian blueprints for a future possible society, but 
practical and strategic organisational forms that arose with little conscious foresight as a 
response to the immediate needs of the time. Placing them in historical perspective provides a 
richer historical portrait of the councils and challenges a number of the misrepresentations of 
Arendt’s account.216 
 
Departing from Arendt’s idiosyncratic style, I attempt to foreground historical events in my 
interpretation of the councils and pay closer attention to the intentions and actions of 
participants in the political struggle. One limitation of Arendt’s approach is her tendency to 
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rely on the “great texts” of the history of political thought to understand political phenomena, 
rather than basing her arguments on historical facts. Too often in On Revolution, references to 
the political theories of canonical authors are intended to stand in for or provide explanations 
of actual historical events. For Arendt, Rousseau’s discovery of pity and compassion 
“anticipates” the instability and terror of the French revolutionary government, while his 
concept of the volonté générale “became axiomatic for all factions and parties of the French 
Revolution.”217 Moreover, the turning point of the French Revolution for Arendt – when the 
rights of man were transformed into the rights of the sans-culottes – can be located in the 
writings of Marx, “the greatest theorist the revolutions ever had,” whose “enormous impact” 
can in turn explain the following course of revolutionary history.218 In contrast to this form of 
storytelling in which extraordinary texts serve to illuminate events, I concentrate on the actual 
practices of individuals and groups within the councils and attempt to understand these 
practices with reference to the actors’ declared intentions and ideologies. As a result, my 
research encompasses a broader scope of ordinary, mundane historical material: manifestos, 
pamphlets, declarations, minutes and other historical evidence that sheds light on the period. 
 
The two most prominent examples of councils to emerge in Europe were those of Russia and 
Germany in the period 1917–1919. Councils also appeared in other countries such as Austria, 
Italy and Hungary, but attention in this chapter will be given to the two largest and most 
prominent cases. I also concentrate on events that transpired in each capital city, which were 
the locus points for the development of the councils.219 A historical examination of their 
political struggles offers two case studies of the possibilities and dangers of council 
democracy. Germany was viewed by European revolutionaries at the time as the most likely 
country to instigate an international socialist revolution. It was the most advanced industrial 
nation with a highly organised labour force and a long history of revolutionary politics. 
However, to the surprise of many, it was the relatively under-developed Russia that first 
formed councils and eventually incorporated them into a council state. Although there is 
much historical scholarship on the councils, they usually figure only briefly as part of more 
general studies.220 In spite of a revival in the 1960s, there has been relatively little recent work 
                                                
217 Arendt, On Revolution, 67, 147. 
218 Ibid., 51.	  
219 Berlin, for example, consistently had the highest number of strikes in all of Germany and was the heart of the 
German labour movement. Hans Manfred Bock, Syndikalismus und Linkskommunismus von 1918–1923 
(Meisenheim am Glan: Verlag Anton Hain, 1969) 82. 
220 There are a number of good early German studies on the councils dating from the 1920s. See Franz Gutmann, 
Das Rätesystem: Seine Verfechter und seine Probleme (München: Drei Masken Verlag, 1922); Otto Seeling, Der 
 62 
in Anglophone scholarship on the role that the councils played in this important turning point 
in world history.221 
 
One reason for this neglect of the councils is that within certain traditional historical 
approaches the story of the councils has been lost between the cracks of social democracy and 
Marxism-Leninism. On the one hand, the German councils have typically been portrayed as 
representing the chaos and disorder before the emergence of stable liberal democratic 
institutions. Traditional West German historiography dismisses the period of the councils as a 
dangerous flirtation with Bolshevism on the path to liberal democracy.222 In the interpretation 
of Karl Erdman, representative of this earlier West German approach, the councils embodied 
a radical Bolshevik ideology of council dictatorship, which was only avoided through the 
leadership of the German Social Democratic Party towards parliamentary democracy.223 
Similarly, in scholarship on the Russian Revolution, the story of the soviets in the early 
phases of the Russian Revolution tended to be overshadowed by the larger framework of the 
Bolshevik takeover and the creation of a one-party state, such that it was difficult to discern 
what was unique or distinctive about the councils themselves.224 Meanwhile, in the Soviet 
Union, the councils were represented as the admirable but ultimately temporary organs of the 
working class that would eventually be replaced by the superior knowledge and organisation 
of the party. A more balanced assessment of the role of the councils was hindered in the 
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former soviet states by prejudice arising from Lenin’s attack on council communist tendencies 
in his “‘Left-Wing’ Communism: An Infantile Disorder.”225  
 
A re-examination of the two cases of Russia and Germany provides several crucial 
modifications to Arendt’s narrative.226 The councils emerge as a more defined and historically 
restricted institution that develops predominantly in the period immediately following the 
First World War. The historical periodisation of the councils alters from a time span that 
stretched back to the French Revolution into one that is, in essence, only a few short years. 
This also prompts reconsideration of the councils’ basic structure and form. While Arendt 
presents the councils as a new form of government, they operated more frequently as 
oppositional institutions that sought to control and regulate governing bodies and further the 
aims of the revolutionary movement. On this point, however, there has been significant 
disagreement, since a number of different perspectives existed at the time regarding the 
proper structure and roles of the councils. These disagreements will be discussed below. A 
third difference between Arendt’s analysis and the historical evidence of the councils 
concerns their economic activities and essential class composition. The councils undertook 
extensive economic planning and social welfare activities and sought to democratise 
workplaces and barracks. They were considered by most participants to be institutions that 
represented the interests of workers, rather than as universal or class-neutral organisations. 
Fourth, it is untenable for Arendt to draw a strict distinction between the councils and political 
parties because the conflicts within the councils were organised through existing parties rather 
than in opposition to them.  
 
Arendt provides an important starting point for understanding the nature of the councils, but 
the limitations of her approach necessitate a revised historical narrative in order to reclaim the 
lost significance of the councils for contemporary politics. In this chapter, I will limit 
discussion to how a re-evaluation of the history of the councils provides a modified 
perspective on Arendt’s argument for a council democracy. This historical research will lay 
the groundwork for a theorisation of the possible resources provided by the democratic 
practices of council delegates. In chapter five, I will further develop this analysis and examine 
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the precise sense in which the councils may be held to have significance for contemporary 
political practices. 
 
 
Situating the Councils 
 
The first councils appeared in Russia in 1917, and then later in Germany, Hungary, Austria 
and Italy. Historians have pointed to the similarity of the councils with a long line of direct 
democracy and self-determination movements “from the urban communes of the middle ages, 
the Swiss peasant cantons, the original collective settlements in North America, the Paris 
Commune of 1871 and the Russian soviets.”227 There is a resemblance between many of these 
grass-roots organisational forms that have emerged over the course of rebellions and 
revolutions. However, the councils of the early twentieth century were a very distinct 
institution that arose out of a revolutionary situation during the big strike movements of the 
preceding years as a means for the recently emerged working classes to represent their 
interests and overturn hierarchical structures that oppressed them. The structure of the 
councils was closely linked to the organisation of workers in large factories, which permitted 
their close co-operation and facilitated their resistance to domination. As one of the foremost 
historians of the council movement, Oskar Anweiler emphasises the uniqueness of this 
historical phenomenon.228 The councils also briefly reappear in Hungary and Poland in 1956, 
which Arendt rightly saw as following in the steps of the earlier councils.229 
 
The main historical precedents for the post-First World War councils were the early workers’ 
soviets of the 1905 Russian Revolution.230 When the soviets first arose in May 1905 they 
were composed of deputies who represented primarily workers’ economic interests to factory 
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owners in disputes over conditions.231 The Mensheviks began campaigning for “revolutionary 
self-government,” which was followed by the formation of the St. Petersburg Soviet of 
Workers Deputies during the peak of the strikes in October.232 These soviets politicised 
workers and gave them the opportunity to appoint recallable delegates to struggle for greater 
worker self-determination. Their political goal was a radically democratic parliamentary 
republic. The soviets conceived of themselves as revolutionary committees rather than the 
beginnings of a new state form.233 Though they only existed relatively briefly, these soviets 
left behind a revolutionary tradition amongst the workers, which emerged anew in 1917. 
Comparisons could also be made to the 1871 Paris Commune, although there is little evidence 
that there was any direct influence of the Commune over subsequent developments of the 
council form.234 The main connection is through Marx’s essay on the Paris Commune, which 
became the point of departure for Lenin’s analysis of the soviets.235 
 
There are also theoretical forerunners to the councils in the writings of some 19th century 
anarchist and socialist authors. Arendt holds a particularly negative assessment of the ability 
of anarchists to grasp the council form. “They were singularly unequipped,” she claims, “to 
deal with a phenomenon which demonstrated so clearly how a revolution did not end with the 
abolition of state and government but on the contrary, aimed at the foundation of a new state 
and the establishment of a new form of government.”236 However, a number of the writings of 
the so-called “utopian socialists” demonstrate similarities with elements of the council idea, 
such as self-government, co-operative production and direct action. Arendt is mistaken in her 
claim that a clear separation can be drawn between the councils and anarchist thought. A 
number of contemporary anarchists draw from the period of the councils and from what is 
known as anarchist or left communism.237 Here, I will consider just two possible figures of 
the earlier writers, Proudhon and Bakunin. Proudhon theorised a form of society in which a 
number of small productive groups would be connected through a decentralised economic and 
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political federal system.238 His thought has been directly linked to the formation of the 
Russian councils and exercised a profound influence on the development of the Left in 
Europe.239 His confrontation with Marx, which led to the split in the First International, 
represents the first clash between centralising and federalist tendencies that would later play 
out in the struggle over the Russian soviets. There is also a resemblance of the council system 
in the work of Bakunin who proposed the formation of revolutionary committees that would 
elect members to councils. Bakunin argues for the “free federation from the bottom upward, 
the association of workers in industry and agriculture – first in the communities, then through 
federation of communities into districts, districts into nations, and nations into international 
brotherhood.”240 He goes further than Proudhon in attempting to connect theoretical principles 
of freedom and equality with revolutionary action. While followers of Proudhon and Bakunin 
were suggesting workers’ councils in the 1860s and 1870s as organs of class struggle, it was 
not until later that they received a concrete form.241 
 
 
Russia: Towards a Council Dictatorship 
 
After a long nadir following the repression of the 1905 Revolution, the councils (in Russian: 
soviets) dramatically reappeared in Russia following a wave of mass strikes in March 1917.242 
Workers seized the opportunity to create workers’ organisations of various kinds, including 
trade unions, factory committees, soviets and political parties. Soviets flourished across 
Russia, arising to meet the immediate needs of the workers and soldiers. The most vibrant and 
democratic element of this workers’ movement were the factory committees and soviets that 
sprang up across the industrial centres of Russia.243 In spite of different tendencies amongst 
the workers, Trotsky notes that “the form of organisation [the soviets] itself stood clear of all 
debate.”244 In Petrograd, a central committee of this emerging workers’ movement was 
established in the form of the Petrograd Workers and Soldiers Soviet on 12 March 1917. This 
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soviet appealed to workers and soldiers to send deputies to elect an Executive Committee.245 
Soviets elected one deputy for each 1000 workers to sit on the Petrograd Soviet, or 
alternatively, one delegate for each company of soldiers.246 A meeting of over 250 workers, 
soldiers and intellectuals elected Nikolay Chkheidze as chairman and Alexander Kerensky as 
vice-chairman.  
 
At this time, the revolutionary forces that had opposed Tsarism were split between the 
bourgeois and liberal coalition on the one hand, who participated in the Duma and the 
Provisional Government, and the workers, soldiers and peasants on the other, who all 
established soviets.247 The Petrograd Soviet rejected participation in a Provisional 
Government with the Duma Committee, which consisted of Octobrists and Constitutional 
Democrats such as Foreign Minister Miliukov and Minister of War Aleksander Guchkov. 
Instead, the Petrograd Soviet presented the government with a list of demands as a condition 
of its support, which was signed on 15 March 1917.248 Their demands consisted of a complete 
democratisation of the state and the granting of civil and political freedoms. They called for 
an immediate general amnesty for all political prisoners and the abolition of restrictions and 
discriminations based on religious or national grounds. It was proposed that the hated police 
force of the Tsar would be turned into a national militia with elected officer subject to 
democratic controls. The workers also desired freedom and democracy in the workplace and 
rallied against autocratic managerial despotism in the factories.249 Chief among their priorities 
were an eight-hour workday, improved conditions and a right of supervision over how 
factories were organised. In March, workers’ demands did not extend to managing the 
technical or economic side of production, but workers did want to limit the power of 
management and be able to negotiate organisational matters.250 
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In the first weeks of the Petrograd Soviet’s existence the number of delegates grew to such an 
extent that by the end of March it had reached nearly 3,000.251 Under such circumstances, it 
was difficult to organise efficient meetings. The sessions of the Soviet resembled mass 
demonstrations rather than functional meetings. The delegates decided to select a smaller 
council of about 600 members, which would be composed of an equal number of workers and 
soldiers. This reduced number allowed for more business to be conducted, but the majority of 
decision-making still occurred in the Executive Committee, which from the very first days of 
the revolution was the key organisational body of the soviets. By early April, the Executive 
Committee consisted of 42 members, so many that they created a special “Bureau of the 
Executive Committee” with only seven members to deal with current and urgent business.252 
This Bureau was allowed to take independent political decisions in emergencies.  
 
The executive organs of the soviets began to meet daily, while the plenary sessions for 
ordinary delegates became more sporadic. The business of the executive required an ever-
growing team of administrative labourers, most of whom had been clerks in old government 
departments. As the Executive Committee became a more efficient administrative machine, it 
began to lose touch with and organise independently from the rank and file soviet delegates. 
In theory, the delegates continued to hold the right to dismiss the Committee, guaranteeing 
that ultimate power remained in the lower soviets. Yet already in these early days a tension 
appeared between the soviets’ role as revolutionary organisations and in their more permanent 
administrative functions. As institutions without a clear structure, constitution or proper 
delegation of roles, the soviets were not ideally suited for administrative tasks. However, in 
the absence of a permanent central government or well-resourced parliamentary institutions, 
they began to take on some of the day-to-day tasks of provisions, supplies and rebuilding.  
 
For all practical purposes, February to October was a period of dual power in which the 
Provisional Government could only make decisions that were agreed to by the Petrograd 
Soviet. Workers and soldiers recognised the soviets as the true authoritative institutions in the 
country and would only follow orders of the government that were not in contradiction with 
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those from the Petrograd Soviet.253 However, during the first months of the revolution the 
soviets left the majority of business to the Provisional Government and established an 
agreement that the soviets would be a “controlling organ of revolutionary democracy.”254 The 
Petrograd Soviet did not request any formal definition of their authority as they saw their role 
as guiding the revolution and protecting it against counter-revolutionary forces. They aimed 
to influence the government and ensure its actions were in accordance with the principles of 
the soviets’ program. As a result, the government instituted wide-ranging political freedoms 
to citizens including civil rights, the abolition of restrictions based upon nationality, religion 
and class, penal reform, freedom of speech, press and assembly, the release of political 
prisoners, and the calling of a constituent assembly.255 The implementation of the soviets’ 
program was supervised by an “Observation Committee” that was selected by the soviets to 
monitor government activities.256 The committee was established to “convey to the 
Provisional Government the revolutionary demands, to pressure the government to fulfil these 
demands, and to control government actions.”257 Provincial soviets were instructed by 
Petrograd to “in no way solely assume government functions.”258 The soviets preferred to 
patrol elite actions in order to ensure greater levels of accountability to ordinary citizens than 
remove the government entirely. 
 
This period of dual power raises what Trotsky called the “paradox of the February 
Revolution.” The working classes overthrew the old regime but appeared unable or unwilling 
to govern themselves. The Bolshevik critique of this period of dual power dismisses the 
workers’ conditional support for the Provisional Government alongside the soviet system as 
an example of their lack of political consciousness. However, it is difficult to dismiss the 
attitudes of the workers during this period as a product of their naivety. Workers were 
responding to genuine concerns of the possible deleterious consequences of a complete 
takeover of administrative responsibilities. They preferred to preserve their hard-fought 
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victories and extend these through pressure on the Provisional Government. Although the 
workers were distrustful of the propertied classes, there was little support for abolishing the 
Provisional Government and establishing a full council republic. As one meeting of 
metalworkers on 21 March 1917 near Petrograd resolved:  
 
All measures of the Provisional Government that destroy the remnants of the autocracy and strengthen 
the freedom of the people must be fully supported on the part of democracy. All measures that lead to 
conciliation with the old regime and that are directed against the people must meet a most decisive 
protest and counteraction.259 
 
Workers demanded a strict control of ministers within the government and the vigilant 
oversight of the implementation of the soviets’ program. However, it was not seen as 
necessary to transform the councils into bureaucratic organisations that would fulfil 
governmental administrative duties. 
 
Debates at the All-Russian Congress of Soviets in June presented a division between the 
moderate and radical socialists.260 The point of conflict related to the instability of a system of 
dual power. This could be resolved either through the dissolution of the Provisional 
Government and the assumption of sole power by the soviets or through the formation of a 
coalition government between socialists and moderates. The majority of delegates from the 
Mensheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries did not favour taking sole power and argued for 
joining the Provisional Government. They considered that complete soviet rule would alienate 
the peasantry and the bourgeoisie. The workers and soldiers organised in the councils 
represented only a small proportion of the total population. The moderate socialists argued 
that as the peasants and urban-dwellers were continuing to organise themselves in self-
governing units, a national constituent assembly would be a more democratic indicator of the 
desires of the masses. At this point Russia was still largely an agrarian economy with a 
majority of peasants in the lower classes. The Bolsheviks, however, famously argued for 
Lenin’s slogan of “all power to the soviets” and the rejection of the bourgeois Provisional 
Government. With the Bolsheviks still in a small minority at this stage, the All-Russian 
Congress decided against the assumption of power by the soviets and in favour of the 
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formation of a coalition government. The Bolsheviks rejected participation in this 
government, thus setting the scene for the next phase of the conflict. 
 
Following a failed revolt in July, the Bolsheviks began agitating both legally and in 
clandestine for an armed uprising of the workers that would bring them to power. Through his 
study abroad, Lenin had resolved that the revolution must destroy the existing state 
institutions and create new ones. Combining Marx’s text on the Paris Commune with his 
experiences of the Russian Revolution, he saw the soviets as organs of revolutionary power 
that could be seized by the Bolsheviks to direct the revolution.261 However, once the All-
Russian Congress had refused to assume sole power, the Bolsheviks required a different 
course of action. “All hope for peaceful development of the Russian revolution has definitely 
vanished,” Lenin declared. “The objective situation is either a victory of the military 
dictatorship … or victory, in a decisive battle of the workers, which is possible only as a 
powerful mass rising against the government and the bourgeoisie.”262 During the course of 
1917 the Bolsheviks attracted greater support from workers in the soviets due to their 
championing of the lower classes and their revolutionary agitation against the perceived 
failings of the Provisional Government.263 Steadily growing their party from disaffected 
moderate socialists, soldiers and peasants, the Bolshevik Party won 51% of the seats of the 
dumas in Moscow in September compared with only 12% three months earlier.264 The 
Bolsheviks also gained majority support in a few of the metalworkers’ factories and made 
substantial increases in their vote in other areas from February to October 1917. The idea that 
the Bolsheviks seized power solely through illegitimate machinations underestimates their 
broad support amongst parts of the working class. However, even at the peak of their 
popularity in October no more than 5% of workers were actual members of the Bolshevik 
Party and only 1.5% of the Russian population were industrial workers.265 In October, the 
party stood at the precipice of an important decision for armed insurrection. Lenin strongly 
advocated for the seizure of power and attempted to persuade the Bolshevik Central 
Committee to support an uprising. The Committee was at first hesitant, but agreed on 5 
November (Georgian calendar) to an armed rebellion. This was carried out on 7 November 
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1917 when the newly formed Military Revolutionary Committee of the Petrograd Soviet 
ordered the occupation of key government buildings and an attack on the Winter Palace.266 
 
When the Bolsheviks took power they did so in the name of the soviets and the working class. 
However, it was not long after the initial overthrow that the Bolshevik Party began 
centralising power into its own hands. There was little support for armed action against the 
Provisional Government from the other socialist groups. Delegates to the Second All-Russian 
Congress of Soviets from the Menshevik Party and Right Socialist Revolutionaries stormed 
out of the meeting on 13 November 1917 in protest over the Bolshevik’s actions. When the 
new Council of People’s Commissars was elected as the new government its members were 
drawn exclusively from the Bolshevik Party. The other socialist parties attempted to work 
towards a new socialist government with a coalition of members from different socialist 
groups, but the Bolsheviks rejected this possibility. Even key members of the Bolshevik 
Central Committee were critical of this rejection, with five members resigning due to not 
wishing “to bear responsibility for this fatal policy … which is carried out against the will of a 
large part of the proletariat and soldiers.”267 Although the Bolsheviks had majority support 
within a few of the workers’ soviets, in reality, their armed takeover of power in November 
led to minority dictatorship.  
 
As events progressed, it became apparent that the councils were part of a tactical manoeuvre 
for Lenin rather than a deep ideological commitment to worker self-organisation and 
autonomous activity. Lenin distrusted the unguided instincts of the masses, which he believed 
could serve as a bridge to reactionary political paths and economic and social chaos. In July 
1917 Lenin wrote: 
 
In times of revolution it is not enough to ascertain the “will of the majority.” No – one must be stronger 
at the decisive moment, in the decisive place, and win. Beginning with the medieval “peasant war” in 
Germany … until 1905, we see countless instances of how the better organized, more conscious, better-
armed minority imposed its will on the majority and conquered it.268 
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As soon as the councils presented a hindrance to the revolutionary seizure of power by the 
party, their autonomy from the Bolshevik Party was drastically reduced. The majority of 
council delegates from other socialist parties did not agree with Bolshevik one-party rule nor 
did they accept the illiberal measures the Bolsheviks began to apply in order to secure their 
position. To combat dissent, in December 1917 the Bolsheviks created a new brand of secret 
police called the Cheka who had the power to arrest any citizen and to inspect any institution. 
This police force penetrated all soviets and began a wave of terror against suspected counter-
revolutionaries and dissidents.269 The remaining socialist parties that were still working within 
the soviets now faced even more difficult conditions. The secret police also clamped down on 
anarchist activity and shut down several left-wing newspapers and publications. Within a 
matter of months, the Bolsheviks had disenfranchised the soviets and established control over 
the central apparatuses of government.270 On 14 June 1918, the Bolsheviks decided to expel 
all the Mensheviks and Right Socialist Revolutionaries from the soviets, further consolidating 
their one-party rule. 
 
The re-emergence of local, decentralised councils in Kronstadt in 1921 elicited a hostile 
reaction from the Bolsheviks. The Kronstadt sailors demanded direct mass democracy in 
accordance with the will of the people rather than a Bolshevik minority. They proclaimed that 
“the Communist Party, which rules the country, has become separated from the masses, and 
shown itself unable to lead her from her state of general ruin.”271 Both Lenin and Trotsky 
blamed the rebellion on the influence of foreign imperialist powers and dismissed it as a 
negligible challenge to Bolshevik rule. An examination of the demands of the Kronstadt 
sailors, however, reveals not the operation of foreign agents but a desire for “new elections to 
the Soviet … on a fairer basis” that would lead to “true representation of the labourers” and 
for a rejuvenation of the Soviet as “an active and energetic organ.”272 The criticisms were not 
directed at the soviet system as such but towards the Bolshevik control of this system through 
a dictatorial centralised party. Nevertheless, the rebellion stood as a challenge to Bolshevik 
rule and was ruthlessly put down. The final call of the Kronstadt delegates was “all power to 
soviets and not to parties,” before they were subdued by the Communist Party in March 
                                                
269 Richard Pipes, The Russian Revolution 1899–1919 (London: Fontana Press, 1990) 730. 
270 Paul Avrich, Kronstadt 1921 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970) 161. For a more detailed account 
of the Bolshevik seizure of power from the councils see Maurice Brinton, The Bolsheviks and Workers’ Control, 
1917–1921 (London: Solidarity, 1970). 
271 “To the Populace of the Fortress and Town of Kronstadt, Comrades and Citizens!” Kronstadt Izvestia 
Number 1, 3 March 1921. 
272 Ibid.	  
 74 
1921.273 By 1921, with the crushing of the Kronstadt sailors’ rebellion, all semblance of rule 
by the soviets themselves had vanished and the party had assumed complete control.  
 
The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, created by the Bolsheviks as a one-party state, had 
little resemblance to the original council form or with the hopes and aspirations of most 
council delegates at the beginning of the revolution. As Alexander Rabinowitch notes, when 
the councils arose they were “genuinely democratic, embryonic organisations of popular self-
rule” which channelled the goals of the dissatisfied lower classes of citizens for the “creation 
of an egalitarian society and a democratic-socialist, multi-party political system.”274 The 
position of the councils within the increasingly totalitarian one-party state was reduced to 
bureaucratised pillars of state power.275 Yet the councils developed independently of 
Bolshevik ideology and only at a later date became incorporated within the communist state. 
Prior to this point, the councils were revolutionary organs of workers’ power as part of a 
broad, popular democratic movement against tyranny. The Bolsheviks were able to pacify the 
democratic and anti-centralist forces in the councils and transform the self-government of 
elected factory committees and co-operatives into a centralised Bolshevik state. 
 
 
Germany: The Councils Betrayed 
 
The German councils, by contrast, are far less well known than their Russian counterparts. 
The later history of the collapse of the Weimer Republic and the rise of Nazism has tended to 
overshadow this ambiguous chapter in German history. Unlike many other revolts and 
revolutions of the twentieth century, the working class was the principal protagonist of the 
German Revolution.276 The revolution was organised by the strongest union movement in the 
world, which was made up of two and a half million workers. German workers had been 
steeped in Marxist theory for two generations and the unions were deeply involved in shop-
floor negotiations over pay and working conditions. Renegades within the union movement 
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constituted the main opposition to the First World War within Germany.277 They mobilised 
workers, disrupted ammunition production and attempted to bring Germany’s war efforts to a 
halt. As the German armed forces showed the final signs of defeat by the Allies, events began 
to move at a lightning speed. Less than a week had passed between a sailors’ mutiny at Kiel 
on 5 November 1918, the abdication of the Kaiser, and two separate declarations of a German 
republic on 9 November 1918.  
 
The first of the declarations was by Philip Scheidemann of the Social Democratic Party of 
Germany (SPD), who declared Germany a republic from the Reichstag; the second was by 
revolutionary socialist, Karl Liebknecht of the Independent Social Democratic Party of 
Germany (USPD), who proclaimed Germany a free socialist republic from a balcony of the 
Berlin Royal Residence.278 This situation was symptomatic of the contested political climate 
at the time and the number of competing claims to power and authority. Liebknecht, who had 
recently been released from jail and refounded the Spartacus League, was viewed as an erratic 
radical by the SPD.279 In turn, the radical elements of the workers movement, including the 
USPD, the Spartacus League [Spartakusbund] and the Revolutionary Shop Stewards 
[Revolutionäre Obleute] – a radical organisation with extensive networks within the industrial 
factories – distrusted the SPD leadership who they saw as attempting to obstruct the 
revolution. The future governmental form of the new German state would not finally be 
decided until the National Congress of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Councils [Allgemeiner 
kongreß der Arbeiter- und Soldatenräte] in mid-December 1918. 
 
Later that same evening, on 9 November 1918, the Stewards attempted to seize the initiative 
by announcing elections for workers’ and soldiers’ councils to be held the following day.280 
This group was the most organised and disciplined in the workers movement and made up the 
core of the organised sections of the councils. The Stewards had been planning a coup 
independently of the sailors’ mutiny in Kiel and had been surprised by the abdication of the 
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Kaiser and the pace of the revolution. The initial plans for the formation of workers councils 
were hastily drawn up by revolutionary steward, Richard Müller, “without checking it 
thoroughly, responding to the need of the hour.”281 The brevity and ambiguity of Müller’s 
proposal would later allow different parties to attempt to impose their own designs on the 
council form. Upon hearing of plans for elections, the SPD sent speakers to the factories to 
influence the elections in favour of the SPD leadership. 
 
In the confusion of elections the following day, council delegates in fact elected 
representatives to two political bodies: an interim cabinet for a provisional government and an 
Executive Council [Vollzugsrat]. Learning of the SPD’s attempt to control the provisional 
government, the Stewards suggested the establishment of an “Action Committee,” 
[Aktionsausschuss] which they hoped would assist in controlling the conservative leanings of 
the provisional government.282 Delegates at the meeting rejected the suggestion, but a 
compromise was reached to elect an Executive Council, which was, in theory, the highest 
ranked political organ in Germany.283 The Executive Council, headed by Richard Müller, 
issued a declaration that the sovereignty and constituent power of the German people was 
represented by the councils and embodied (at least provisionally) in the Executive Council.284 
But to the great dismay of the Stewards, delegates voted in favour of an SPD dominated 
interim cabinet to be established as a provisional government in Berlin. The cabinet of six 
members, called the “Council of People’s Deputies” [Rat der Volksbeauftragten], formally 
recognised the councils as the source of its power, although the exact relationship remained 
unclear.285 The Executive Council held the right to appoint and dismiss the six People’s 
Deputies and demanded a right of control over the operation of the ministries.286 But in 
practice, the Council of People’s Deputies began to assume greater power and governmental 
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functions and disregarded resolutions of the Executive Council, leading to an increasingly 
acrimonious relationship between the two.287 During November and December 1918 open 
hostility was temporarily muted due to a strong public demand for unity across the working 
class. 
 
The composition of the Council of People’s Deputies itself was indicative of the competing 
ambitions and tendencies that existed within the revolutionary movement. There was a 
political schism between the three SPD members and the three USPD members of the Council 
over the precise role of the workers’ and soldiers’ councils.288 The more radical USPD 
favoured the establishment of the councils as permanent political and economic institutions, at 
least until more of the revolution’s aims had been achieved.289 In their conception, the 
councils should form the basis of a new executive power to be based in Berlin composed of 
directly recallable delegates. In the economic sphere, the USPD advocated for worker-
managed factories under democratic control. At the very least, there was a strong desire 
among the radical elements of the revolution to create more facts on the ground before 
anything resembling nation-wide elections could be considered. They wanted to destroy the 
power base of the old industrialists and officer class and transform the structures of German 
society so that more conservative political parties would no longer appear as viable options in 
a future election. On the other side stood the SPD members led by their party leader, Friedrich 
Ebert. He considered the councils as merely temporary organs with only limited economic 
functions and preferred the immediate election of a constituent assembly to establish a 
parliamentary republic.290 The SPD thought that fundamental issues of constitutional law, the 
composition of the economic order and the new structure of government should be decided 
after the election of a national assembly. In reality, they were sceptical of the chaotic and 
undisciplined nature of the councils and did not consider them as desirable alternatives to a 
parliamentary system. This disagreement led to one of the biggest questions of the National 
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Congress of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Councils: the choice between parliamentary democracy 
and proletariat democracy, or otherwise stated, “national elections or the council system.”291 
 
The popular nature of the council movement represented a dramatic break with the previous 
theory and practice of the social democrats in Germany. The general view in the SPD was that 
the councils were filled with poor unskilled labourers who knew nothing about socialism or 
revolution.292 The SPD held a wait-and-see approach when it came to the revolution, which 
focussed on improving German workers’ living conditions and led to political passivity.293 
The SPD had tried throughout the war period to control workers, make reasonable demands to 
government and focus efforts on production. Rather than conceive socialism as a matter of top 
down planning within state apparatuses, the councils embodied a more radical form of 
socialism consisting of mass participation from below.294 Delegates were voted from within 
the factories and were directly accountable to their constituencies. The entire movement was 
based on the participation of ordinary workers and their continual pressure on leadership to 
fulfil key demands. The leadership of the SPD considered this form of organisation 
irresponsible and subject to the whims of the masses who lacked the hard-headed realism of 
their leaders. There was also a general fear of the bolshevisation of German politics and the 
threat of minority takeover. However, the German councils were not explicitly modelled after 
the Bolshevik council state. Indeed, the extreme measures that the Bolsheviks undertook 
throughout 1918 during the beginning of the “Red Terror” tended to discredit the idea of a 
proletariat dictatorship.295 Many of the German socialists were neither favourably disposed 
towards the Bolsheviks nor particularly impressed by the results that they had achieved.  
 
The split within the provisional government represented the precarious balance of power 
between revolutionary and conservative forces. In reality, a state of dual power persisted in 
Germany throughout November and December of 1918 between the councils and the old state 
bureaucracy, military command and police force. As the latter offered no resistance to the 
councils, the whole structure tended to remain in place.296 The conservative elements of the 
state were compelled to begrudgingly accept the de facto position of the councils. The 
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bourgeoisie, industrialists and organised unions were suspicious of the councils, but were too 
timid to risk a direct confrontation.297 The revolutionaries had perhaps naively underestimated 
the staying power of the bureaucratic apparatuses even after the revolution had taken place. 
Friedrich Ebert managed to insist that the majority of personnel in these institutions should 
retain their positions and that council delegates should monitor them to ensure compliance 
with revolutionary objectives. Later, Richard Müller would complain how “the entire political 
and economic life is the same, only that the workers’ and soldiers’ councils, embodied in the 
Executive Council, represent the sovereignty of the state.”298 There was no thought within the 
SPD of the purging or democratising of the bureaucratic apparatus. They used their role 
within the council movement to protect the state machinery and allow it to retain much of its 
old character.  
 
Even in the earlier stages of the revolution, conservative forces in the councils were already 
attempting to undermine them from within. Unknown to most council members at the time, 
late in the evening on 10 November 1918 a secret deal was struck between SPD leader, 
Friedrich Ebert, and head of the armed forces, General Wilhelm Groener. According to this 
pact, the General guaranteed the military’s support of the SPD against the councils so long as 
Ebert agreed to reinstate military discipline and restore the power of the officers.299 Fearing 
the radicalisation of the revolution along the lines of the Russian soviets, Ebert allied himself 
with the conservatives and old elites of the Empire in order to avoid a social revolution.300 For 
this reason, real power in the council movement always remained with the SPD, since they 
were the only faction with whom the old conservative powers would negotiate.301 Ebert aimed 
to win over the old elite to the SPD and form a ruling coalition against the radical elements of 
the councils.302 There is extensive evidence that he joined the revolution primarily to slow 
events down and control it. His participation in the Council of People’s Delegates was a 
strategic play rather than any show of support for the council form or the ambitions of a social 
revolution. 
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The slogan of the workers’ movement was “Freiheit, Friede und Brot!” [freedom, peace and 
bread]. Their program consisted of calls for democracy, pacifism, socialisation of the 
economy and an end to the hierarchical and bureaucratic apparatuses that oppressed them.303 
An indication of the desires and aspirations of the rank-and-file delegates of the councils can 
be gained from the speeches and voting that took place at the first National Congress of 
Workers’ and Soldiers’ Councils from 16 to 20 December 1918 to decide on the future of the 
German republic.304 Plans for the congress were first spoken about on 10 November 1918 at 
the initial gathering of council delegates at Circus Busch.305 The proceedings of the 
conference offer invaluable source material on the political perspectives of the delegates and 
the competing arguments that were staged within the councils. The 489 delegates of this so-
called “Parliament of the Revolution” were to decide on the future of the German state form 
and other central political issues such as the timeframe of national elections, socialisation of 
industry and the structure of the military.306 
 
The most immediate demands of the soldiers were for a dismantling of the system of military 
hierarchy and discipline, including the abolition of all marks of rank, the election of officers 
by their men, and the takeover of military discipline and command by the councils. The 
Congress approved these measures through its affirmation of the radical “Hamburg Points” 
that were introduced by the Hamburg soldiers’ council and approved without dissent.307 
Friedrich Ebert did not openly oppose the points at this stage, although he would have known 
that they would have been entirely unacceptable to the military high command who supported 
him. Instead, he sought to influence the progression of events through his position as the 
Representative for Military Affairs on the Council of People’s Delegates. In late December 
1918, Ebert commissioned the formation of new voluntary units, which would later be used 
against the revolutionary forces. One of the contradictions of this period was that although 
delegates voted for the transformation of military hierarchy and discipline, in practice many 
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of the troops still elected their old officers back to the same position. As a result, there was 
minimal structural change.308 After the elections on 19 January 1919 the government declared 
the Hamburg points to be mere “guidelines” and refused to change the fundamental structure 
of the army. By June 1919, soldiers’ councils were no longer functioning in Germany and had 
been replaced by the establishment of a new army.309 
 
On the morning of Friday, 20 December 1918, delegates of the congress debated measures for 
socialising the economy. Such a program had already been announced by the provisional 
government in a declaration on 10 November 1918, “for the speedy and thorough 
socialisation of the capitalist means of production.”310 However, aside from appointing a 
“Socialisation Committee” to produce a report, the cautious interim government had been 
content with minor social reform measures rather than a change of relations between capital 
and labour.311 From the revolutionary outbreak onwards, the word “socialisation” was at the 
forefront of national debate. In a 1919 pamphlet entitled “What is Socialisation?” leading 
German Marxist theorist and member of the Socialisation Committee, Karl Korsch, describes 
socialisation as a “new regulation of production with the goal of replacing private capitalist 
economy with a socialist communal economy.”312 This constituted a striving towards the 
democratic control of the means of production by workers who would determine production 
based on the needs of the community. For Korsch, socialisation did not simply mean that 
workers would begin to run factories, as in the case of producers’ associations, but that 
production would be brought under the ownership and control of the community as a whole. 
In Korsch’s conception, this would entail a middle ground between the exploitation of 
capitalist production and the centralised planning of state socialism through a network of 
producer and consumer groups in civil society. Other individuals and groups within 
Germany’s council movement had varied understandings of what was meant by socialisation, 
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but most of these entailed a form of social ownership of the means of production and worker 
management and control of key industries.313  
 
Rudolf Hilferding opened proceedings on the final day of the conference by presenting a 
report from the Socialisation Committee. Acknowledging the considerable difficulties that 
would be involved, he recommended socialisation of the mines and parts of the coal industry, 
while approaching the socialisation of other industries with more caution. He requested that 
agricultural production by peasant farms should be left for the time being, while industries in 
which capitalist cartels and trusts had produced particularly exploitative systems should be 
gradually socialised. The main practical difficulty facing the government was the shortage of 
capital and raw materials. The SPD leadership considered that the socialisation of industry 
would further hamper an already crippled German economy. In a previous cabinet meeting, 
Gustav Bauer, SPD Minister for Labour, contended that socialisation was likely to produce 
“Russian conditions” of rationing and starvation.314 Phillipp Scheidemann maintained that 
socialisation measures would scare away employers and hinder the creation of new jobs. The 
USPD delegates questioned whether full economic recovery was really a condition for 
socialisation, but even left-wing delegates recognised the obstacles of socialising the economy 
in one country alone without international solidarity.315 Yet, there was general optimism 
towards the idea of a gradual process of socialisation, particularly from the miners who 
pushed for even more immediate steps to be taken. In response to the question of pursuing 
socialist measures in one country alone, it was argued that if Germany started the process 
other countries would follow and German socialisation would help spread socialism abroad. 
Hilferding concluded the debate as follows: “Germany is going this alone. But, party 
comrades, precisely that makes this task not only difficult but also promises that the solution 
will carry an extremely highly reward.”316 Delegates voted with a clear majority in favour of 
the socialisation of all industries that were “ripe” for it, in particular, the mining industry.317 
The victory for the SPD was to formulate this resolution such that there arose no immediate 
actionable directives, allowing for the delay of any practical socialisation measures. 
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On the issue of council democracy or national assembly, on the other hand, the majority of 
delegates were clearly not in favour of asserting the councils as a new state form. They were 
generally against the idea of establishing anything like the council dictatorship of Russia.318 
One of the most important consequences of the Congress was the scheduling of national 
elections for 19 January 1919, even earlier than first proposed, which placed Germany on 
track to become a parliamentary democratic republic. Ernst Däumig’s recommendation of the 
continuation of the council system was voted down with a sizable majority. The safer option, 
presented by SPD member, Max Cohen, was to call for national elections to a new parliament. 
His reasoning was that without a clear majority the socialists would face substantial resistance 
from the bourgeoisie and risked a Bolshevik-style minority takeover and civil war. The 
negative experience of Russia played a large role in the minds of the delegates as the German 
revolutionaries had always considered that a German revolution would necessarily be based 
on a proletarian majority. For many of the delegates who had either fought in the war or 
experienced other wartime hardships, the idea of experimenting with a largely hitherto 
untested state form was an unattractive option. There was a widespread hope that the socialist 
goals of the revolution would be implemented from above by a socialist majority government 
following a national assembly. As a result, the congress voted in favour of Cohen’s 
suggestion. Däumig warned that the councils would be signing their own death sentence by 
supporting a national vote, since the bourgeoisie would never allow the councils and 
parliament to exist side by side. He argued for a “proletarian democracy expressed in the 
council system” that would be a more genuine expression of the will of the people than a 
bourgeois parliament.319 Richard Müller also questioned the other delegates: 
 
Should the fate of the German Revolution be handed to a national assembly elected by every German 
adult—exploiter and exploited, revolutionary and counterrevolutionary alike—or should the proletariat, 
the armed workers and soldiers, keep and secure the political power in a council system, establish the 
dictatorship of the proletariat, and wrest the economic power from the bourgeoisie?320 
 
In this instance, Däumig’s warnings proved accurate. Following a workers’ revolt in early 
January 1919 the SPD and the army acted to violently repress the councils with the assistance 
of the reactionary Freikorps, returned soldiers still loyal to the officer class. The hastily 
assembled “Revolutionary Committee” who had issued a call for the overthrow of the SPD 
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government was little match for the well-organised and disciplined troops loyal to the 
government. The uprising was put down and a number of its leaders were killed in the 
process. The move to the right by the SPD was assisted by the sizeable vote they received in 
the national elections, winning 163 of the 421 seats, which solidified their position and 
emboldened their stance against the revolutionaries. With Luxemburg and Liebknecht 
executed by the Freikorps and the councils undermined and powerless, a new parliament was 
elected and plans for more extensive social and political transformations were put on hold. 
 
While it is clear from the councils’ proclamations that their most immediate concerns were for 
the democratisation of social and economic life, delegates could not see at the time that their 
support for a national assembly would lead to the defeat of these more important goals. The 
revolution ultimately failed to attain the workers’ more pressing demand for the 
reorganisation of the economy and military along the lines of a socialist democracy. During 
the first months of the revolution, the SPD leadership were able to outmanoeuvre their 
adversaries and impose their own narrative on the course of the revolution. In this way, they 
managed to prevent the realisation of the more far-reaching demands of the radical elements 
of the councils. Events transpired slightly differently in other German cities, where a number 
of “council republics” were declared in Munich, Bremen and Brunswick.321 However, by 
1921, the organisational form of the councils was largely defeated across Germany.322 It was 
left to intellectuals to debate over different theoretical models after it had been vanquished as 
a true historical force.323  
 
 
Between Council Dictatorship and Social Democracy 
 
In this section, I contrast Arendt’s account of the councils with the historical evidence in order 
to scrutinise a number of her claims. My first point of contention relates to Arendt’s assertion 
that the councils were not content to be temporary revolutionary organs, but in fact considered 
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themselves to be a new form of government. She portrays the history of the councils as a 
competition between two systems: the party and the council system, which “came to the fore 
in all twentieth century revolutions.”324 In Arendt’s conception, the councils were popular 
assemblies that strived for a transformation of the state and “made all attempts at establishing 
themselves as permanent organs of government.”325 She criticises Marx and Lenin for failing 
to grasp this aspect of the councils and for viewing them as merely temporary institutions of a 
revolutionary movement. Is Arendt accurate in considering the councils as a new form of 
government? This question implies a determination of whether it is even possible to refer to a 
council system, as opposed to merely a council movement or a revolutionary program. In fact, 
as the councils never had one unique form, it would be misleading to speak of a council 
system in the singular.326 There was much disagreement over their proper role as the councils 
had little in the way of theoretical development before they arose. Some commentators have 
attempted to differentiate between different forms of councils, identifying their various 
features and creating a council typography.327 A limitation with such a schematic approach is 
that rarely did the actors themselves agree on which form of council they were participating 
in. The structure and function of the councils was itself the subject of political struggle and 
debate. One’s understanding of the nature of the councils was often determinative of a 
broader political program relating to how society and its main institutions should be 
structured. A great lack of clarity persisted over the essential tasks of the councils, even 
among their staunchest defenders.328 Debates were had over the structure of the councils, the 
source of their power, their sphere of activity (political or economic) and their relationship to 
existing social and political institutions.329 Configurations of regimes that incorporated some 
form of a council structure ranged from models of social democracy to council dictatorship.  
 
A distinction can be drawn between the ideological conceptions of the councils within 
different groups and the actual actions of the councils in practice. On the one hand, we have 
already seen that some of the more radical council delegates clearly imagined the councils as 
the basis of a new state form. In Germany, members of the Revolutionary Shop Stewards and 
the Spartacus League offered detailed outlines of the possible structure and functions of a new 
                                                
324 Arendt, On Revolution, 265. 
325 Ibid., 256.	  
326 Gutmann, Das Rätesystem: Seine Verfechter und seine Probleme, 130. 
327 See Tormin, Zwischen Rätediktatur und sozialer Demokratie. 
328 Korsch, “Evolution of the Problem of the Political Workers Councils in Germany”. 
329 For an overview of the different conceptions of the council system from the perspective of the communists, 
socialists, democrats, conservatives and independents see the collection of primary sources in Bessmertny and 
Neven Du Mont (eds.), Die Parteien und das Rätesystem. 
 86 
council state. Along these lines, the Executive Council in Berlin declared in a statement of 17 
November 1918: “The German state has to become a proletarian republic on the grounds of a 
socialist economy.”330 The future of the German Revolution was seen by its revolutionary 
elements as a choice between bourgeois democracy and a council republic.331 On the other 
hand, the SPD believed the councils should not exceed anything more beyond a minor 
economic role in channelling workers’ demands. This is the fate that eventually awaited the 
councils in Germany in Article 165 of the new Reich Constitution, which restricted the 
workers’ councils to purely economic tasks. 
 
In practice, however, an analysis of the actual decisions of the council delegates reveals a 
consistent disinclination towards abolishing other formal institutions of government. In the 
case of Germany, most of the urban and rural councils outside of Berlin did not exercise 
anything more than a mere control function over existing state apparatuses.332 Some attempts 
were made to construct council republics, most notably in Bavaria and in Hungary, but these 
endeavours were largely unsuccessful and differed from the aspirations of the majority of 
those who participated in the councils in other parts of Europe.333 For this reason, it is 
misleading for Arendt to assert that the councils always considered themselves as permanent 
organs of government that would survive the end of the revolution.334 However, it is equally 
disingenuous of some of her critics to claim that the councils never entertained such 
aspirations.335 The reality is far more complex. Councils arose in different institutional and 
political contexts and were subject to competing and antagonistic social forces. Many of the 
participants in the councils were extremely sceptical of the promises of bourgeois 
representative democracy and insisted upon extensive political and economic transformation. 
Yet, during the periods of their greatest power and influence, the councils hesitated at 
asserting their command in the absence of formal parliamentary majorities. Despite the 
desires of the revolutionaries, ordinary council members balked at the idea of creating 
permanent governing institutions out of these revolutionary organs. The problem with 
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Arendt’s assertion of the councils as a new form of government is that the complexities of 
these debates are glided over in favour of her mythologised narrative. 
 
Doubt can also be cast on Arendt’s claims that the councils were neither concerned with 
socio-economic affairs nor considered predominantly as working class institutions. With 
regard to the former claim, we have already seen in the previous chapter that Arendt’s 
characterisation of the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 as concerned almost exclusively with 
political matters was inaccurate. Her attempt to draw a distinction between the councils’ 
economic and political activities is no more successful in the cases of Russia and Germany in 
1917–1919. There is much evidence to suggest that the councils were engaged in a wide 
variety of social and economic activities.336 In the immediate aftermath of the war, when 
economic production had ground to a halt and government bureaucracies were incapacitated, 
the councils undertook a number of urgent practical activities such as economic planning, 
resource distribution and social welfare. Similarly, there is little evidence for Arendt’s 
assertion that the councils sought to avoid economic activities in favour of some conception 
of a purely political function, however this might be understood. No major group who 
participated in the councils shared Arendt’s position of the necessity of maintaining a 
distinction between the economic realm and a public sphere of freedom. One of the oddities 
of her interpretation is that in order to claim that the councils were the emergence of a new 
state form she would have to side with the more radical council delegates who conceived of 
them as forming the structure of a proletarian republic and a socialist economy. The radical 
political demand for a new state form went hand in hand with calls for the reorganisation of 
the economy. The division that Arendt attempts to establish between economics and politics 
simply did not exist within the council movement. Not only were the majority of councils 
formed in factories by workers for the express purpose of organising labour, but such a 
division between economic and political affairs is contrary to the dominant political ideology 
of the council delegates. Rather than establish a strict distinction between politics and the 
economy, councils sought to introduce democratic controls into the workplace. It was their 
desire to have a greater control over this aspect of their daily lives that incited workers to 
demand council organisations play a greater role in key industries. 
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The question of whether the councils were exclusively working class institutions – along the 
lines of Marx’s concept of the proletariat – is more difficult to answer. Certainly, a number of 
the leaders and organisers of the councils were imbued with the spirit of revolutionary 
Marxism, as were radical elements of the Revolutionary Shop Stewards and other organised 
workers. However, the inclusion of soldiers in both council systems often led to a dampening 
of the more radical aspirations of the revolutionary leaders. Soldiers, on the whole, were less 
favourably disposed to radical transformations and more influenced by liberal ideology that 
favoured national elections to a parliament. The way in which their units were structured also 
led them to exercise a greater than proportional influence over the voting sessions, since a 
soldier often represented far fewer than the 1000 workers supposedly represented by each 
factory delegate.337 Even within the ranks of the Marxists there was no consistent view that 
the councils were revolutionary working class institutions capable of carrying out a full social 
revolution. The orthodox Marxist view held by the organised unions was that the true 
revolution could only proceed once a majority of the population backed the idea of a socialist 
society. According to this interpretation, it was the unions and the SPD that were the true 
working class institutions, rather than the unruly councils who could make unrealistic 
demands and jeopardise the slow and gradual achievements of the working class. It was only 
the position of the more radical delegates that the councils constituted the sole instrument of 
proletariat power and social revolution.338 The moderates argued that the urban poor and other 
rural people had not yet organised themselves and that they too required their voices to be 
heard. Yet in spite of the moderates’ fears of mass radicalism through the councils, there was 
little doubt from any of the parties that at the very least these institutions represented the 
interests of ordinary workers and soldiers. They were viewed by political actors at the time as 
composed of elements of the working classes and representing interests that were in conflict 
with those of the bourgeoisie and the old government bureaucracy.  
 
Next, we turn to Arendt’s suggestion that the councils were opposed to the parties and 
represented a different principle of organisation. For Arendt, “what the councils challenged 
was the party system as such,” a conflict which came to the fore “whenever the councils, born 
of revolution, turned against the party or parties” as a danger to their existence.339 Yet for 
Arendt to say that there was a strict opposition between the “parties” on the one hand and the 
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“councils” on the other, ignores the extent to which organised political parties were able to 
exert their influence over the emergence of new political actors and institutions. It is not 
possible to demarcate between two separate “systems,” since most actors within the councils 
were also party members and the dynamics of party politics played out within the councils. 
The councils emerged as a political movement through the organisational initiative of the 
main political parties rather than in opposition to them. Council delegates were generally not 
elected from amongst the factories and trades of the proletariat, but were organised through 
the existing socialist parties, which tended to increase factional fighting and manipulation.340 
In her exhaustive study of the German National Congress of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Councils, 
Sabine Roß concludes that party-membership was the strongest determinant of voting patterns 
at the Congress.341 Both of the two main political parties pre-caucused the day before the 
Congress and differences in voting represented a deep ideological divide between the parties 
over their interpretation of the meaning and the consequences of the revolution. One could be 
critical of the negative influence that party manipulation had over the course of the history of 
the councils, but it does not make sense to imagine that they emerged on the basis of an anti-
party political agenda or with a view to replace a party system of government, which had not 
even existed in Russia or Germany prior to the revolution. Arendt’s criticism of the party 
system is more intelligible when considered as her reaction to the machinations and power 
politics of the American two-party system of her time. 
 
The main weakness Arendt admits of the councils is that they “did not distinguish clearly 
between participation in public affairs and administration or management of things in the 
public interest.”342 In her account, this is the only hint that the councils suffered from an 
internal shortcoming, rather than merely adverse external circumstances. Her romanticised 
glossing of the councils renders them a disservice by failing to properly illuminate their 
weaknesses. It leads to an unrealistic assessment of a set of institutions that even sympathetic 
participants admitted were improvised, at times disorganised, and evolved haphazardly 
according to the demands of the situation.343 For example, historical evidence indicates that 
the councils rarely adhered to strict voting methods, meeting procedures or verification of 
deputies.344 In Germany, initial plans for the formation of workers councils were drawn up 
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without any consideration for the huge industrial and working class neighbourhoods outside 
of Berlin’s city limits.345 Committed radicals would later complain that the council delegates 
themselves often did not have the faintest idea of the organisational tasks of the councils or 
what historical role they could have played. Karl Korsch lamented: 
 
Such was the lack of clarity which, during the first period immediately following the November events, 
prevailed with respect to the essential tasks of the Council dictatorship, even among the most renowned 
defenders of the revolutionary idea of the Councils in Germany.346 
 
Furthermore, the councils faced the inevitable difficulty of gradual bureaucratisation as they 
became increasingly burdened with administrative affairs. In Russia, as the councils took on 
more tasks, they were forced to create an executive, which became more autonomous and 
disconnected from its constituents.347 Nevertheless, a crucial feature in all of the pre-1920 
councils was that deputies had recallable positions. This ensured, at a minimum, the control of 
the deputies’ work by their constituents. However, the councils’ large bodies and occasionally 
disorganised meetings demonstrated that they were less suited to complex administrative 
tasks than to their function as organs of a revolutionary movement. Their strength lay in their 
ability to represent the interests of some of the lowest strata of society in a simple, 
reproducible and accountable political structure that was responsive to workers’ needs and 
could be readily assembled. As the councils began to resemble administrative apparatuses of 
the state, they were less able to act as revolutionary organs. 
 
A further weakness on which Arendt remains characteristically silent is the question of gender 
politics and the lack of women in leadership roles in the councils. Although all parties in the 
councils broadly supported women’s emancipation, this did not equate to equal representation 
of men and women within the councils’ executive.348 There were hardly any female officials 
compared to the significant numbers of women within the rank and file of the workers and 
their decisive role in revolutionary events.349 Of the 489 delegates at the German Congress, 
only two were women: Klara Noack and Kätha Leu.350 Leu was the only woman to speak and 
                                                
345 Hoffrogge, Working-Class Politics in the German Revolution, 76. 
346 Korsch, “Evolution of the Problem of the Political Workers Councils in Germany”. 
347 Anweiler, The Soviets, 112. 
348 Hoffrogge, Working-Class Politics in the German Revolution, 10. For example, the 1919 National Assembly 
was the first time women were able to vote in national elections in Germany. 
349 “The Unions and Women,” Der kommunistische Gewerkschafter (1921) 2; Helga Grebing, Frauen in der 
deutschen Revolution 1918/1919 (Heidelberg: Stiftung Reichpräsident Friedrich Ebert Gedenkstätte, 1984). 
350 Roß, Biographisches Handbuch der Reichsrätekongresse 1918/1919, 209–212. 
 91 
this was at the end of the final day of the conference. She was also the first to address the 
delegates with the gender inclusive “Parteigenossen und Parteigenossin.”351 Before she spoke, 
the chairperson insisted that an important task of the revolution was to actively support 
women’s interests, but this plea could barely be heard above the noise from the previous 
discussion.352 Sabine Roß notes that this lack of female representation cannot be put down to 
a lack of active and politically capable women, since there were a large number of talented 
women involved in the council movement.353 While the councils provided an institution for 
ordinary workers to exert a greater political influence than in any other time in history, they 
systematically reproduced the same patriarchal structures that excluded women from public 
life.  
 
A return to the historical evidence of the council movements in Russia and Germany has 
revealed a different narrative to the one put forward in Arendt’s interpretation of the council 
system. This historical analysis provides a critical lens through which Arendt’s account can be 
interrogated to better understand the structure and contradictions of her political thought. One 
important conclusion is that Arendt’s retrieval of the councils cannot be taken as a historically 
accurate portrayal of the actions of council delegates during this period. Acknowledging this 
discrepancy facilitates a more productive encounter with Arendt’s political theory and the 
historical practices of the council delegates. The misrepresentations in Arendt’s account often 
highlight moments of tension in her work and theoretical difficulties with which she 
continued to grapple. However, the historical errors and distortions of Arendt’s interpretation 
should not lead us to consider her political theory fatally flawed. Rather, they assist us in 
distinguishing between the incisive aspects of her analysis, the points at which Arendt’s 
evaluation should be treated with caution and elements of the councils that would benefit 
from further research. 
 
Against the backdrop of this historical portrait of the council movements, I will now outline 
the development of my argument in the following chapters. In the next chapter, I return to 
Arendt’s political theory to explore how her writings on council democracy provide an 
alternative set of political principles that can serve as a counterweight to the currently 
dominant liberal conception of democratic government. Next, in chapter four, I continue my 
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analysis of Arendt’s political theory by turning to her institutional proposal of a council 
democracy and examining its strengths and weaknesses for democratic theory. In the final 
chapter of the thesis, I consider the ways in which the historical councils can be reconsidered 
in order to provide new resources for contemporary democratic practices. Here, I put aside 
Arendt’s political theory and return to the historical examination of the councils undertaken in 
chapter two. The theoretical work of chapter five builds directly upon my historical analysis 
of obtaining a more accurate and nuanced understanding of the political struggles of the 
councils. In this sense, I continue to draw from both Arendt’s political theory and the 
historical practices of council delegates in order to question current democratic institutions. 
 
 
  
  
 93 
Chapter 3: Arendtian Principles 
 
 
Arendt celebrates the abyssal nature of human action – its ability to make radical ruptures 
with the past and to initiate new political beginnings. But despite the numerous interpretations 
and analyses of Arendt’s account of political action, a crucial dimension has remained vague 
and undefined: how could it be said that action both “springs from” and is “guided by” 
something Arendt calls a principle? Furthermore, Arendt claims that although this principle 
lies at the origin of political action as its inspiration and source, it “becomes fully manifested 
only in the performing act itself.”354 To add to the complexity, Arendt appears to vacillate on 
the location of these principles, arguing first that a political action “carries its own principle 
within itself,” yet at another point claiming that principles “inspire … from without.”355 A re-
examination of this material reveals that one of Arendt’s most novel and important 
innovations is her conception of immanent principles that inspire, guide and organise political 
action.356  
 
Arendt develops her own understanding of political principles from Montesquieu’s distinction 
between different forms of government and their animating principles. While a form of 
government for Montesquieu describes its nature and constitutive structure, it is a principle 
that animates it and inspires the actions of both the government and its citizens, actions whose 
positive effects cannot be explained through the merely negative boundaries of the law. Her 
remarks on principles, scattered through a number of her books and essays, are elliptical, all 
too brief, and are at times even mysterious. Of those who have attempted to understand this 
aspect of her work the temptation has been to either declare it incoherent or interpret it 
                                                
354 Arendt, Between Past and Future, 152. 
355 Arendt, On Revolution, 205; Arendt, Between Past and Future, 152. 
356 For previous discussions of Arendt’s principles see Knauer, “Motive and Goal in Hannah Arendt's Concept of 
Political Action,” 724–726; Kateb, Hannah Arendt: Politics, Conscience, Evil, 12–13; Canovan, Hannah Arendt: 
A Reinterpretation of her Political Thought, 171–175; Gottsegen, The Political Thought of Hannah Arendt, 33–
39; David Ingram, “Novus Ordo Seclorum: The Trial of (Post) Modernity or the Tale of Two Revolutions,” 
in  Larry May and  Jerome Kohn (eds.), Hannah Arendt Twenty Years Later (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press , 1997) 
232–245; Kalyvas, Democracy and the Politics of the Extraordinary, 241–253; Sofia Näsström, “The Right to 
Have Rights: Democratic Not Political,” Political Theory (2014) 42 (5), 543–568; Lucy Cane, “Hannah Arendt 
on the Principles of Political Action,” European Journal of Political Theory (2015) 14 (1), 55–75; Lucy Cane, 
“Arendt on Principles, the Right to Have Rights, and Democracy: Response to Näsström,” Political Theory 
(2015) 43 (2), 242–248; James Muldoon, “Arendtian Principles,” Political Studies (2016) forthcoming. 
 94 
through the lens of other theorists that are foreign to Arendt’s thought.357 As a result, 
particular interpretive difficulties are ignored or glided over. This oversight is unfortunate 
because Arendt implies that a proper understanding of principles is essential to her theory of 
political freedom and human action.358 Indeed, political principles appear at numerous 
decisive points in Arendt’s work and could be described as one of her central political 
concepts.359 There is evidence that this lacuna in the interpretation of her work is beginning to 
be addressed.360 However, recent attempts at explicating Arendt’s concept have failed to 
perceive the multi-faceted nature of political principles or reveal the political logic that 
underpins them. I aim to clarify Arendt’s conception of principles and demonstrate that they 
contain a transformative potential insofar as they are able to open up new relationships with 
the past and enable future political transformations. 
 
There are two important ways in which my analysis of Arendt’s political principles 
contributes to a project of interrogating the weaknesses and limitations of liberal 
representative democracy. First, a reconstruction of the principles of Arendt’s council 
democracy offers a more substantive and robust conception of the principles of democratic 
government than that of minimalist liberal accounts. Arendt holds that a system of 
competitive elections in which citizens endowed with political rights vote for political leaders 
at periodic elections demonstrates only a minimal commitment to rigorous democratic 
criteria.361 She accepts that some form of competitive elections must take place in a 
democracy, but wishes to add to this a concern for a fuller realisation of democracy’s basic 
values such as political freedom and citizen empowerment. Central to Arendt’s perspective is 
the active participation of citizens in governmental decision-making processes. Second, I 
draw on Arendt’s conception of principles in order to highlight the methdological resources 
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available in her work for engaging with historical exemplars. I explicate how Arendt’s use of 
political principles opens up an innovative relationship to the past in which partially realised 
ideals and historical exemplars can be appropriated for political transformation in the present. 
 
The first half of the chapter seeks to explain the nature and function of political principles in 
Arendt’s work. I contend that Arendtian principles contain three partially overlapping 
dimensions, which are provided with different weighting depending on the context in which 
they arise in her work. In “What is Freedom?” Arendt emphasises the originary power of 
principles, their ability to inspire and generate free political action that is unconstrained by a 
prior system of moral standards. In this context, principles ensure the spontaneous and non-
determined nature of action by distinguishing it from the means-ends character of a pre-
determined motive and dictating will. In On Revolution, however, Arendt highlights the 
guiding power of principles, an internal ground of judgment and normative element that arises 
through the performance of the act.362 This standard guards against the arbitrariness and 
potential boundlessness of action and prevents a self-defeating pursuit of an absolute 
beginning upon which to base it. In the essays collected in The Promise of Politics, Arendt 
illustrates the organising power of principles, their embodiment in the institutions and 
practices of a political community based on a shared fundamental experience and set of 
political convictions.363 Finally, I argue that principles contain a transformative potential 
insofar as a return to forgotten principles can inspire new political action on the basis of their 
rearticulation and renewal. 
 
The second half of the chapter continues the analysis begun in chapter one of providing a 
more participatory and empowered interpretation of Arendt’s political theory. I reconstruct 
the three central principles of Arendt’s council system: political freedom as participation in 
political institutions, the empowerment of political communities and decentralised federalism. 
She argues that her basic set of political principles “establishes a diametrically different set of 
guiding principles from the ‘moral’ standards inherent in the Platonic notion of rule.”364 The 
principles of the councils are opposed to the older principles of sovereignty, rulership and the 
nation-state, which she views as having animated modern politics from the French 
Revolution. By putting forth an alternative set of principles Arendt makes an intervention into 
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her own political world and contributes to public deliberation over the appropriate form of 
democratic government. Her purpose is not to legislate universally applicable principles to 
politics but to engage with contemporary debates and persuade her readers of the value in 
these forgotten perspectives. Arendt proposes that the councils represented alternative power 
structures that could challenge the centralised power of parliamentary and state institutions. In 
this sense, Arendt’s political principles gesture towards different forms of political 
organisation through which democracy’s central values could be actualised. 
 
 
Three Perspectives on Arendt’s Principles 
 
The original source of Arendt’s conception of political principles is Montesquieu, who 
defines a principle as “that by which a government is made to act” and “the human passions 
that set it in motion.”365 Drawing from Montesquieu, the first important aspect of Arendtian 
principles is their capacity to “inspire” or “inspirit” action. She describes principles as the 
“source” and the “wellspring” of action, since principles “inspire the actions of both rulers 
and ruled.”366 Action does not necessarily take part in a determined and rule-bound causal 
series since it has the capacity to start something new and connect with a new principle. 
Human beings are capable of new beginnings because action can be inspired by new 
principles and begin unpredicted chains of events. In this sense, principles sustain human 
beings’ capacity for radical novelty by providing a spontaneous and undetermined point of 
departure for action. A difficulty that arises in the interpretation of this position is that Arendt 
makes it clear that she does not wish to equate principles with the subjective psychological 
motives that cause individual human agents to act. How could a principle be both that which 
inspires action and yet still somehow be distinguished from psychological motives? It appears 
absurd that a principle could be simultaneously “never the direct cause of action” but 
“nevertheless what first sets it into motion.”367 Arendt’s argument relies on a distinction that 
she establishes in “What is Freedom?” between an action’s principles and its motives and 
goals.368 Her analysis of this correlation is essential to a proper understanding of her 
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conception of principles. The relationship between the three is explained by Arendt as 
follows:  
 
Principles do not operate from within the self as motives do … but inspire, as it were, from without; and 
they are much too general to prescribe particular goals, although every particular aim can be judged in 
the light of its principle once the act has been started … In distinction from its goal, the principle of an 
action can be repeated time and again, it is inexhaustible, and in distinction from its motive, the validity 
of a principle is universal, it is not bound to any particular person or to any particular group.369 
 
When Arendt states that principles can “inspire” action she is not referring to an agent’s 
empirical desires and motivations. An agent’s motives are a private affair and in certain 
respects are of limited significance to the public realm. Arendt states that an act “makes 
manifest its principle, [but] does not reveal the innermost motivation of the agent.”370 
Principles, for Arendt, are not purely subjective motives, but rather, public grounds of 
justification for the act. To say that an agent is “inspired” to act is not to make a claim about 
the actual subjective motives of the agent but to refer to the norms and reasons according to 
which such action could be justified. There is an overriding public dimension to these grounds 
because they cannot rest on merely contingent or arbitrary motives. Arendt believes that an 
actor should be able to give an account of their actions and to say how they came to hold their 
position and why they acted in the way they did.371 In this respect, Arendt distances herself 
from Montesquieu’s subjective and psychological language of “les passions humaines.” 
 
In opposition to the private existence of motives, principles have an inter-subjective 
dimension that allows them to be deliberated on in the public realm. Arendt argues that “in 
psychological terms,” political principles could be described as the “fundamental convictions 
that a group of people share.” 372 The reference to psychology is confusing here because 
Arendt is elsewhere clear that principles should not be understood in terms of an individual’s 
psychological motivations.373 However, the appeal to “fundamental convictions” can be 
viewed as referring to the shared political values of a community, rather than the particular 
motives of an individual. A community’s political values will “inspire” in Arendt’s sense of 
the term insofar as they represent the deep-seated and habitual political orientation in the 
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world from which agents are accustomed to acting. This is based on Arendt’s belief that it is 
not the negative boundaries of the law but the positive values of a community that will be the 
source of political action. 
 
Furthermore, Arendt distinguishes her conception of principles from particular political goals. 
In Between Past and Future, she argues that the general and non-specific nature of principles 
is what separates them from the particular and determinate ends of political action. Although 
an action can manifest a principle in a significant and meaningful way, principles should not 
be confused with the concrete and particular goals of the action itself. It appears that Arendt 
seeks to differentiate between the broad and general nature of political values from their 
embodiment and actualisation in particular political acts. A goal is fixed, definable, and 
attainable, whereas a principle exists at a higher level of generality and could never be fully 
realised in any particular political action. However, it is difficult to reconcile this position 
with her analysis of goals and principles in The Promise of Politics in which she offers a 
different account of their relationship. In this text, goals come to take on a number of the 
characteristics that in other works Arendt attributes to principles. Arendt describes goals as 
the “guidelines and directions by which we orient ourselves” and the “standards by which 
everything that is done must be judged.”374 When these texts are considered together it is 
difficult to avoid the impression of ambiguity in Arendt’s distinction between goals and 
principles. There is no clear way to make sense of the discrepancy aside from noting that it 
only concerns her account of goals and in both of these texts the multi-faceted nature of 
principles appears the same. The account of principles remains more consistent than that of 
goals across her corpus. Even in The Promise of Politics Arendt argues that when a principle 
is reduced to a mere goal, it loses its character as a constant, habitual and inspiring principle 
of action and becomes merely a standard of judgment.375 
 
The second element of an Arendtian principle is its capacity to act as a non-prescriptive 
ground of judgment from which political actions can be assessed and evaluated. She argues 
that principles are “the guiding criteria by which all actions in the public realm are judged 
beyond the merely negative yardstick of lawfulness.”376 These principles are immanent, 
which is to say that they are contained within the action itself and are opposed to the 
                                                
374 Ibid., 194–195. 
375 Ibid., 195. 
376 Ibid., 65. 
 99 
imposition of transcendent sources of authority, power and control. It is best to begin with 
Arendt’s own account of this: 
 
What saves the act of beginning from its own arbitrariness is that it carries its own principle within 
itself, or, to be more precise, that beginning and principle, principium and principle, are not only related 
to each other, but are coeval. The absolute from which the beginning is to derive its own validity and 
which must save it, as it were, from its inherent arbitrariness is the principle which, together with it, 
makes its appearance in the world.377  
 
Political action, which Arendt connects to the idea of a new beginning, contains within it a 
normative principle as part of its constitutive structure. She views action as being informed by 
these principles, which arise at the same moment as the performance of the action itself. 
Political action thus consists in a concomitant co-creation of an objective deed and a principle 
according to which this deed can be understood and evaluated. The two appear together 
simultaneously in the public realm in which they can be interpreted and judged. The principle 
plays a double role as that which can retrospectively be said to have inspired the act and 
subsequently a standard by which future acts can be compared. For Arendt, such principles 
are not transcendent norms that form part of an objective and universal metaphysical system. 
In order to preserve the freedom and spontaneity of action Arendt does not appeal to an 
external norm against which an action should be judged. The role of the principle, once it has 
arisen alongside and as a result of the action, is to “save” it from its potential to deviate from 
its intended path or to descend into arbitrariness. The principle can be appealed to as a 
guideline and parameter for how the action should continue to be carried out and unfold. The 
fact that the principle arises as part of the action itself means that it is a self-limitation of the 
action rather than its subsumption under an external norm. As a result of their immanence, 
Arendt’s principles are not eternal laws but historically specific criteria that are attached to 
and rely upon the actions that brought them into existence. Their immanence to an action 
places them in a temporal logic of finitude and a specific relationship to the unstable worldly 
affairs of human beings. The dependence of principles on the continuation of the action that 
formed them gives them a particularly fragile and tenuous existence: “the manifestation of 
principles comes about only through action, they are manifest in the world as long as the 
action lasts, but no longer.”378 As components of action, principles arise within particular 
historical moments and in relation to sets of established social practices and norms. For 
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example, in Montesquieu, the principles of honour and virtue provide the evaluative criteria 
according to which public action within monarchies and republics can be judged. The 
principle of honour does not act as a law or rule in the prescriptive sense that it would be 
against the law to act dishonourably, but reference back to this principle provides criteria 
against which action can be measured. 
 
A third perspective on Arendt’s principles is their organisational function as the central values 
of a political community.379 Within this context, principles represent the predominant ideals 
that prevail in the public realm and form of government. These fundamental principles act as 
a reference point and framework around which other ideas and concepts are organised. Such 
principles are pervasive throughout the public realm and are valid for “both the actions of the 
government and the actions of the governed.”380 There are a number of crucial places where 
Arendt describes principles in these terms, such as her reference to the council system as 
based upon “a completely different principle of organization” than that of sovereignty.381 She 
also names “public freedom,” “public happiness,” “mutual promise and common 
deliberation,” “the federal principle” and “the republican principle” as central organising 
forces during the American Revolution.382 Principles become embodied in both the objective 
institutions of a political community and in the subjective inclinations, dispositions and habits 
of its citizens. As a principle of organisation, a particular political value becomes persuasive 
as “criteria according to which all public life is led” and as a standard that becomes embedded 
within institutional forms.383 Arendt emphasises this objective dimension of principles by 
arguing that when principles are no longer heeded “the political institutions themselves are 
jeopardized.”384 They also apply to individuals’ conduct in public life. Principles can have a 
structuring effect insofar as they “map out certain directions” for acceptable patterns of public 
conduct.385 Arendt is not referring to people’s behaviour in their private lives or the construct 
of some abstract and hypothetical “ideal type.” Political principles animate public life, the 
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shared realm in which citizens confront one another as equals and deliberate over common 
concerns. 
 
Montesquieu understood a form of government to consist of a composition of its structure and 
animating principle. Arendt’s revival of this form of analysis demonstrates that she saw some 
validity in providing a typology of different forms of government and searching for their unity 
and structure – an analysis she had already undertaken with totalitarianism.386 In an 
application for funding from the Rockefeller Foundation Arendt states that she would raise 
again “the old question of forms of government, their principles and their modes of action.”387 
In spite of reservations about the nature of Montesquieu’s “unsystematic and sometimes even 
casual observations,” the great benefit of his mode of inquiry is that through remaining 
attentive to the central animating principle of a government he provides a “deep insight into 
the unity of historical civilizations.”388 The reference to a spirit or a unity of a people might 
raise suspicions that Arendt is engaged in a metaphysical analysis of an essence of a 
government or people. However, Arendt argues that it is precisely in Montesquieu’s “less 
metaphysical” analysis in comparison to the later uses of “spirit” by Herder and Hegel that 
proves “fruitful for the study of politics.”389 In contrast to these metaphysical questions, 
Arendt is engaged in a phenomenological analysis that privileges the experiential character of 
human existence. She argues that an organising principle can be derived from a “fundamental 
experience” of a particular form of politics.390 For example, a principle could be based on “the 
experience of equality,” which would find “an adequate political expression in republican 
laws, while love for it, called virtue, inspires actions within republics.”391 Arendt’s return to 
Montesquieu and the seemingly anachronistic study of principles is due to its capacity to 
reveal the fundamental values of a political community and their corresponding conception of 
politics. However, Arendt does not agree with Montesquieu that the possible number of 
principles of different forms of government could be reduced to the three he identifies of 
virtue, honour and fear. She discusses a range of different principles throughout her work and 
it appears that almost any political value could count as a principle if it was that which 
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inspired an action or organised a political realm.392 Arendt envisages that a society will have a 
number of competing principles at any given time that are debated in the public realm. The 
question of which principle, or constellation of principles, is currently dominant is a matter 
for agonistic contestation, deliberation and political judgment.  
 
The tripartite distinction of the three perspectives on Arendt’s principles does not presume 
that the remaining two aspects are absent from her discussion of political principles in each 
text. Rather, her analysis places emphasis on particular characteristics of the concept 
depending on the context and perspective. The way in which different aspects of the concept 
appear and recede when viewed from distinct angles reflects the perspectival nature of 
political deliberation and judgment. 
 
 
The Transformative Potential of Principles  
 
Political principles play a distinctive role in Arendt’s theory due to the historical relation they 
establish between past events, the present and most importantly, as I will stress, an open and 
yet undetermined future. Arendt argues that principles “come down to us through history” and 
can be “repeated time and again” in different historical contexts leading to their regeneration 
in new political settings.393 For Arendt, principles are general in the sense that they are “not 
bound to any particular person or to any particular group.”394 By returning to hitherto 
forgotten principles, political actors evoke different ideals and values to those currently 
dominant in their political realm and attempt to inspire action based on their rearticulation and 
renewal. Arendt’s writings are filled with stories of people who produced radical political 
transformations through a return to principles. A prominent example is the American 
revolutionaries who were able to “change the whole structure of the future world” through a 
rejuvenation of several interrelated political principles.395 Political transformation in this 
broad sense involves extraordinary political moments of new foundations or altering the 
fundamental identity of political regimes. A principle remains dormant while not being 
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practiced in the public realm, but can become a site of transformation if kept alive in 
historical memory. It is this future-oriented character of principles in Arendt’s work that has 
received insufficient attention in the secondary literature.396 There is also a connection 
between Arendt’s discussion of historical examples and principles insofar as both attempt to 
hold open the potential for future political transformation by establishing a relation between 
the present and past exemplary actions and institutions. In this section, I unpack the 
significance of political principles for Arendt’s political theory. 
 
First, the rearticulation of past principles serves a negative or critical function in creating a 
site of contestation over current values. The invocation of a new principle creates a rupture in 
the present, which Arendt refers to as a “hiatus in the continual flow of temporal 
sequences.”397 This challenges established principles and calls into question the central values 
of a political community. It destabilises the authority of current institutions and practices by 
denaturalising their universal and commonly accepted status. Second, and relatedly, a return 
to principles harbours a transformative potential because it opens up a broader perspective of 
political ideas and initiates new debates on the best form of communal life. In “Introduction 
into Politics,” Arendt laments the “narrow horizon of experience left open to us” in the way in 
which we answer the most important questions of our age due to our neglect of political 
principles.398 She underscores the world-expanding nature of principles in their capacity to 
return to forgotten meanings of politics that no longer animate the public realm. Resuscitating 
lost principles of the past allows for a radically altered perspective on the present through a 
new standpoint and set of political values. Without new principles broadening the scope of 
political debate, Arendt argues it would be possible to “take for granted that there is not, and 
never has been, an alternative to the present system.”399  
 
Third, Arendt differentiates her own use of principles from the nostalgic remembrance of a 
former golden age that could be retrieved as a political model for the present. In her view, this 
relies on a misleading notion of history as the cyclical movement of ages in which a certain 
past era could be turned to as a model for a future society.400 Arendt, perhaps unfairly, takes 
aim at Marx for basing his vision of a post-capitalist classless society on the idea of an 
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“original communism” to which it might be possible to return. In her interpretation of 
political principles, Arendt proposes a vastly different relationship between past and future. 
Principles operate within Arendt’s particular understanding of history, interpreted as the 
continual interruption of actions and events rather than a natural or cyclical process. Since the 
continuity of tradition has been broken by the phenomenon of totalitarianism, the only way to 
gain access to the past is through a selective and fragmentary historiography, captured by 
Walter Benjamin’s phrase, “a tiger’s leap into the past.”401 Arendt’s view of history engages 
with the past, but is also attentive to the promise of the future through the creative and 
transformative repetition of principles. Political action draws upon principles of the past, but 
their manifestation in a new political context implies a necessary transformation and 
reconfiguration. 
 
For example, Arendt argues that the principle of freedom has never appeared since the Greek 
polis with the same clarity. In the polis, freedom was the fundamental dimension of human 
life. The experience of freedom in Athens serves as an exemplar and ideal for future 
generations.402 However, a return to this principle would not reconnect us with an unbroken 
tradition by reviving the exact institutions and practices of the Athenians. For Arendt, it is not 
necessarily the “organizational forms” that should be replicated, as if from a blueprint, but 
“certain ideas and concepts” that are partially realised within a political realm. 403 These ideas, 
or exemplars, can be looked back on for inspiration of different ways of practicing politics 
rather than exact models to be copied. The rearticulation of a principle relies upon a double 
movement, in which the new political action is both rooted in the past and shapes the future 
through an act of radical creation. Historical imitation necessarily involves a degree of 
innovation, which transforms the nature of the principle through its rearticulation. As a result, 
the renewal of a principle such as political freedom will always be a form of reinvention and 
transformation. 
 
Political principles embody a tension in Arendt’s work between her criticism of the dangers of 
absolute new beginnings and the need for political action to be nevertheless free and 
unconstrained by prior historical sequences. Although conditioned by its historical context 
and relationship with past struggles, the rearticulation of principles facilitates a new political 
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action that is more than a simple repetition of the past. Unique adaptations of principles can 
produce novel political actions within a new context and setting. Departing from the largely 
positive assessment of the American revolutionaries in On Revolution, in The Life of the Mind 
Arendt is critical of their tendency of “understanding the new in terms of an improved re-
statement of the old.”404 Upon returning to ancient prudence to supplement their own 
experiences of self-government, the Americans decided that the only possibility for them to 
undertake a new political endeavour was to repeat the primeval founding of Rome anew. 
Arendt suggests that attending to the importance of principles might open an alternative 
pathway that does not rely on the recreation of mythical foundations or the view that new 
action will simply be a return to the past. To avoid this impasse, Arendt suggests a “tentative 
alternative,” the only one that she believes would escape the search for a lost golden age.405 
For Arendt, it is Augustine who stands alone as the thinker who could have underpinned what 
she describes as a “truly Roman or Virgilian philosophy of politics.”406 From Augustine’s 
philosophy, Arendt draws the lesson that human beings are capable of new beginnings based 
on the fact of natality – the entrance of new human beings into the time continuum of the 
world. Thus, for Arendt, the possibility of a return to principles and new political action is 
underwritten by the fact that new human beings are continually being born into the world. 
Although Arendt only briefly touches upon this point, it reveals the essential connection 
between principles and the capacity for free political action to begin unpredicted chains of 
events.407 The rejuvenation of principles facilitates political action as an unexpected 
beginning which is able to “break with the commonly accepted and reach into the 
extraordinary.”408 It enables political transformation through a reconfiguration of past actions 
and the adaption of principles to contemporary political circumstances. 
 
 
The Three Principles of Arendt’s Council Democracy 
 
In this section, I sketch the three main principles of Arendt’s council democracy: (1) political 
freedom understood as participation in political institutions, (2) the empowerment of 
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autonomous communities, (3) federalism interpreted as the decentralisation of authority 
structures and the devolution of power and decision-making responsibilities to mid- and low-
tier political bodies. These principles present an outline of its key values and reveal what is 
distinctive about it in comparison to other forms of democratic government. They are not 
exhaustive in the sense of encompassing all of the conceivable values that the council system 
seeks to advance. Such a list would also include the principles of deliberation, distinction, 
plurality and nonsovereignty, among others.409 Nor do the three main principles offer a 
comprehensive justification and defence of the council system as an independent model of 
democracy.410 It is not the intention of this thesis to provide a full comparison and defence of 
Arendt’s council system against liberal democracy. Rather, the principles of the councils 
present an outline of a more substantive democratic ideal based on active citizen participation 
in government decision-making. 
 
 
I. Political Freedom 
 
Arendt’s conception of freedom is notoriously difficult to disentangle and articulate.411 
Located at the interstices of questions of spontaneous beginnings, free movement, a 
dramaturgical account of action and worldly disclosure, discussions of freedom are woven 
throughout her work. Unfortunately, Arendt provides no single, coherent and well-defined 
account of freedom that remains constant throughout her life.412 A brief overview of her main 
works reveals the shifts in her views on freedom. One of the earliest and most enduring 
elements of freedom to emerge in Arendt’s writing is freedom understood as an innate 
capacity to begin and interrupt a natural process.413 She describes freedom in these terms in 
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The Origins of Totalitarianism as a capacity for origination – the ability to create something 
out of nothing rather than merely to decide between established alternatives.414 The 
importance of new beginnings remains an integral aspect of her concept of freedom despite 
being later incorporated into a broader framework.415 In her next major published work, The 
Human Condition, her analysis of freedom occurs within an expressivist model of the 
virtuosity of human action.416 Here, freedom is not provided with an extensive independent 
treatment, but is instead connected to notions of human plurality and action. Freedom is 
employed primarily in a negative function to criticise the conceit of a belief in a self-
mastering sovereign subject.417 Arendt argues that freedom under the condition of plurality is 
not identical with sovereign control and mastery because to begin something new entails 
being unable to foretell the full consequences of one’s actions or how others will respond as a 
result. Insofar as it takes on a positive sense, freedom and action are interrelated in a vision of 
the agonistic striving of individuals for excellence and public glory through acts of self-
disclosure among their peers.418 Within this Homeric-influenced moment, freedom appears in 
an individualistic and dramaturgical light as an individual’s faculty of self-disclosure in their 
struggle for immortality.419 In Arendt’s later work, such as On Revolution, these aspects 
recede in favour of a more explicitly collective and political conception of freedom focused 
on the involvement of actors in joint political processes of oratory, deliberation and decision-
making.  
 
The complexities and vacillations in Arendt’s account have led interpreters to identify 
constitutive paradoxes in her concepts of freedom and politics.420 Attention has been drawn to 
tensions between an expressive and communicative account of action,421 a heroic and 
participatory vision of politics,422 and a temporal and political dimension of freedom.423 
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However, rather than attempting to incorporate all of Arendt’s disparate lines of argument 
into a single model, it is more productive to concede that Arendt’s understanding of freedom 
develops throughout her life and can only be understood through an evolutionary analysis that 
treats each text as containing its own specific perspective. Although Arendt continually builds 
on her previous ideas, the analysis of freedom in each text often depends on its unique 
position within a constellation of other concepts and the particular aspect of freedom that 
Arendt wishes to accentuate therein. This evolutionary interpretive position has been adopted 
by Andreas Kalyvas who argues that in On Revolution “freedom was now defined less in 
terms of individual performance and virtuosity and more as a collective capacity to initiate 
new political beginnings and to deliberately participate in the extraordinary founding of new 
constitutions.”424 Arendt’s mature understanding of freedom emerges in On Revolution in a 
considerably altered model from her earlier formulations. It is in this text that Arendt 
develops a notion of political freedom in relation to her understanding of modern revolutions 
and participation in the public realm. The older expressivist account is not entirely 
superseded, but it is reorganised within a more explicitly political understanding. However, 
Kalyvas overemphasises the moment of the extraordinary in Arendt and overlooks the fact 
that her account of political freedom rests predominantly on the regular, everyday 
participation of citizens in the business of democratic politics.425 I argue that Arendt’s 
conception of freedom in On Revolution is based on a radical participatory ideal of citizens 
engaging in direct forms of deliberation and decision-making. Freedom in this sense is 
exercised as an ongoing activity that must be continually reasserted against countervailing 
forces of entropy and domination. I will proceed to show how she arrived at such a model. 
 
Arendt’s re-examination of the major concepts of the tradition of political thought following 
the publication of The Human Condition contributes to the development of her understanding 
of freedom. A number of these reflections which inform her later position in On Revolution 
are published as “What is Freedom?” in Between Past and Future. In this essay, Arendt 
distinguishes freedom from other related concepts with which it is often confused. Freedom, 
for Arendt, is not the product of an individual free will nor is it the inner feeling of self-
sovereignty and mastery. She argues that such an unworldly and apolitical account of freedom 
arose only after political freedom as an established fact had disappeared from the world in late 
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antiquity during the Roman Empire.426 Freedom in Arendt’s use of the term requires its 
manifestation and worldly disclosure in a public realm. It relies upon the establishment of a 
space of appearances between plural human beings within which they can act collectively. 
Secondly, freedom should not be confused with an act of liberation. Liberation – both from 
the necessities of life and from the arbitrary rule of despots – is a necessary pre-requisite to 
freedom but should not be mistaken for freedom itself.427 Liberation from an oppressive 
system usually precedes the foundation of a new political regime, but it is possible to 
undertake the former without achieving the latter. Thirdly, Arendt distinguishes political 
freedom from civil liberties, which are the negative rights of individuals living under a 
constitutional government. Civil liberties protect individuals’ private lives from coercion and 
domination but do not create a public realm within which they can act.428 Arendt attempts to 
establish a more politically oriented and public understanding of freedom that goes beyond 
the individual and negative liberties of the liberal tradition. However, one should not equate 
Arendt’s criticisms of Christian and liberal accounts of freedom with an acceptance of Isaiah 
Berlin’s notion of positive liberty as self-mastery and control.429 Arendt prefers to emphasise 
the plural nature of human beings whereby freedom is a condition that only arises when 
individuals are engaged in joint political enterprises. Freedom is not an act of self-mastery, 
but a collective practice of a self-governing community. Finally, Arendt is unequivocal about 
the close correlation between freedom and action. She states that “the raison d’être of politics 
is freedom, and its field of experience is action.”430 People express and actualise their freedom 
through action with their political equals. As Arendt argues, “men are free … as long as they 
act, neither before nor after; for to be free and to act are the same.”431 These analyses lay the 
groundwork for her discussion of political freedom in On Revolution. 
 
As Arendt announces in its opening pages, the fate of the concept of freedom is one of the 
central concerns of On Revolution. The French and American revolutions are the context in 
which Arendt develops her richest account of political freedom. For Arendt, the modern 
concept of revolution is inextricably bound both to the idea of a new beginning in history and 
to the emergence of political freedom. A revolution is an exemplary political act that 
manifests a number of the intrinsic qualities of freedom: it is spontaneous, non-rule-governed, 
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enacts a rupture with the past and demonstrates the highest human capacity to begin 
something new. It is also the necessary precondition for the establishment of a permanent and 
lasting order within which freedom can appear. For Arendt, freedom is the goal and end point 
of modern revolutions. It is also for her the single most important principle of the political 
realm.432 Arendt approvingly quotes Condorcet: “‘the word “revolutionary” can be applied 
only to revolutions whose aim is freedom.’”433 The goal of a modern revolution is not merely 
liberation from an old regime but the explicit constitution and founding of a new political 
form. It requires constitution making, the enacting of new political institutions, the framing of 
new laws and the creation of a new political culture and values.434  
 
However, in spite of the important connections between revolution, new beginnings and 
freedom, the dominant image of political freedom in On Revolution is not one of founding, 
based on a model of making, but rather of plural human action. Throughout the book, freedom 
is increasingly defined less in terms of a miraculous event – a singular act that radically 
breaks with all previous causes – and more in terms of an ongoing experience and a collective 
project of autonomous politics.435 In her first direct reference to the meaning of freedom itself, 
Arendt describes the “content of freedom” as “participation in public affairs, or admission to 
the public realm.”436 Freedom is defined as the taking part and sharing in the daily affairs of 
the body politic. In a second explicit definition, Arendt agrees with Jefferson that “political 
freedom, generally speaking, means the right ‘to be a participator in government’, or it means 
nothing.”437 Both of these statements draw attention to what Arendt views as the core 
substance of political freedom: a regime could only be described as free in Arendt’s use of the 
term if it provides an institutionalised space for the active participation of citizens in forms of 
deliberation and decision-making.  
 
Participation is not simply a matter of voting in electoral institutions or being a member of a 
political party or trade union. Arendt refers to practices in which the people themselves 
“could become visible and be of significance,” decision-making processes in which they have 
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some degree of genuine control over decisions that affect them.438 This is not mere 
consultation or a symbolic presence in non-binding advisory councils. The people say: “We 
want to participate, we want to debate, we want to make our voices heard in public, and we 
want to have a possibility to determine the political course of our country.”439 Arendt 
imagines a wholesale shift away from “a form of government where the few rule, at least 
supposedly, in the interest of the many” and where “public freedom” is “the privilege of the 
few.”440 True political freedom would require “the people qua people to make their entrance 
into political life and to become participators in government.”441 Arendt’s vision is of a self-
determining political community in which a right to participate directly in the affairs of actual 
processes of governance is institutionalised for all members of society. She refers to the 
“good fortune” of the Americans’ “widespread experience with self-government” prior to the 
revolution, which they gained from participating in local, decentralised, self-governing 
communities.442 For Arendt, the appearance of freedom is the result and correlative of the 
day-to-day activities of politics. It is the “speech-making and decision-making, the oratory 
and the business, the thinking and the persuading, and the actual doing” that constitute the 
“experience of being free.”443 In other words, the “‘expressing, discussing, and deciding’ 
which in a positive sense are the activities of freedom.”444 At this level of generality, Arendt’s 
value of political freedom does not specify the precise nature of exactly how often and in 
which particular formats citizens should participate in government. She admits that “by no 
means every resident of a country” would have to participate constantly, but it is important 
that every member “be given the opportunity” to participate in some meaningful way.445 
Political participation is a principle that would require further elaboration in an institutional 
design and could be embodied in a number of different ways that would still fulfil its primary 
criteria. In the following chapter, I address how the principle of political freedom is actualised 
in the institutional structure of Arendt’s council system. 
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II. Empowerment 
 
Empowerment entails the development of a community’s ability to self-govern as a result of 
greater knowledge, skills and capacities.446 In the following, I argue that empowerment is one 
of the core political principles of Arendt’s council system because the councils both generate 
power between citizens and assist in its preservation within stable institutions. While previous 
interpretations of Arendt’s concept of power have focused on its communicative and 
linguistic dimensions, I highlight its neglected organisational and stabilising functions.447 
Central to my argument is Arendt’s claim that the councils “had begun to establish an entirely 
new power structure in the midst of revolution.”448 She describes the councils as the 
development of an alternative power structure that arose alongside and partly in opposition to 
existing institutional sources of power within a political regime. The councils therefore 
challenged the legitimacy of other political institutions as they began to take on political and 
administrative responsibilities. The emergence of the councils in Russia and Germany opened 
periods of “dual power” in which the legitimacy of state institutions was challenged and a 
struggle for power arose between competing institutions. This aspect of the councils as a 
potentially alternative power centre has not been sufficiently examined in the existing 
secondary literature. Focusing on this role of the councils sheds light on their distinctive 
character in Arendt’s work. To further elucidate this point requires a discussion of Arendt’s 
unique conception of political power. 
 
In comparison to the concept of power, the term empowerment is located less frequently 
within studies of Arendt’s work.449 This lack of attention is partly due to the proximity of 
notions of empowerment to an idea of sovereign mastery and control, which Arendt associates 
with forms of domination and the attempt to escape the contingent and unpredictable aspects 
of the human condition.450 Arendt considered that sovereignty, as it has been understood 
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through a long history of absolute monarchy, “allegedly demanded undivided centralized 
power,” which “seemed in contradiction to the establishment of a republic.”451 However, a 
distinction can be drawn between sovereignty as absolute command and a community’s 
ability to self-govern and create their own laws. The latter is of great importance to Arendt 
since it is essential to the creation of a free republic. 
 
Arendt departs from the classic definition of power as unilateral domination, i.e. control over 
the actions of another.452 Her own views on power are a mixture of a capacities-based 
approach combined with a stabilising and organisational dimension to power that is rarely 
included in traditional classifications. For Arendt, power emerges when people come together 
in speech and action. She argues that power will always have a “potential” character as 
something that can be “actualized but never fully materialized.”453 It is a positive capacity to 
act that “springs up between men when they act together and vanishes the moment they 
disperse.”454 From this perspective, Arendt’s conception of power appears similar to other 
Spinozist-inspired definitions of potentia as a democratic and creative “power-to” or “power 
from below” that arises between citizens through democratic politics. For Arendt, “power is 
the only human attribute which applies solely to the worldly-in-between space by which men 
are mutually related.”455 From the French resistance to the American student movement, her 
political writings continually explore the development of power between agents as they act in 
concert. 
 
However, there is another aspect to her understanding of power that can easily be missed. 
While power vanishes the moment human beings disperse, it does linger after a political 
action as that which “keeps the public realm … in existence.”456 There is a second, often 
overlooked, dimension to Arendtian power as a force that preserves and enhances a political 
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community’s future capacity to act. Arendt’s idiosyncratic definition of power defines not a 
substance – something that one could possess, store or deploy – but rather a condition of 
effective relationality between actors. It describes a state of affairs in which different actors 
are comported towards one another in a manner that cultivates and preserves the possibility of 
collective action.457  
 
These two dimensions of Arendt’s conception of power are interconnected. On the one hand, 
power is that which emerges simultaneously with human action as its medium and milieu. 
Power forges new relationships and networks that foster and support political action. The 
exercise of individuals’ capacities as self-governing agents allows a political community to 
transform itself, “establish relations and create new realities.”458 On the other hand, “power is 
what keeps the public realm, the potential space of appearance between acting and speaking 
men, in existence.”459 Power preserves the capacity for future action by holding open and 
preserving the possibility of its continuation. It is what “keeps people together after the 
fleeting moment of action has passed.”460 By this Arendt means that networks and alliances 
have been established that do not immediately disappear but remain potential sources of 
future possible action. She contends that political power contains an aspect of what we might 
today call “organization.”461 Once engendered through action, power contains its own 
“mechanisms … through which new power is constantly generated.”462 It is able to grow 
between political actors and strengthen the bonds of solidarity within a community. In this 
sense, active participation in the public realm creates the conditions for its own continuation 
and expansion through the generation of power between plural agents. A process of 
empowerment, for Arendt, describes both the ability of citizens to take part in genuine and 
meaningful processes of governance in addition to the creation of more organised and capable 
networks of citizens who have the knowledge and capacity to act together effectively.463  
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This conception of empowerment embodied within the council form can be contrasted with 
both the disempowerment of liberal institutions and the equally problematic unilateral seizure 
of power by a revolutionary vanguard party. To explain this more fully, let us consider how 
the councils first established themselves as new structures of power during the course of the 
revolution. They generated power through the active participation of citizens in public affairs 
and by organising them into political bodies. For Arendt, “[p]ower is engendered by any 
group of people that organizes itself and acts in concert.”464 This aspect of the councils is 
essential for Arendt because it provides a remedy to the great deficit of power that affects 
contemporary liberal democracies. Her most substantive criticism of the American Revolution 
was that it failed to incorporate the councils as new institutions of power in the post-
revolutionary constitutional regime. Without any concrete institution within which citizens 
could exercise power, the principle that power lies with the people rings hollow. The town-
hall meetings, in Arendt’s narrative of the American revolutionary experience, allowed for 
ordinary citizens to regularly assemble and address issues of common concern. They were 
“spaces of freedom” where people could participate in political debate and decision-
making.465 In this way, they provided an avenue of participation for ordinary citizens unable 
to take part in parliamentary institutions. 
 
Secondly, Arendt, like Luxemburg, was acutely aware of the dangers of a misshapen 
revolution. As alternative structures of power, the councils play a different role in 
revolutionary situations from a vanguard political party. Arendt contrasts the purpose of the 
councils with the Marxist-Leninist theory of the revolutionary party, which aimed to take over 
state power and direct it towards revolutionary ends. There is a fundamental difference 
between the “openly proclaimed revolutionary goals of the Bolshevik Party to ‘seize power’” 
and the strategy of the councils.466 The Bolsheviks conceived of revolution as a means of 
toppling the government and seizing the central political apparatuses of the state. They 
viewed this as a way to gain control over the means of violence in order to transform the state 
through political force. Arendt is critical of this strategy because it replicates the hierarchical 
structure of the state in the institutions that are designed to replace it. Her criticism is based on 
the insight that a just society cannot be imposed on people from above but must be the result 
of their own organisational impulses. Arendt follows Luxemburg in claiming that “the nature 
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of new societies is affected by the nature of the actions that bring them into being.”467 Rather 
than produce new emancipatory institutions with alternative models of power, the Bolsheviks 
took over and intensified many of the pre-revolutionary apparatuses of the state. The councils, 
on the other had, are institutions of empowerment, which are designed for the purpose of 
generating and increasing the political capacities of ordinary citizens. In the next chapter, I 
demonstrate how Arendt’s principle of empowerment is embodied in the institutional 
framework of her conception of a council democracy. I argue that Arendt’s councils arise as 
alternative institutional arrangements to the central political institutions of a regime due to 
their different model of political power. 
 
 
III. Federalism 
 
For Arendt, a third important principle of the council system, alongside the freedom and 
empowerment of citizens, is the development of a federal structure of government. As it is 
traditionally understood in political and constitutional theory, federalism involves the division 
of power between member units and a larger common government.468 Although at some 
points in her later work Arendt associates the federal principle with a division of powers 
within government,469 the majority of her references are to a principle according to which 
“constituted political bodies can combine and enter into lasting alliances without losing their 
identity.”470 Arendt conceives of federalism as a system whereby, without relying on a 
concept of sovereignty, political communities can make binding agreements with one another 
and still retain a degree of independence and political equality. It can be distinguished from a 
confederal system in which member units retain complete sovereign control and the 
confederal body can only proceed with the voluntary cooperation of each member unit.471 A 
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federal arrangement, on the other hand, can produce decisions that are binding on member 
units if the correct law-making procedure is followed.  
 
Arendt adopts the federal principle to argue for the redistribution and dispersion of power, 
authority and resources from a central government to intermediary and lower levels.472 Her 
model of a council system entails a layered and gradated federal network of councils, which 
“begins from below, continues upward, and finally leads to a parliament.”473 It attempts to 
balance the important normative claims of autonomy and self-government with the practical 
issues of co-ordination and joint activity. In pursuing the first claim, Arendt envisages not 
simply the delegation of certain administrative functions but a full devolution of structures of 
power combined with the resources to implement decisions to local councils. She argues that 
councils should be entrusted “with extensive powers of local self-government.”474 Arendt 
understands this as a process of empowerment, allowing ordinary citizens to have a greater 
influence over the formulation and implementation of laws and policies. It is also able to “act 
as a safeguard against accumulation of power” by a central authority.475 On the other hand, 
Arendt wishes to ensure that units are connected through horizontal networks of 
communication, accountability and resource sharing. Local councils should have significant 
discretion and decision-making power, but this need not entail a form of “localism” where 
small communities are completely self-reliant and autonomous. Arendt was attentive to the 
dangers of simply breaking up larger units into a number of smaller ones, which in Germany 
“assumed a hopelessly reactionary character” and, far from guaranteeing a more democratic 
politics, risked leading to exclusivity and parochialism.476 A federal structure allows for 
knowledge and resources to be transmitted across the system, enabling a wider process of 
social learning.  
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The notions of federalism, federal political systems and federations are provided with a 
number of conceptual distinctions in the literature.477 Thus, it is important to properly 
delineate the distinctive aspects of Arendt’s variety of federalism. First, she views a federal 
system as an alternative to sovereignty and the nation-state.478 Patrick Riley argues that 
federalism can most plausibly be described as having arisen from the sixteenth century 
onwards in opposition to and as an alternative to the concept of sovereign states.479 The great 
contradiction of most theories of federalism is that they mistakenly tend to defend themselves 
through a reliance on a concept of the sovereignty of their individual territorial units. By 
falling back on the very concept that federalism criticises for suppressing local autonomy, it 
unwittingly entrenches the dominance of a sovereign paradigm. For Riley, “it would have 
done better to try to overturn the idea of sovereignty.”480 For most federalists, from Madison 
and Hamilton onwards, federalism is a particular organisational structure of a sovereign 
nation-state. It has advantages and disadvantages when compared to other such organisational 
forms, but it ultimately remains a subspecies of the dominant state system. Thus, many 
federations such as the United States, Canada, Germany and Australia are still sovereign 
states in the international system. Arendt holds a minority view – a more radical concept of 
federalism that challenges the concept of sovereign nation-states as a foundational model of 
organising politics.  
 
The grounds of Arendt’s aversion to sovereignty are obvious enough. Sovereignty is the 
assertion of a claim to absolute command and authority within a given territorial entity. This 
sovereign command is located in a singular organ and unfettered by restrictions of law. The 
discourse of sovereignty is associated for her with a regime of domination and the attempt to 
escape contingent and unpredictable aspects of the human condition. Sovereignty, as it was 
understood through a long history of absolute monarchy, “allegedly demanded undivided 
centralized power,” which “seemed in contradiction to the establishment of a republic.”481 She 
claims that “the identification of freedom with sovereignty is perhaps the most pernicious and 
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dangerous consequence of the philosophical equation of freedom and free will.”482 Arendt 
puts forward a theory of politics and freedom that attempts to avoid questions of sovereignty 
as the basis of a political society. Commentators have criticised Arendt’s one-dimensional 
analysis of sovereignty inherited from Schmitt and have argued that she was not attentive to 
distinctions between “state” and “organ” sovereignty or its substantive and relational 
dimensions.483 Many of these criticisms are perceptive and accurate, but I cannot treat them in 
detail here. Instead, I want to focus on Arendt’s assessment of the pernicious effects of the 
concept of sovereignty. It is this point that is most relevant for the topic of the council system. 
While at points she seems to grant a certain “limited reality” to sovereignty, her main goal is 
to redirect our political imaginary to alternative frameworks of practicing politics.484 The 
essence of most of her references to sovereignty is a critique of a unifying logic that attempts 
to reduce a plurality of voices to a singular instance of representation. “Sovereignty,” Arendt 
argues “can only be achieved by the many bound together.”485 The concept of sovereignty 
relies on a notion of the unitary will and an ideal of mastery. 486 She is concerned about the 
reductive effects of a mode of politics which consists in the presumption of and striving 
towards a single, unified will expressed through an executive organ. She wishes to preserve 
an open space for the exchange of opinion that would not be pre-emptively closed by the 
claim of a unified will and singular unquestionable identity.  
 
Arendt also considers federalism “the sole alternative to the nation-state principle.”487 It is 
through her conception of federalism that Arendt seeks “a new state concept” outside of the 
framework of the nation state, the rudiments of which lie in “the federal principle.”488 
Arendt’s initial criticisms emerged through her reflections on Jewish politics, which 
crystallised into a strong critique of the nation-state system that was steadfast throughout her 
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life.489 She witnessed the “catastrophic decline of the national-state system” following the 
dramatic redrawing of borders after the First World War and the creation of many new states 
with mixed populations.490 As the nation-state was not suited to these new territorial entities, 
it resulted in internal problems of coerced assimilation of minorities and external issues of a 
reliance on war to achieve the political ends of state sovereignty. In “Nationalstaat und 
Demokratie” Arendt addresses the issue of whether the nation-state is compatible with 
democracy. If by democracy we understand “active participation in public matters, and not 
only the protection of certain fundamental rights,” then it is clear that the nation-state stands 
in tension with democratic ambitions because of its centralised power structure.491 Arendt 
argues that “real democracy, however - and this is perhaps in this context the decisive factor - 
can only exist where the centralisation of power in the nation-state is broken and in its place is 
put the federative system, proper to which is the diffusion of power in many power 
centres.”492 
 
Second, federalism is an attempt to pluralise political space and displace state- and 
government-centric conceptions of politics. For Arendt, a proliferation of political action and 
participation demands a wider dispersal of institutions in which it can take place. It involves 
moving beyond a focus on the national executive and legislative government as the sole organ 
and institutionalised space of political action. The problem with many conventional theories 
of democracy is that they rely on an image of a democratic polity based on a single organ of 
government and a concept of the unified people as a rule-bound electorate. A federal system 
allows multiple constituent institutions to operate simultaneously on a gradated level of 
political responsibility and accountability. Arendt calls for “a new type of republican 
government which would rest on ‘elementary republics’ in such a way that its own central 
power did not deprive the constituent bodies of their original power to constitute.”493 It 
permits a more active conceptualisation of the people, not simply as an abstract entity evoked 
by those in power, but as an active political subject. She contrasted the federal principle with 
the ‘‘national principle,’’ according to which ‘‘there must be one representative of the nation 
as a whole, and where the government is understood to incorporate the will of all 
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nationals.”494 The competing conceptions of federalism and the nation-state are lucidly 
presented in Arendt’s narrative of the French and American revolutions. The American 
“elementary republics” of the pre-federation era are depicted as a superior model to the 
centralising tendencies of the Jacobin party during the French Revolution. Arendt praises the 
French revolutionary societies as centres of political action, but these nascent institutions 
were crushed by the Jacobin government. The dispute, as Arendt presents it, was a “fight of 
the government’s monopoly of power against the federal principle with its separation and 
division of power, that is, the fight of the nation-state against the first beginnings of a true 
republic.”495 Under the pretence of representing the sovereignty of the nation, the Jacobins 
deprived the people of their power to constitute and quashed the federal principle as a living 
reality in continental Europe.  
 
Next, Arendt considered that the federal system would rejuvenate local democracy against 
increasing forces of centralisation. She was critical of progressivist tendencies within the 
United States, who, over the course of the twentieth century, argued for more centralisation in 
order to increase the nation’s power.496 The dim result of this process according to Arendt was 
that “centralization does not work.”497 Although Arendt felt that centralised institutions would 
be best to deal with what Engels called the “administration of things,” they posed a great 
danger to democracy because of centralisation’s disempowering effects.498 Centralisation 
tended to take decision-making power out of the hands of local communities and into larger 
government bureaucracies. Arendt’s support for local processes of democratisation is first 
evident in her analysis of the Israel/Palestine conflict. Her proposed solution to the issue was 
a federal state with a common government for the two peoples. The most distinctive feature of 
Arendt’s schema was that this federated structure rested on “Jewish-Arab community 
councils,” which she argued would assist the conflict to be resolved “on the lowest and most 
promising level of proximity and neighborliness.”499 Arendt imagines these councils “on a 
small scale and as numerous as possible,” which would comprise an independent tier of “local 
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self-government” and act as the starting point for a broader system of federated councils. She 
was a constant supporter of local self-governance, arguing that “it would teach grass-roots 
democracy in the field of communal or local affairs where people had their immediate 
interests and were supposed to know the ropes.”500 She contended that America “has had an 
especially long and solid tradition” in processes of “direct local democracy via the town 
hall.”501 One of the key objectives of Arendt’s council system was to cultivate these local 
forms of democratic action against the centralising tendencies of modern nation-states. 
 
Fourth, Arendt maintains an ambiguous relationship with the American Federalist tradition of 
Madison and Hamilton. Lisa Disch highlights Arendt’s curious position in relation to the 
federalist debates: “her narrative of the American Founding puts forward Anti-Federalist 
arguments while shoring up Federalist ideology.”502 Arendt appears to either misunderstand 
or ignore the fact that the Federalists were in favour of centralising national systems and were 
generally sceptical of popular participation in politics.503 Madison’s arguments for a republic 
as opposed to a democracy were primarily aimed at limiting the dangers of self-government, 
popular mobilisation and direct democracy.504 Arendt’s narrative of the American Revolution 
in On Revolution takes a quintessentially Federalist line whilst in substance defending anti-
Federalist concepts of decentralisation and self-government.505 Rather than criticise the 
original Founders for their elitist and aristocratic understanding of the concept of 
representation, Arendt points to their lack of conceptual clarity and the negative effects of a 
European tradition from which they could not completely detach themselves.506 Arendt’s 
council system appears significantly more decentralised and autonomous than the conception 
of the Federalists and the institutional arrangements of current federations such as the United 
States of America. Her support for the Federalists can be understood in a variety of ways, but 
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what is clear is the significant difference between the position of the American Founders and 
Arendt’s conception of a council republic. This distinction is easily lost due to Arendt’s 
largely positive treatment of the Federalists in On Revolution and the contradictions of her 
analysis of the American Revolution. 
 
In fact, Arendt’s federal system seems to bear more of a resemblance to an anarchist form of 
federalism from Proudhon to Bookchin.507 She shares their emphasis on self-government, 
decentralisation and a critique of the nation-state system. She also links federalism to notions 
of popular participation and citizen control. For Arendt, the federal principle “came to the fore 
only in the spontaneous organizational efforts of the people themselves.”508 Federalism as a 
form of political organisation was particularly attractive to people when left free to organise 
themselves, which highlighted for Arendt “the intimate connection between the spirit of 
revolution and the principle of federation.”509 The similarities cannot be overstated, however, 
as Arendt shows little sympathy for anarchist ideology and draws a distinction between 
political matters and socio-economic concerns, which runs counter to the anarchist 
tradition.510  
 
Arendt puts forward a radical form of federalism that is inseparable from her conceptions of 
political freedom and empowerment. These three central principles together constitute the 
basic political values of the council system. In this chapter, I have put forward a particular 
interpretation of Arendt’s political theory from the perspective of the council system that 
accentuates the participatory and empowered dimensions of her thought. Each of the 
principles I have explicated above contributes to rethinking the basic principles of current 
liberal democratic governments. They serve as useful normative standards for considering 
possible reforms and guiding discussion towards a more substantive and robust conception of 
democracy. Although the principles do not constitute a complete alternative model of 
democracy, they do provide a number of critical angles from which one can interrogate 
existing democratic regimes. The next chapter continues my interpretation of Arendt’s 
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political theory, shifting from an analysis of the core normative principles of the council 
system to a detailed examination of its institutional structure. 
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Chapter 4: The Institutional Design of Arendt’s Council Democracy 
 
 
In addition to the political principles examined in the previous chapter, Arendt also sketches a 
rough framework of how such principles could be embodied in an institutional form. Yet, 
Arendt was not inclined to create detailed institutional blueprints or engage in system building 
in her writing. As a result, much ambiguity surrounds her brief sketches of a council system. 
Furthermore, Arendt abruptly halts her institutional analysis without providing a detailed 
assessment of the council system’s realistic prospects as a permanent system of government. 
One possible reason she gives for her reluctance to pursue the matter further is her claim in an 
interview that “important studies on this subject have been published in recent years in 
Germany and France and anyone seriously interested can inform himself.”511 The remark is 
puzzling, however, since Arendt does not cite any articles. It is also not immediately clear 
from the available historical evidence to which studies she was referring. While some 
historical work has been undertaken on the councils, very little of it has adopted Arendt’s 
particular interpretation. If we wish to understand the possible institutional schema of 
Arendt’s council system we must examine the brief remarks scattered throughout her works 
on the topic, in particular those on the final pages of On Revolution.  
 
In this chapter, I reconstruct Arendt’s proposed institutional design of a council system from 
her texts and interviews and analyse its strengths and limitations for democratic theory. The 
perceived marginality of the council system in Arendt’s work has prevented rigorous analysis 
of its institutional framework. Commentators usually point out its obvious flaws without 
further scrutiny of why the model was so important to Arendt and of the ways in which it 
embodied her central political values. One of the chief aims of this chapter is to fill this gap 
by pursuing a detailed examination that takes Arendt seriously on the councils but remains 
critical of her claims and attentive to the historical realities in which any proposed council 
system would have to operate.512 While chapter three developed the central principles of 
Arendt’s councils as a critical perspective on current liberal democratic regimes, chapter four 
adopts a more sceptical attitude towards Arendt’s writings on the councils in examining her 
                                                
511 Arendt, Crises of the Republic, 235. 
512 Of those who take Arendt seriously on the councils, another possible error has been to be too lenient on the 
weaknesses of Arendt’s proposal. For examples of such an interpretation see Totschnig, “Arendt’s Argument for 
the Council System: A Defense”; Lederman, “Councils and Revolution: Participatory Democracy in Anarchist 
Thought and the New Social Movements”. 
 126 
institutional design. This is due to the fact that I turn from an outline of desirable political 
principles to analyse the difficulties of realising these principles within Arendt’s proposed 
institutions.  
 
Within the existing literature, two divergent interpretations of the council system have 
prevailed, both of which, I argue, fail to capture what is distinctive about Arendt’s proposal. 
On the one hand, Margaret Canovan contends that the councils can be understood as a call for 
the rejuvenation of American democracy and could serve as an “intermediate institutional 
structure that would connect the citizen to government.”513 In Canovan’s reading, the councils 
are relegated to a supplementary position within existing liberal institutions. The second line 
of interpretation views Arendt as rejecting all forms of representation outright and 
succumbing to a desire for a more immediate and direct form of democracy. In this vein, there 
has been an ongoing trend of interpreting Arendt as a supporter of a naïve form of direct or 
unmediated politics, either by way of the charge of “polis envy,” or the claim of a hidden 
“metaphysics of presence” that naturally leads to direct democracy.514  
 
I depart from both of these classic narratives. The councils are neither exclusively an element 
of civil society nor a return to Athenian democracy. Arendt’s articulation of democratic 
institutions circumvents the traditional immediate/mediated and direct/representative 
divisions.515 Cutting across this conventional debate, Arendt proposes an alternative to liberal 
representative democracy that remains within the realm of democracy and representative 
government.516 The council system entails the transformation of state institutions towards a 
new model of a federal council state. In my interpretation, Arendt’s councils are shown to 
represent an alternative power structure that poses a challenge to traditional top-down models 
of state power. Building on my analysis of Arendt’s political principle of empowerment in 
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chapter three, I reveal her emphasis on the oppositional nature of the councils in relation to 
existing governmental structures, a point which has been overlooked by other interpreters. 
 
Arendt strives for – although does not completely attain – an alternative conceptualisation of 
democracy. She does not adequately articulate a political structure that could replace existing 
liberal democratic institutions. After examining Arendt’s argument in detail, I conclude that 
she is unable to fully illustrate the institutional details in a manner that would resolve crucial 
inconsistencies and meet the potential objections of her critics. In particular, her account 
suffers from a mistaken belief that the administration of economic issues would be undertaken 
by a non-politicised bureaucracy, leaving the councils freed from the majority of 
administrative tasks. Arendt’s insistence on the non-economic nature of the councils allows 
her to sidestep important questions of practicality and feasibility that have plagued all 
arguments for council democracy. In addition, tensions remain in the precise relationship 
Arendt sought to institute between the higher and lower councils, revealing problems in her 
attempt to eliminate the exercise of sovereign power within her system. She is also unable to 
solve the issue of a new form of representation that would avoid the depoliticising effects of 
current representative institutions. Finally, I analyse claims that Arendt’s councils would lead 
to the establishment of a new political elite. I conclude that she was inattentive to the 
operation of structural power that would have led to undemocratic exclusions in any potential 
council democracy. Her inability to answers these crucial questions undermines her sketch of 
the councils. 
 
Nevertheless, I contend that there is much of importance in Arendt’s institutional sketch of a 
council system. As an intervention into debates over the possibilities and limitations of 
contemporary democratic institutions, her council system contests the presuppositions of 
sovereignty and liberalism in democratic institutions. She seeks to rearticulate a concept of 
democracy that does not adopt the form of “the party system,” which she worries “has come 
to be regarded as synonymous with democracy.”517 She argues for the necessity of processes 
of “real democratization” to democratic institutions that go beyond the more conservative 
elements of Madisonian republicanism.518 Her institutional proposal provides a critical 
perspective on liberal representative democracy and prompts further experimentation with 
other alternatives beyond current electoral institutions. It allows for a way out of stale debates 
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between direct and representative democracy and opens new pathways for institutional 
innovations within democratic theory.  
 
 
Interpretations of Arendt’s Council System 
 
Andreas Kalyvas has provided the most recent examination of Arendt’s council system, 
which he interprets as her attempt at “the institutionalization of the extraordinary” into a 
federal constitutional system.519 His emphasis on the radical break Arendt makes with 
traditional forms of liberal democracy and her conception of a federal constitutional republic 
draws his interpretation closest to my own. However, there are two main aspects of Kalyvas’ 
reading of Arendt’s councils with which I take issue. Firstly, Kalyvas argues that Arendt’s 
radical republicanism can be read as a critical response to the dangers of modern democratic 
tendencies. I contend that Kalyvas mistakenly separates Arendt’s position from its democratic 
leanings in calling her system a “republic of elementary councils,” which he claims she 
“strongly distinguished from democracy.”520 Arendt herself rarely emphasised such a 
distinction between these two forms of government and often used them interchangeably.521 
She can certainly be described as a republican, but not in a sense that would separate her 
fundamentally from a broader project of radical democracy. Arendt’s criticisms of democracy 
are more often directed at procedures of majority rule, the subversion of legality by popular 
will and the unbounded exercise of power, none of which are strictly equivalent with 
democracy.522 Many of her critical remarks on democracy are espoused through the writings 
of the Founding Fathers. As with all of Arendt’s appropriations of historical sources, it is 
rarely clear to what extent Arendt is endorsing their views or maintaining a critical distance. 
To the extent that Arendt criticised a form of representative democracy, she could still be said 
to support a different understanding of democratic politics based on the model of a council 
democracy. 
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The second issue concerns the place of Arendt’s councils within Kalyvas’ broader framework 
of a theory of extraordinary politics. Kalyvas’ interpretation of Arendt is based on his own 
attempt at deriving a “three-level model of democratic politics” that depends on the separation 
of constituent power into three distinct temporal moments.523 Kalyvas’ first moment “refers to 
the extraordinary, instituting moment of democratic founding, the creation of new symbolic 
meanings, popular insurgencies, and original constitution making.”524 The second “refers to 
procedural, everyday institutionalized politics,” “ordinary politics conducted by pressure 
groups, political elites, interest aggregation, party officials, and public bureaucrats according 
to the rules and procedures of an existing legality and with a minimum of democratic 
participation.”525 Once the extraordinary moment of popular mobilisation has been stabilised 
in a permanent regime it risks “stagnation and juridification” to such an extent that Kalyvas 
requires a third moment of “semi-extraordinary” politics to keep alive the “active, everyday, 
physical participation of citizens.”526 The problem with such a formulation is that it begins 
from precisely the split that Arendt aimed to overcome: it starts from a separation of the 
concepts of “stability and the spirit of the new,” which Arendt claims “have become opposites 
in political thought and terminology.”527 The extraordinary moments to which Kalyvas 
appeals are the three instances of Schmitt’s self-instituting sovereign, which he superimposes 
on to Arendt’s political theory as a way of taming Schmitt “for a normative democratic theory 
with a radical intent.”528 Arendt’s project, on the other hand, is an attempt to meaningfully 
combine notions of constituent power and constitutional form within a single regime and 
democratic model.529 She sought to replicate the achievements of the Athenian polis which 
had been designed “to enable men to do permanently … what otherwise has been possible 
only as an extraordinary and infrequent enterprise for which they had to leave their 
households. … its foremost aim was to make the extraordinary an ordinary occurrence of 
everyday life.”530 An Arendtian politics is based on a plurality of instances of the 
extraordinary – the “miraculous” nature of human action – dispersed throughout ordinary life. 
Her democratic theory seeks to establish the conditions in which ordinary citizens could take 
significant political action on an everyday basis within a constituted political order. Kalyvas 
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risks misrepresenting Arendt’s democratic politics due to its subordination within his broader 
project of an analysis and critique of the constitutional writings of Carl Schmitt. 
 
The second prominent engagement with this aspect of Arendt’s work is John Sitton’s early 
interpretation and defence of her council system, first published in 1987.531 He sets the 
parameters of subsequent readings by answering a number of Arendt’s critics and sketching 
an outline of the position of the councils in Arendt’s political theory. Since politics for Arendt 
is an irreplaceable human experience that brings freedom and happiness, the primary role of 
the councils according to Sitton is to maintain a space for political action. The main principles 
of the councils for Sitton are those of non-sovereignty, participation in politics and the 
experience of a plurality of perspectives in the public realm. Sitton is justified in assuming 
that Arendt’s council system is an argument for a council democracy that is within the forms 
of democratic government. He demonstrates that Arendt’s focus on territorial councils and 
criticisms of workers’ councils are the source of her misunderstanding of council democracy. 
He also indicates that Arendt is critical of the principle of sovereignty and that her council 
system operates according to a federal model of power. On these basic points, Sitton offers a 
sound interpretation of Arendt. However, his analysis is very brief and he does not flesh out 
the implications of Arendt’s critique of sovereignty or her federal system in any detail, 
leaving Arendt’s arguments vague and ambiguous. I seek to add to Sitton’s analysis by 
providing a more thorough examination of the intended practical operation of the councils and 
by revealing the importance of the councils as new democratic power structures in response to 
the disempowerment of modern democracies. First, however, I turn to Arendt’s criticisms of 
liberal representative institutions that lead to her argument for a council democracy. 
 
 
Critique of Representative Democracy 
 
Arendt’s own institutional arrangements are most intelligible when viewed as a response to 
the perceived shortcomings of modern representative democracies. Her critique of current 
democratic regimes gestures towards an outline of her proposed alternative. The primary 
thrust of her argument is that representative democracy systematically disempowers the vast 
majority of its citizens and exhibits a natural tendency towards greater levels of centralisation 
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and bureaucracy. Her position contains two elements: a radical democratic critique of the 
aristocratic function of representative government as it was introduced in the eighteenth 
century and, secondly, drawing from twentieth century sociology, a critique of the oligarchic 
structure of modern political parties. In a representative government in which political 
decision-making is restricted to parliamentary institutions, bureaucratically organised political 
parties control the mechanisms of government and marginalise citizens. Arendt believes that 
the issue is so grave that it could be said that “representative government has in fact become 
oligarchic government,” not in the traditional sense, but certainly to the extent that “what we 
today call democracy is a form of government where the few rule, at least supposedly, in the 
interest of the many.”532 I will examine each aspect of her critique in turn. 
 
Firstly, Arendt argues that representative democracy constitutes a partially aristocratic form of 
government.533 The most distinguishing feature of representative democracy for Arendt is not 
the radical break that it makes with monarchical rule, but the continuation with previous 
systems that legitimise the rulership of the few over the many. For Arendt, representative 
democracy is the most recent articulation of a political strategy of division and rule. Rather 
than abolish the age-old distinction between rulers and ruled, the representative institution of 
elections allows for the permanent inscription of this division based on the purported consent 
of the people. Arendt often expresses this division through the metaphor of a spatial exclusion 
– of the people being barred from admission to the public realm. The people in a 
representative democracy must remain forever outside of the public realm, the central 
mechanisms of which are controlled from above by an elite organised within an inaccessible 
party system. Arendt could well have quoted Madison’s famous distinguishing characteristic 
of modern republics, which lies in “the total exclusion, of the people in their collective 
capacity” from government.534 Indeed, Arendt reminds us that the primary theoreticians of 
representative government, Madison and Sièyes, saw a fundamental difference between 
democracy understood as self-government or popular rule and the systems they were 
creating.535 The conservative leanings of the creators of the American Constitution are well 
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known to historians, even if they have been partially forgotten by some political theorists.536 
The writings of a number of the Federalists are pervaded by a distrust of the capacities of 
ordinary citizens and the dangers of democratic rule. In fact, the Federalists had far less of a 
claim to be supporting the popular empowerment of American citizens than their opponents, 
the anti-Federalists, who favoured measures of direct government and greater accountability 
of representatives.537 
 
While the advent of representative democracy following the French and American revolutions 
is celebrated as the entrance of ordinary citizens into the political realm, the political reality 
provides a radically different portrait. A discourse of popular sovereignty and representative 
institutions actively works against political participation by privileging parliament as the 
exclusive seat of political power. The government’s activity of ruling in the name of a 
hypothetical “people” takes the place of the people’s actual political practices.538 Arendt 
views the question in terms of “the conflict between the people and a mercilessly centralized 
power apparatus which, under the pretence of representing the sovereignty of the nation, 
actually deprived the people of their power.”539 Representative democracy, as a specific 
institutional framework first put into practice in the late eighteenth century, was largely 
designed to legitimatise a form of elite rule. Regular rotation of those in office fails to 
alleviate the fact that the majority of citizens are excluded from participation in the daily 
business of government. Although structured competition between elites generally reduces the 
chances of the systematic abuse of individuals’ private interests, it fails to provide a public 
space for political participation or grant citizens a significant role in public affairs. Arendt 
laments that following the American Revolution, “there was no space reserved, no room left 
for the exercise of precisely those qualities which had been instrumental in building it.”540  
 
Representative democracy is also criticised because it does not allow for the genuine 
formation of opinions due to a lack of deliberative spaces for ordinary citizens. This criticism 
is tied to Arendt’s distrust of voting as a political process in the absence of other more 
meaningful extra-electoral political activities. On its own, voting is an inadequate form of 
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political participation because it does not provide a space in which to discuss ideas and test 
the cogency of different arguments. In response to the standard objection to more direct forms 
of democracy, that “the room will not hold all,” Arendt argues that current representative 
institutions are equally inadequate because “the booth in which we deposit our ballots is 
unquestionably too small, for this booth has room for only one.”541 Arendt values the 
educative and transformative qualities of deliberation and goes so far as to say genuine 
opinion formation cannot exist in their absence. An individual is only able to form an opinion 
when balanced against a multitude of opinions held by others and in response to challenges to 
their own position. In the absence of such deliberation, Arendt argues that there can only be 
“moods” within an electorate that can be registered by polling and statistical surveys, but 
never genuine opinions. For Arendt, “opinions are formed and tested in a process of exchange 
of opinion against opinion.”542 Citizens require personal experience in public debate that 
develops their ability to criticise opinions and exercise political judgment. The absence of 
genuine participatory spaces in representative democracy leads to the retreat of citizens into 
their private interests and a cycle of cynicism and apathy towards the public institutions that 
purport to represent them. 
 
Secondly, Arendt traces a number of the essential problems of representative democracy to 
the development of a party system.543 Representative government was originally created 
without the presence of political parties, which arose during the second half of the nineteenth 
century.544 The object of Arendt’s critique is therefore not simply representative democracy, 
but a specific form of representative government called “party government” in Anglo-
American circles or Parteiendemokratie in German.545 Arendt’s critique of the function of 
political parties can be placed within a tradition of sociological literature that originated with 
Robert Michels’ Political Parties.546 Most well known for its thesis of the “iron law of 
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oligarchy,” Michels’ work argues that modern bureaucratic political parties will inevitably 
become dominated by the leadership and develop into oligarchies. Arendt may not agree with 
his identification of historical laws, but she shares Michels’ critical stance towards party 
politics. For Arendt: 
 
What stands between the people and power is the political party “machine.” The parties were originally 
devised as a means to represent the people and an instrument for electing representatives. Today they 
represent nobody, not even party members, but only the party bureaucracy. In other words, the people 
have been left without appropriate institutions for their representation.547 
 
Designed to bring the mass of voters closer to the workings of power and into the political 
community, mass political parties were originally hailed as a positive development for 
democracy.548 In addition to exercising political power, parties are thought to mediate 
competing interests, educate the public, provide avenues for participation, and open spaces for 
deliberation and debate.549 In sum, the role of political parties is to provide a bridge between 
government and society. Robert Goodin offers a contemporary defence of the place of 
political parties. He asserts their importance in articulating political platforms and organising 
the public around political ideas. This activity is central in Goodin’s account for “ideationally 
unifying” the public around certain “ratios” or principles so that by voting for a party, citizens 
can be said to be collectively self-legislating and, in one sense, setting their own laws.550  
 
The problem for Arendt is that in practice the parties have failed miserably in this ostensible 
role and are instead better described as “the very efficient instruments through which the 
power of the people is curtailed and controlled.”551 Her thesis is deliberately provocative, 
since it calls into question the traditional view that political parties are an essential and 
indispensable aspect of modern democratic government. The current consensus appears to be 
that parties are not going anywhere and that it is hard to imagine the proper functioning of 
democracy without them.552 Arendt entertains a bolder vision, arguing that “the party system 
is really relatively very young, and that one should not feel that if we develop different ways 
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of organizing ourselves, and electing our representatives, that that is the end of 
democracy.”553 Arendt’s central point of contention relates to parties’ oligarchic structure and 
lack of internal democracy. The major parties of large democracies tend to be, in practice, if 
not in theory, organised through top-down structures with a tightly controlled system of 
patronage and apprenticeship to access positions of power.554 Policies and positions within the 
party are organised through factional deals and orchestrated by party heads that deter broader 
participation from the public. Parties develop their own internal culture and systems of 
hierarchies and interests, which Arendt describes as their “ambitions and fanaticism … things 
which the people at large neither understood nor shared.”555 In practice, to stand a reasonable 
chance of being elected, candidates must belong to one of the major parties and agree to abide 
by the parties’ political platform and party discipline. Rather than select who they wish to 
represent them, citizens are given a choice between two (or more) candidates chosen by the 
party organisations, which suffer from a lack of internal democratic structure. This feature, for 
Arendt, means that the parties cannot realistically be described as popular organs of the 
people.  
 
Additionally, Arendt is critical of the fact that parties present their policy platform as a 
“ready-made formula,” to be executed and carried out rather than opening a space for political 
action. Many parties provide only limited avenues for genuine participation in policy-making 
because most major points are organised in advance by party officials. Arendt argues that this 
leads to “a cleavage between the party experts who ‘knew’ and the mass of the people who 
were supposed to apply this knowledge.”556 The trouble is that this formula “left out of 
account the average citizen’s capacity to act and to form his own opinion.”557 Parties require 
the support of the people in order to retain their legitimacy, but often there is very little effort 
put into actually providing people with a space for anything but tokenistic participation. For 
this reason Arendt argues that a parliament of political parties “remains a body whose 
approach to the people is from without and from above.”558 Today, there is an even greater 
tendency for parties to organise themselves in this manner than in Arendt’s time. By denying 
citizens a share in public power, Arendt argues that the parties deprive them of some of the 
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most essential aspects of a full human life, namely a “share in public happiness” and 
“experience in political freedom.”559 
 
Arendt’s polemic distinguishes between the council system and the party system as two 
different forms of government resting upon different political principles and modes of 
organisation. However, the councils have never completely excluded political parties, nor 
have they developed outside of their influence. Arendt notes that “the remarkable thing about 
the councils was of course not only that they crossed all party lines, that members of the 
various parties sat in them together, but that such party membership played no role 
whatsoever.”560 We have seen that although the former statement may be true, the latter is 
demonstrably false. It is not evident whether Arendt considered it possible to completely 
eliminate political parties, although she considered it an extremely difficult system to 
reform.561 She admits that her analysis is a more accurate description of the continental party 
system than the United States or, to a lesser extent, Great Britain. She also has a positive 
image of a wide array of clubs, popular societies, associations and assemblies that operate in 
different ways from the party system.562 In criticising the party system she appears to be 
referring to a tendency of political parties – when combined with powerful economic interests 
and bureaucratic forms of organisation – towards corruption and perversion of the public 
realm. Arendt gives voice to the mistrust and scepticism that pervades most ordinary citizens’ 
experiences of political parties. What stood first and foremost in Arendt’s mind was that 
current representative institutions denied ordinary citizens the right to meaningfully 
participate in government. Her criticisms raise the question of which alternative institutions 
Arendt had in mind for enabling broader citizen participation and more robust government 
accountability. 
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Arendt’s Institutional Design 
 
In this section, I examine Arendt’s proposed institutional design of a council democracy and 
how such councils would operate in practice. A study of Arendt’s writings on the councils 
would be incomplete without a thorough analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of her own 
proposal. For Arendt, the council system entails a federal state consisting of a network of 
councils organised in a pyramidal structure. Grass-roots council members elect delegates to 
sit on progressively higher councils, which culminate in a central executive council. The 
councils are open to all and small enough so that every citizen could participate and have a 
voice in deliberations. Local issues would be decided relatively autonomously by the relevant 
local council whereas larger matters concerning the entire political community would be 
deliberated on at a grass-roots level and then decided by delegates at a higher council.  
 
The political structure that Arendt sketches in the final pages of On Revolution embodies the 
political principles that I analysed in chapter three: political freedom, empowerment and 
federalism. Firstly, Arendt stresses the councils’ role as “spaces of freedom,” participatory 
institutions in which every citizen could take part in public affairs. 563 The councils were 
“organs of order as much as organs of action,” which preserved their citizens’ capacity to 
deliberate and to act.564 Secondly, the emergence of the councils led to a “loss of authority in 
the powers-that-be” and the development of a “new power structure,” organised according to 
a “radically different concept of power which permeates the whole body politic.”565 Power is 
generated through the actions and organisational efforts of citizens and moves from the 
bottom up rather than emanating down from a central political institution. Thirdly, in 
opposition to the unitary model of sovereign power embodied in the party system, the 
councils represented a “federal principle” of the plural organisation of political space.566 In 
Arendt’s council system, power and authority would be devolved as much as possible to local 
councils who would retain their capacity for independent action and decision-making. 
 
As I mentioned in my opening remarks, Arendt provides only a brief sketch of her proposed 
institutional arrangement, which begs many questions as to how she imagined the councils 
would operate in practice. It could be argued in her defence that it was not her job to articulate 
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a blueprint for others to implement. Such a blueprint would conflict with her stated goal of 
participatory politics, her criticism of philosopher-legislators, and her acknowledgement of 
the contingent sphere of political action. However, if she expected her readers to take her 
proposal seriously it would have been beneficial for Arendt to have considered some of the 
practical problems of the councils and addressed the many possible objections. Her critics 
argue that Arendt is only able to maintain her enthusiasm for the councils due to avoiding 
pragmatic questions of how the councils would actually operate.567 To respond to these 
questions we must explore Arendt’s proposal in greater detail. Further analysis requires more 
clarity as to the structure and function of Arendt’s councils. I will consider 1) the types of 
councils appropriate to Arendt’s system, 2) the relationship of the councils to each other, and 
3) the primary activities of the councils.  
 
To begin with, there is some ambiguity surrounding what types of councils Arendt considered 
to be relevant to her council system. On the one hand, she admitted a wide variety of councils 
including “neighbourhood councils, professional councils, councils within factories, 
apartment houses and so on. There are, indeed, councils of the most various kinds.”568 
However, she was not equally interested in all types of councils and did not consider her 
council system to consist of every possible form. For example, in her discussion of the 
Hungarian Revolution Arendt only discusses the “revolutionary councils” and not the 
“workers’ council,” which she considered less relevant to her analysis.569 Her support for 
Jefferson’s town hall meeting styled “ward system” and the central position it occupies in her 
discussion of the council system suggests that Arendt believed councils should be territorially 
rather than functionally base. It appears that she viewed “the subdivision of the counties into 
wards” as the most preferred form of council system.570 There are points at which Arendt 
considers workplace divisions of councils such as where she refers to “the elementary 
councils that sprang up wherever people lived or worked together,” but she is for the most 
part highly sceptical of the role of workers’ councils.571 As we have seen in chapter one, 
Arendt attempted to construct an image of a council system that minimised the economic 
aspects of the councils and their location in workplaces and barracks. From the available 
evidence it appears that Arendt favoured the establishment of neighbourhood councils based 
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on the division of territory and population, leading to larger regional councils and up to a 
national parliament.  
 
Another major challenge to such a system is determining how the different levels of councils 
would relate to one another. For example, how would political issues be divided between the 
councils or joint actions be co-ordinated? There is much that is left vague and confusing in 
Arendt’s model on this point. The first problem concerns Arendt’s claim to have reconciled 
the demands of equality and authority. She contends that councils are equal to one another: 
both in the sense that no council would possess sovereign power over another and that 
delegates in one council are “not subject to any pressure either from above or from below.”572 
This is noticeably different from the historical workers’ councils in which recallable delegates 
were directly accountable to their constituents. An absence of pressure from below is essential 
for Arendt in order to maintain the council members’ freedom of political action. Equality in 
Arendt’s model is maintained by an agonistic relationship between the councils, which she 
claims, would “mutually check and control their powers.”573 The political demands of one 
council would be checked and kept in place through the claims and counter-demands of other 
councils in the network. Arendt argues that the councils were “bound to discover the 
divisibility of power” and the necessity of maintaining appropriate checks and balances. 
However, as the councils undergo the process of “co-ordination and integration through the 
formation of higher councils of a regional or provincial character” the difficult question of 
priority between the councils emerges.574 Delegates in lower councils have no way of directly 
participating in important discussions concerning issues broader than their municipality aside 
from through their representatives. As the council structure develops Arendt admits that it 
adopts a “pyramidal form,” with the most logical conclusion being some form of national 
council at its apex. Through this stratification an obvious inequality develops between 
delegates on different levels of the council system. Arendt’s suggestion that authority would 
be generated at each level of the councils does little to explain how the lower and higher 
councils would maintain their equality; or how, in the absence of other formal constraints, 
powerful councils would not dominate weaker ones. As Arendt argues that power flows from 
the bottom up, one would assume that issues such as agenda setting and the determination of 
new laws and regulations would come from the lower councils and be voted up to the higher 
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ones. But then, who would have the final say on such issues? At some point a decision must 
be made on matters of importance to the political community as a whole. The most practical 
solution is that such decisions would be taken by the national council. If this were the case, 
would the national council have the power to enforce its decision against the lower ones? If 
so, which appears to be what Arendt has in mind, this begins to appear like the exercise of 
sovereign power. Much will depend on a number of other factors such as what the councils 
would actually be doing and the relationship between delegates and their electors, issues 
which will be considered below. As will be shown, there are a number of practical questions 
that are left unanswered by Arendt, which places in doubt her claim of reconciling equality 
and authority.  
 
A third and related question concerns the primary activities of the councils. On this point, 
Arendt is less elusive than she first appears. In specifying the functions of the councils, 
Arendt turns to a quote from Jefferson: “It would be tempting to spin out further the 
potentialities of the councils, but it certainly is wiser to say with Jefferson, ‘Begin them only 
for a single purpose; they will soon show for what others they are the best instruments.’”575 
This vague line has frustrated her critics and led to a degree of consternation that there is a 
lack of clarity as to the councils’ proper purpose.576 But for Arendt, the councils’ lack of 
specific administrative duties enabled them to fulfil their intended role: to act as genuine 
spaces of freedom, institutions of participation and deliberation over political issues. The 
councils are the institutional realisation of her theory of political freedom as empowered 
participation in political institutions. Arendt explains the underlying rational as follows:  
 
The basic assumption of the ward system, whether Jefferson knew it or not, was that no one could be 
called happy without his share in public happiness, that no one could be called free without his 
experience in public freedom, and that no one could be called either happy or free without participating, 
and having a share, in public power.577 
 
Arendt was clear on the intended purpose of the councils and their absence of administrative 
tasks. The councils would deliberate on political matters, engage in decision-making, create 
new laws and ordinances and constitute an open public realm.  
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It was only in the form of workers’ councils, that the councils attempted to undertake 
economic tasks such as manage factories. Arendt considered councils that engaged in 
administrative tasks to be deviating from their true purpose: “the fatal mistake of the councils 
has always been that they themselves did not distinguish between participation in public 
affairs and administration or management of things in the public interest.”578 For Arendt, 
there could be a strict separation of properly political concerns from the tasks of 
administration in a modern society. As has been aptly demonstrated in Sitton’s analysis of 
Arendt’s council system, this was based on her mistaken belief that it would soon be possible 
for modern technology to handle “all economic matters on technical and scientific grounds, 
outside of all political considerations.”579 For her, advances in technology would provide 
society with a greater capacity to organise the economic sphere more efficiently. Arendt 
assumed that technical questions could be put outside of the sphere of politics and decided in 
an objective manner by professional administrators.  
 
As we have seen in chapter one, Arendt’s inability to grasp the political dimension of 
economic activities weakened her institutional writings on the councils. On the one hand, it 
led her to ignore the activities of workers’ councils, which were the main historical form of 
councils in the modern period. Arendt’s claim that attempts at factory management were 
intended to “drive their members away from the political realm back into the factories” 
entirely misunderstands the political concerns of the workers. For the councils, the 
democratisation of the factory was an eminently political demand that complemented their 
other goals such as democratically organised political institutions.580 As a result of this 
confusion, Arendt’s councils are open to the criticism of presenting a hollow and overly-
idealised view of political action. If the councils would not be discussing issues of health, 
education, housing and other socio-economic concerns, it is unclear what they would be doing 
and whether they would serve any useful function as political institutions. On the other hand, 
her separation of the economic and the political spheres prevented her from conceptualising 
the councils’ attempt at bringing the economic sphere under political control and subjecting 
the unfettered rule of economic elites to democratic forms of accountability. Such endeavours 
could only appear as misguided and counterproductive from Arendt’s standpoint of the 
implicit separation of the political and the economic. However, by presupposing their 
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partition, Arendt misunderstands one of the essential functions of the councils to re-organise 
the underlying structural conditions of workers’ lives. 
 
In his analysis of Arendt’s councils, Sitton briefly points to her reliance on a principle of 
nonsovereign politics and her interest in a federal system. However, Sitton does not expand 
on what is implied by Arendt’s critique of sovereignty or support for a federal model of 
political power. In the previous chapter, I demonstrated how Arendt’s critique of sovereignty 
advocates a more plural organisation of political power and that it does so against unifying 
forms of political logic. She attempts to cultivate a more active conception of political 
subjects in democratic regimes through the creation of new institutional spaces for political 
action. Power structures would be decentralised to intermediate and local constituent bodies, 
which would enable increased political action at a grass-roots level. In this chapter, I exhibit 
how this analysis of federalism and empowerment dovetails with Arendt’s institutional 
aspirations to foster a different structure of political power.  
 
For Arendt, the councils organised power according to a diametrically opposed model to 
traditional governments. Arendt depicts the new organisational structure of the councils 
through two different images of power: one that flows horizontally across councils and 
another that moves from bottom to top.581 Most governments are organised by a centralised 
apparatus that controls key decisions and feeds power down to subordinate institutions and 
personnel. This is the model of the centralised sovereign state, which was retained in the 
democratic sovereign model of Rousseau and the French Revolution. The authority to act in 
the name of the government is conferred upon agents by the sovereign, with power emanating 
from above and moving down the structure. In contrast, the councils organise power from the 
bottom up. The institutional structure of the council system retains genuine power at the 
lowest levels of decision-making where it is closest to the people. There is no hypothetical 
social contract in the form of a renouncing or conferring of power to a sovereign in exchange 
for peace, security or property rights. Power arises in the people through joint political action 
and is not monopolised by a hierarchical institution in order to maintain a system of rulership. 
The councils, for Arendt, are “something which builds itself up from the grass roots, so that 
you really can say potestas in populo, that is, that power comes from below and not from 
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above.”582 She contrasts the council system to the “mercilessly centralized power apparatus” 
of the sovereign state, for whom the power of the people is a useful fiction that confers 
legitimacy and authority on the central government via democratic elections.583 
 
One aspect of Arendt’s councils that has failed to receive sufficient attention is their role as 
oppositional sources of alternative power within a political regime. This is evident in her 
description of them as the “amazing formation of a new power structure which owed its 
existence to nothing by the organizational impulses of the people themselves.”584 Arendt 
emphasises that the councils were able to produce new forms of political power through 
eliciting the political energies of citizens. The generation of new forms of power through 
political action is able to transform stagnant political institutions and rejuvenate the political 
processes. In Arendt’s account, as citizens began to create power, the councils challenged the 
legitimacy and authority of existing institutions and began to act as “competitors for public 
power”.585 She views the council system as arising alongside the remnants of state institutions 
as a new structure of power that challenged existing institutions, a “counterpower.”586 In 
certain respects, her theory anticipates contemporary ideas of the construction of alternative 
institutions within a regime, developing alongside existing structures in order to eventually 
replace them. In these currents of revolutionary discourse, counterpower designates popular 
institutions that are challengers to traditional state power.587 David Graeber describes it as “a 
collection of social institutions set in opposition to the state and capital: from self-governing 
communities to radical labor unions to popular militias.”588 Their goal is to undermine and 
delegitimise the power of the old elites and simultaneously build alternative models that could 
replace them. While Arendt would not concur with all aspects of contemporary articulations 
of counterpower, for both Arendt and contemporary writers, councils seek to transform the 
institutions of the state into more open and democratic council institutions. Arendt’s 
institutional design emphasises the oppositional and insurgent nature of the councils as 
alternative structures of political power. 
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Problems of Scale and Complexity 
 
A number of criticisms have arisen concerning the proposed structure of Arendt’s council 
system. The main problem encountered by any model of radical or participatory democracy is 
the charge of irrelevance in the face of large-scale, heterogeneous and technically complex 
societies.589 In other words, the councils may simply be an unfeasible response to current 
organisational requirements. For example, Jürgen Habermas is troubled by what he sees as the 
“anti-institutionalism” inherent in council democracy. He argues that conceiving of society on 
the basis of horizontal networks of voluntary associations “was always utopian; today it is still 
less workable, given the regulatory and organisational needs of modern societies.”590 This 
argument is most commonly deployed against forms of direct democracy based on the 
Athenian model or anarchist ideals of a stateless and lawless society.591 However, Arendt’s 
proposal is less susceptible to the criticism of anti-institutional bias than classical anarchist 
models due to its strong conception of the rule of law, separation of powers and stable 
institutions. Central to Arendt’s idea of the councils is a federal model with a system of co-
ordination between councils. Power and authority would be gradated throughout the system to 
ensure a division of power between the councils and a system of checks and balances that she 
so admired in the American Constitution. Therefore, we must consider whether Arendt’s 
council system, with its federal structure, rule of law and balancing of powers, is susceptible 
to similar criticisms of an inability to deal with problems of scale and complexity.  
 
Firstly, there is the problem of how to scale up face-to-face meetings of individual councils to 
create a broader functional system. Meetings of small groups of citizens may be able to 
resolve local problems but how would the citizens of an entire state manage to personally 
engage with one another in discussing political concerns. Arendt recognises this to be a 
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problem for attempts at rehabilitating direct forms of democracy: “The Greeks . . . were quite 
aware of the fact that the polis, with its emphasis on action and speech, could survive only if 
the number of citizens remained restricted.”592 But Arendt’s council system is not a simple 
direct democracy because it relies on the election of representatives to higher council levels. I 
will further discuss the nature of representation in Arendt’s system below. But for now, it is 
enough to note that it is precisely this federal model that is her answer to the problem of scale. 
As has been demonstrated, the federal structure enables direct participation of citizens on 
certain issues while still permitting representatives to be selected to constitute higher councils 
in a pyramidal structure. She considered this federal system appropriate for all levels of 
politics: from the smallest local councils up to international alliances between federal council 
states.593 There are still a number of questions of how such a federal system would practically 
be organised, but this is not to say that it would be impossible to develop. The participatory 
budgeting councils of Porto Alegre and other Brazilian cities present one prominent recent 
historical example of a political system in which a large-scale participatory model has dealt 
reasonably well with the negotiation of competing interests across different levels of 
councils.594 There is no evidence to suggest that a federal model of gradated authority as 
Arendt describes would be completely impractical if the political will existed to implement it. 
As Benjamin Barber conceives it, the problem of scale is elastic rather than absolute insofar 
as it is susceptible to technological and organisational amelioration.595 One of the basic 
hurdles has been the problem of communication across large distances, which advances in 
communications technology have now rendered far less problematic. The traditional 
scepticism and pessimism of critics is now challenged by a small but growing body of 
evidence documenting experiments in large-scale participatory politics.596  
 
A second problem with the council system is that it appears to offer a far less efficient means 
of governance. It requires a lengthy process of deliberation on issues in local councils in order 
for decisions to be made. This could result in an inordinate amount of time being spent on 
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deliberation, which may come at the expense of the attainment of policy objectives. 
Furthermore, it demands high levels of participation from citizens, which some critics believe 
to be unrealistic in our highly disengaged and apathetic societies.597 The levels of time and 
energy required of a council system may simply be too demanding for contemporary 
societies. To the first issue, Arendt could reply that a council system might incorporate special 
emergency powers for making time-sensitive decisions, which would then need to be justified 
to the councils after the fact to explain why such emergency measures were necessary. With 
regards to the efficiency of the council system, every political system must strike a balance 
between the administrative demands that are placed on citizens and government and the 
democratic values of transparency, equality and legitimacy. All democratic governments must 
tackle questions of an “economy of time” when designing institutions for greater civic 
participation.598 The normative argument in favour of more participation is that some 
additional burdens on public authorities and institutions are necessary and justifiable when 
considering the positive democratic goods that result from increased participation and greater 
popular control over decision-making.599 It is not possible at a general level to determine the 
precise point at which increased time requirements would become too onerous for 
participatory institutions. This would have to be determined pragmatically by actors involved 
in the process. Weighing up the perceived costs alongside the benefits of participation would 
be a central consideration of any new institutional design. 
 
A third potential issue is that the problems faced by contemporary politics are too complex 
and sophisticated to be dealt with by ordinary citizens working within a council system. Ever 
since Plato’s seafaring metaphor, advocates of “guardianship” models of political society 
have emphasised the necessity of appropriate levels of expertise in governance.600 The 
contemporary version of Plato’s argument is reflected in technocratic visions of society. The 
complexity of modern governance problems has increased in our time due to the further 
differentiation and development of society into a number of semi-autonomous subsystems. 
Our society appears more sophisticated than ever before, placing in doubt whether a council 
organisation could cope with the levels of administrative and political complexity.601 In 
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response to this problem it can be argued that there is no discernible reason why a 
representative democracy would be more equipped to cope with greater levels of technically 
complex information than Arendt’s council democracy. Both systems have access to expert 
knowledge to assist in political decisions and both are expected to make information 
accessible to the public in order to inform broader public debate. An argument against council 
democracy on this point would appear to be equally directed against all forms of democratic 
government, which few today would be willing to support. 
 
 
Representation in the Councils 
 
Another issue for Arendt’s council system concerns its form of political representation. 
Arendt is well known as a steadfast critic of representation and an advocate of more direct and 
immediate forms of political participation. Indeed, there is a general scepticism towards 
representation and a participatory streak that runs throughout her writings. As has been 
demonstrated in her critique of representative government, she believes that forms of virtual 
representation can be disempowering because they exclude the represented from the direct 
exercise of public power. Citizens who are merely represented are “not admitted to the public 
realm” and are not able to exercise their “virtuous dispositions” in political action.602 By 
leaving political affairs to elected representatives, citizens allow themselves to be 
disenfranchised and relegated to the margins of political life. Political representation is bound 
to be a difficult issue for Arendt’s political theory for the simple fact that it places a high 
importance on the direct speech and action of individuals as an integral part of the political 
process.603 Participation in politics is for Arendt an irreplaceable form of experience that 
provides both happiness and freedom. Its abdication constitutes an assault “on the very 
dignity of the political realm itself.”604 By this Arendt means politics is a particular sphere of 
life that enables a certain form of human activity that cannot be undertaken outside of this 
realm. In political action, citizens appear amongst their peers and are seen and heard in the 
public realm. For these reasons, many of her critics have taken Arendt to be unequivocally 
opposed to all forms of political representation.605 There are good grounds to support this 
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position. Even in her institutional analysis, she tends to frame the question in oppositional 
terms: “the issue at stake was representation versus action and participation. The councils 
were organs of action, the revolutionary parties were organs of representation.”606 However, 
this simplicity belies a greater level of nuance in Arendt’s writings on the topic of 
representation.  
 
As Andreas Kalyvas and Lisa Disch have demonstrated, although Arendt is critical of current 
incarnations of representative government and the party system, she is not opposed to the 
concept of political representation per se.607 Arendt is not advocating a simple system of 
direct democracy – either in its ancient Athenian or modern Swiss variants.608 She is 
interested in alternative forms of representation and institutional innovations rather than a 
complete rejection of representation on Rousseauian grounds. In fact, she criticises 
Rousseau’s disciples in the French Revolution who claimed that representation was 
impossible.609 Arendt claims that the council system is “the only alternative of democratic 
electoral representation to the one presented by the Continental multi-party system.”610 It 
enables “different ways of organizing ourselves, and electing our representatives.”611 
Arendt’s council system seeks a new enactment of political representation that would avoid 
the depoliticising effects of current representative systems and the impracticalities of direct 
democracy. The gradated system of councils for which Arendt advocates attempts to enable 
citizens to participate in certain forms of deliberation and decision-making and have their 
views represented at higher councils in the case of broader issues. It seeks to provide multiple 
points of participation that offer citizens opportunities to contribute without subjecting every 
political decision to a direct plebiscitary vote. Cautious of traditional theories of 
representation, Arendt attempts to overcome the deficiencies of both direct and existing 
representative forms of democratic government. However, although Arendt sheds light on 
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many of the weaknesses of current representative institutions, I argue that she is unable to 
formulate a compelling political alternative. 
 
Throughout her analysis in On Revolution, Arendt vacillates between two alternative 
conceptions of representation: mandate and independence, both of which she ultimately 
rejects.612 Yet her compromise position, based on the principles of personal trust and integrity, 
is highly unrealistic and ill-equipped to fully account for the complexities of a plausible 
concept of representation in contemporary society.613 Arendt conceives of the 
mandate/independence debate as a tension between two equally undesirable concepts of 
representation: either the people elect representatives who are authorised to act on the basis of 
their own judgment, independent of their constituents, or, the representatives are mere 
delegates, compelled to act precisely as their constituents would in their position. In the latter 
case, Arendt believes that no genuinely political space could emerge for deliberation and 
decision-making, because representatives would be reduced to mere messengers of their 
constituents. In the former case, where representatives form opinions and judgments in the 
course of governing, their constituents surrender all power to them and politics once again 
becomes a privilege of the few. Arendt considered this second alternative closer to the 
realities of the modern age, but maintained a critical stance towards both perspectives.  
 
Turning now to Arendt’s position, the federal council system is structured such that 
representatives are elected by council members to sit on progressively higher levels of the 
pyramid. The first level of the councils is constituted through a process of self-selection. 
Arendt explains that the bottom layer would be composed of people “who selected 
themselves,” in other words, “those who cared and those who took the initiative.”614 I will 
return later to the problems of elitism and inclusivity relating to this procedure. But for now, 
let us note that all citizens have the right to participate in the councils. These citizens then 
“chose their deputies for the next higher council, and these deputies, again, were selected by 
their peers, they were not subject to any pressure either from above or from below.”615 
Importantly, deputies are chosen by other citizens within their council rather than being 
“proposed” to the electorate by a party apparatus following a pre-selection process. This small 
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difference is crucial for Arendt because the council system is designed to break the 
stranglehold of the oligarchic political parties over the political process and open it up to a 
broader section of society.616 
 
Arendt proposes a distinctive way in which representatives would be chosen. Her concept of 
representation in the councils begins from the simple scenario of a small group conversation. 
Arendt argues, “if only ten of us are sitting around a table, each expressing his opinion, each 
hearing the opinions of others, then a rational formation of opinion can take place through the 
exchange of opinions.”617 For Arendt, genuine opinion formation can only occur within a 
deliberative environment in which individuals can discuss political issues and compare their 
views with the perspectives of others. For this aspect of her theory, Arendt draws from the 
Federalists’ vision of representation as permitting the purification and refinement of opinion. 
Although critical of Madison on other points, she appreciates the unique role of the US Senate 
in opinion formation and the way in which it was designed to act as a “medium through which 
all public views must pass.”618 From this metaphor, it becomes clear that Arendt understands 
it is opinions that will be the object of representation, rather than interests or persons.619 The 
opinion formed within this deliberative setting would be represented at the next level of 
councils by what Arendt names a “delegate” or “deputy.” Arendt uses the term delegate rather 
than “representative,” but without a corresponding theory of delegation.620 Arendt explicitly 
rejects the typical socialist model of strictly binding mandates and directly recallable 
delegates that is associated with the historical councils. The distinctive aspect of Arendt’s 
system relates to how such delegates would be selected. For Arendt, it would be “according to 
political criteria, for their trustworthiness, their personal integrity, their capacity of 
judgement, often for their physical courage.”621 But above all, deputies are selected on the 
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basis of “personal trust” and the “confidence” of their peers.622 This model of representation 
as the realisation of a bond of trust is based on a form of politics that Arendt locates in the 
Hungarian Revolution. She observed that during the formation of councils, the choice of the 
voter was made “exclusively by his estimation of a man” and was “not bound by anything 
except trust in his personal qualities.”623 Arendt does not clarify what she calls “the principle 
of personal trust,” but leaves it to her readers to imagine the potentialities of such a system.624 
The only guidance she offers is that the delegate most suited to representing the opinion that 
emerges within deliberations is the individual who is able to gain the trust and confidence of 
other council members. 
 
I contend that there is a fundamental limitation with this approach due to its conception of 
representation as an individual relationship rather than a function of a political system. In her 
own conception of representation, Arendt turns away from her previous systematic analysis of 
the overall effects of a system of representation to conceive of it in individualistic terms as a 
direct relationship between constituents and a delegate. This fails to account for the broader 
role of political representation, which Hanna Pitkin usefully summarises as “primarily a 
public, institutionalized arrangement involving many people and groups, and operating in the 
complex ways of large-scale social arrangements.”625 Rather than analyse a direct constituent-
representative relationship, for Pitkin, “what makes it representation is not any single action 
by any one participant, but the over-all structure and functioning of the system, the patterns 
emerging from the multiple activities of many people.”626 While Arendt’s systematic critique 
of representative democracy provides a critical angle on its disempowering effects, her own 
proposal appears naïve and underdeveloped in the face of the complexities of modern 
governance institutions. One key problem of Arendt’s theory is her idea that representatives 
would not feel pressure from above or below, which neglects the existence of bargaining, 
strategic negotiation and trade-offs in politics. Whether or not Arendt approves of such 
activities, they are realities of political life that are unlikely to disappear within a different 
institutional form. The problem of representation, which Arendt saw as “one of the crucial 
and most troublesome issues of modern politics,” proved to be a stumbling block that she was 
                                                
622 Ibid., 271. 
623 Arendt, “Totalitarian Imperialism: Reflections on the Hungarian Revolution,” 30. 
624 Arendt, On Revolution, 271. 
625 Pitkin, The Concept of Representation, 221. 
626 Ibid., 221–222. 
 152 
unable to adequately overcome.627 That Arendt could not conjure an adequate explanation of 
the issue of representation should come as no surprise, since she admitted that it “constituted 
one of those dilemmas which permit of no solution.”628 While more promising explorations of 
the concept of political representation have been written in recent years, the implausible role 
of representatives in her council system undermines the institutional feasibility of her 
position.629 Arendt’s criticisms of existing representative institutions reveal the fundamentally 
disempowering effects of current systems, but the weaknesses of her own account show that 
more work is needed, both theoretically and practically, in developing viable political 
alternatives. 
 
 
Arendt’s Elites  
 
One of the major criticisms of Arendt’s writings on the councils is that her proposition to 
replace modern representative government with a participatory council system would lead to 
the creation of a new well-resourced elite. Arendt’s declaration of the “end of general suffrage 
as we understand it today” is enough to strike fear in the hearts of modern liberal democrats, 
but it does not need to have such elitist overtones as her critics suggest. I contend that the 
charge of elitism is partially refuted by the intention of Arendt’s argument, which forces us to 
put into context her final provocative statement regarding the creation of a new “aristocratic” 
elite. Arendt’s council system is better interpreted as an extension rather than a limitation of 
political rights and participation. Her main thesis in On Revolution is that representative 
democracy denies people genuine political freedom and self-rule and puts in its place a 
“government of the people by an élite sprung from the people.”630 For Arendt, voting for 
rulers in periodic elections from a professional class of party politicians is entirely missing the 
point of politics. “For political freedom, generally speaking, means the right ‘to be a 
participator in government’, or it means nothing.”631 Politics is not concerned with “ruling” 
but rather the creation of a public space between plural human beings where they may act in 
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concert. Despite contrary interpretations, Arendt does not wish to further limit democratic 
participation to a privileged few but extend the opportunity of direct participation in 
government to every citizen. 
 
A possible concern with the transformation of state institutions is that it would threaten 
individual civil liberties enshrined in law. However, there is no indication that Arendt 
intended to remove existing liberties through the implementation of the council system. Fears 
of a council dictatorship that would run roughshod over civil rights are not warranted in the 
case of Arendt’s constitutional council system. She valued the civil liberties provided by 
stable institutions and the rule of law and showed no sign of advocating for their abolition. On 
the contrary, the councils would further embed and extend existing freedoms. While certain 
models of a council republic entail the elimination of a separation of powers and the removal 
of judicial controls over democratic decisions, Arendt did not prescribe the absolute rule of a 
democratic majority outside of all boundaries of positive law. Arendt’s council system 
proposed a clear separation of powers, an independent judiciary as a neutral arbiter of the law 
and constitutional liberties for citizens. 
 
However, Margaret Canovan believes her reading of an elitist strand in Arendt’s work is 
supported by Arendt’s “distrust of the mass of ordinary voters” evidenced in her previous 
works, The Origins of Totalitarianism and The Human Condition.632 A key theme in 
Canovan’s reinterpretation of Arendt is that Arendt's political thought developed from her 
reflections on totalitarianism.633 Canovan asserts that as a Jew who witnessed the rise of 
Hitler, Arendt carried with her a distrust of “the masses” that taints her work.634 While it is 
difficult to deny a suspicious tone in Arendt’s earlier work, there are a number of passages in 
On Revolution that praise the capacities of ordinary citizens and appear to offer an alternative 
perspective on democratic politics. Arendt refers to the “political maturity” of the working 
class who are “entirely capable of acting in a political capacity.”635 She mourns the loss of the 
“the townships and the town-hall meetings, the original springs of all political activity”636 
attended by “the many” in American society, alongside the suppression of the popular 
societies by Robespierre during the French Revolution. 
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Jeffery Isaac believes that this misunderstanding of Arendt's work is due to her use of the term 
“the masses” as a sociological category to designate the type of person produced by a mass 
society: the anonymous individuated consumer who votes according to private interests and 
participates infrequently in public affairs. But Isaac stresses “‘the masses’ is not a 
psychological category intended to denigrate the capacities of ordinary men and women.”637 
Arendt herself notes the dangers in the simple “equation of ‘people’ and masses,”638 
highlighting the clear distinction in her mind. Whereas a member of the masses is conformist 
and is controlled by mainstream media and “Madison Avenue” politics, Arendt urges ordinary 
citizens to break out of this cycle by forming citizens’ councils and creating a public space in 
which to act. It is only through “breaking up ‘the many’ into assemblies where one could 
count and be counted upon” that the perversions of mass society could be remedied.639 And 
indeed, her pessimism should not be overstated for this is qualified by her position that 
“political passions ... are perhaps not as rare as we are inclined to think, living in a society 
which has perverted all virtues into social values.”640 Furthermore, the lofty ideals which 
Arendt sets for her citizens as someone who “strives for excellence regardless not only of 
social status and administrative office but even of achievement and congratulations” 
demonstrates that we should not be too disheartened to find that Arendt’s citizens are 
“certainly out of the ordinary under all circumstances.”641 
 
However, there are also a number of troubling statements in Arendt’s work regarding the 
limitations of freedom and the role of elites that seem to support some of the more elitist 
interpretations of her work. Firstly, let us consider Arendt’s claim that freedom is spatially 
limited and that the political spaces of freedom are like “islands in a sea or oases in a 
desert.”642 It could be argued that this does not imply that certain categories of people must be 
excluded, nor does it entail the separation of a political aristocracy from the masses. This line 
could be read as inferring that equality among humans is a political construction rather than a 
self-evident natural fact. Arendt’s vivid metaphor of an island in a sea echoes the description 
of classical republicans such as Machiavelli and Rousseau for whom the city-state had to be 
defended against the inevitable decay of corruption and war. Indeed, it is true that throughout 
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history, republics of the kind Arendt admired have seldom come into existence. There is no 
logical inconsistency with modern democratic societies creating similar spaces of public 
freedom on a larger scale. 
 
Yet, if it will only be “those few from all walks of life who have a taste for public freedom 
and cannot be ‘happy’ without it” participating in government, how will Arendt’s council 
system fight against democratic exclusions?643 Isaac chastises Canovan for supposing that 
Arendt’s council system restricted politics to an “aristocratic leisure class” as he believed 
“[Arendt’s] ‘aristocracy’ is an aristocracy of civic-mindedness, not a hereditary elite based on 
access to wealth.”644 However, it seems legitimate to ask who exactly are these “happy few” 
and what structures of power would manifest themselves in this new system to exclude certain 
types of people from participation. Canovan is rightly concerned for those who are “too old, 
too ill, overburdened with work, or too inarticulate” to participate.645 In principle, Arendt’s 
council system would have no institutional barriers to prevent citizens from participating. Yet 
Arendt displays no consideration for how traditional power differentials would manifest 
themselves in her council system.646 Studies of political participation reveal a strong 
correlation between advantages in income, wealth and education and higher levels of 
participation in politics.647 This tendency increases the more intensive and demanding the 
form of participation.648 There is therefore a danger that the councils would reinforce and 
intensify existing power differentials in society.649 Arendt appears either oblivious or 
indifferent to such consequences, since she includes no discussion of how the institutional 
design of the councils would guard against these imbalances thwarting her egalitarian 
commitments. More recent writings in participatory democracy have identified ways in which 
institutions can be designed that partially overcome the overrepresentation of economically 
advantaged participants and that can even reverse the bias that has traditionally been found in 
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participatory institutions.650 However, these concerns are not addressed by Arendt in her 
theory of representation or seen as a weakness of the council form that would need to be 
overcome. This inattentiveness to the political dynamics of struggles for power raises serious 
questions over the potential unjust and undemocratic exclusion of citizens in Arendt’s council 
system. 
 
 
The Desirability of Arendt’s Council System 
 
In this chapter, I have raised a number of problems concerning Arendt’s institutional 
proposal. Considered together, these contradictions and inconsistencies present a sizeable 
obstacle to the direct implementation of Arendt’s council system. The most pressing concern 
is Arendt’s belief that the councils would not undertake economic tasks or deliberate on 
administrative issues. I have argued that such a division would be impossible to maintain in 
practice and if it were attempted it would lead to the irrelevance of the councils for the many 
political concerns that also contain deep social and economic dimensions. Furthermore, it is 
not clear which form of representation would be possible or desirable in an Arendtian council 
system. Arendt is clearly against the typical socialist model of mandated and directly 
recallable delegates, but her own proposal based on a principle of personal trust in which the 
representatives would not be pressured by their electors is an unrealistic and unviable 
alternative. There are other criticisms against which Arendt would have a more convincing 
reply such as problems of scale and elitist tendencies in the system, but even here it is not 
clear that Arendt’s proposal presents a more desirable embodiment of democratic principles 
than that which could be established by reforms to current liberal representative institutions. 
Ultimately, it is difficult to conceive of a functioning model of anything like Arendt describes 
in the final pages of On Revolution.  
 
Nevertheless, Arendt’s design of a council system is important for two reasons. Firstly, the 
councils are central to her vision of a renewal of political action and the public realm in the 
modern world. To completely discount her writings on the councils as an anomaly in her work 
would be to fail to see the ways in which they embodied many of her central political values 
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in an institutional form. In particular, the role the council system plays in the articulation of 
her central political ideas shows to what extent her political thought is misrepresented when 
considered as an institutionally unanchored account of political action or an exercise in 
Grecophilic nostalgia. Secondly, Arendt’s council system retains a pressing relevance for 
political theory because it provides a robust and prescient criticism of liberal representative 
democracy and presents an alternative set of political principles that could guide its reform. In 
this respect, we can see the councils as an historical example in the sense developed in the 
introduction and chapters two and three of this thesis. Arendt’s return to forms of council 
democracy is based on her retrieval of forgotten political principles that disrupt modern 
narratives and open up a broader horizon of political ideas.651 The idea of a council system 
redirects our political imagination by offering an alternative political vision to guide our 
interrogation of democratic questions. Although we have reason to doubt the attractiveness 
and feasibility of a full-scale council model, Arendt’s writings on the councils prompt active 
experimentation with institutional alternatives to liberal representative democratic regimes. 
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Chapter 5: Council Democracy Revisited 
 
 
Despite widespread criticisms of current liberal minimalist forms of democracy, the 
democratic councils of the immediate post-First World War period have not captured the 
imagination of mainstream political thought. Council democracy has generally been 
disregarded as an unfeasible and utopian political project. In contrast, democratic theory has 
tended to draw inspiration from other more prominent historical eras such as ancient Athens, 
the Roman Republic, the French and American Revolutions and the civil rights and student 
movements. One reason for this lack of interest is that council democracy has traditionally 
been considered as a wholesale alternative to the institutions of liberal parliamentary 
democracy. The classic vision of council democracy consists of workers’ and soldiers’ 
councils organised into a pyramidal structure that would replace liberal parliamentary 
institutions and capitalist production with rule by working-class council institutions and a 
socialist system of co-operative production. Considered in this sense, council democracy is 
treated as outside of the scope of liberal representative democracy and therefore of marginal 
interest for contemporary debates within democratic theory. In a recent examination of the 
field, leading democratic theorist, John Dryzek, considered council democracy a “dead duck” 
with very few theorists or followers.652 Nor does council democracy feature in David Held’s 
influential Models of Democracy, receiving only a cursory mention under theories of 
participatory democracy as an alternative that “has attracted fewer supporters.”653 For most 
democratic theorists like Dryzek and Held, the councils are a forgotten relic of the past. The 
aim of this chapter is to challenge this prevailing interpretation and argue for a new 
understanding of the councils’ significance for democratic theory. 
 
The dominant conception of democracy in the study of real world democratic institutions is a 
liberal minimalist model. This model is based on Joseph Schumpeter’s definition of 
democracy as an institutional arrangement in which the holders of political power are 
determined by competitive elections between political parties.654 Minimalist democracies aim 
to protect the private liberties of citizens and hold leaders accountable through elections. The 
benefit of this definition for its adherents is that it provides simple empirical indicators for 
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measurement and is not burdened by wide-ranging normative criteria. More substantive issues 
of government responsiveness, levels of participation, political equality, or socio-economic 
disparities are excluded from consideration. In his defence of a minimalist democracy, Adam 
Przeworski glosses this conception as “a system in which parties lose elections.”655 This 
model can easily be applied to the study of democratic regimes such as in Huntington’s “two-
election test” for determining the presence of a consolidated democracy. According to this 
test, a consolidated democracy is one in which a freely elected political party peacefully cedes 
power in a subsequent election.656 Although organisations such as the Freedom House and 
Polity IV use slightly enlarged criteria, which assess the presence of human rights, basic civil 
and political liberties, universal franchise and a free media, the basic conception of a liberal 
minimalist model remains similar.657 Scholars engaged in the study of comparative 
democracy or democratic transitions and consolidation also employ largely minimalist 
democratic criteria in their analyses.658 In fact, over the past thirty years, even as criticisms of 
minimal democracy have become dominant within normative political theory, the empirical 
criteria of the minimalist model have gained a stronger hold in the real world.659  
 
However, there are limits in the ability of a liberal minimalist conception of democracy to 
tackle some of the central issues of democratic politics such as facilitating greater levels of 
citizen participation, controlling elites and promoting conditions of political equality. Much of 
the current malaise in advanced industrial democratic societies simply does not register on a 
minimalist model so long as a country has free and regular elections. A number of other 
normative theories of democracy have criticised the inadequacies of a liberal minimalist 
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account of democratic politics and proposed alternative interpretive frameworks.660 On the 
one hand, deliberative democrats emphasise the central value of democratic legitimacy in 
decision-making, which is generated through meaningful debate between free and equal 
citizens.661 These theorists demand greater levels of rationality and political inclusiveness 
from democratic institutions and insist that deliberation should take priority over the raw 
aggregation of votes as the principle source of democratic authority. On the other hand, 
radical democrats direct attention towards moments of contestation and resistance within 
democratic regimes and criticise liberalism’s depoliticisation of democracy through legal 
mechanisms and universal principles.662 For radical democrats, democracy is best 
characterised as oppositional practices that challenge oppression and open the possibility for 
new political claims and subjectivities to emerge. Radical democrats contend that the 
deliberative focus on reaching consensus in decision-making supresses differences and 
antagonisms in addition to masking oppressive power relations.663 
 
In this chapter, I turn to the democratic councils in order to articulate new possibilities in 
debates in democratic theory between deliberative and radical democrats on the meaning and 
significance of democratic agency. The councils’ own vision of how democracy should be 
practiced is best illustrated not as a model of democracy but as a mode of democratic action. 
The councils practiced democracy as an ongoing resistance to forms of elite domination by 
introducing democratic forms of control over democracy-resistant institutions and forces. The 
central activity of this practice consisted of working-class forces organising to restrain 
recalcitrant elites, dismantle hierarchical systems and equalise power between citizens. They 
adopted an interventionist approach by targeting specific sources of domination in their 
everyday lives and demanding the extension of democratic forms of organisation into the 
bureaucracy, army and workplace. These forms of democratic intervention occurred across 
the political and economic domains in a remarkably similar manner that refused to separate 
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democratic politics from socio-economic concerns. The councils sought to extend democratic 
principles of equal control over all of the central institutions in society. 
 
Examining the practices of the councils is able to highlight approaches that are neglected by 
both deliberative and radical democrats. Against deliberative democratic theorists, the 
councils were not centrally concerned with questions of democratic legitimacy achieved 
through the quality of decision-making processes. The councils reveal that the deliberative 
democratic approach is too narrowly focused on the procedures of decision-making and on 
questions of legitimacy to capture the most interesting and important aspects of democratic 
politics. I argue that deliberative democracy obscures the central democratic questions of 
equalising power relations between citizens and bringing oppressive institutions and forces 
under democratic control. The democratic actions of the councils have more in common with 
the constellation of authors located broadly within a radical democratic camp. In this chapter, 
I take Jacques Rancière as exemplary of this radical democratic tradition. One reason for this 
is the number of striking similarities between Rancière’s and Arendt’s political approach, 
which I analyse below. Rancière conceives of democracy as an episodic and interruptive 
process that destabilises established political categories and regimes. However, Rancière’s 
emphasis on the disruptive and momentary nature of democratic politics tends to foreclose the 
possibility of a sustained engagement in and transformation of institutions. In contrast, the 
political struggles of the councils offer a more substantial account of interventions in political 
institutions and provide more useful tools in analysing the dynamics of institutional struggle. 
While reflections on the councils are not able to provide a new model of democracy, they do 
assist in the elaboration of novel perspectives on democratic politics. 
 
I begin the chapter by tracing the influence of the democratic councils in political thought, 
arguing that there has been a neglect of the councils due to a perception of their irrelevance 
for contemporary democratic politics. I show that they have been largely forgotten within 
democratic theory, yet exalted within certain minor currents of socialist thought. Against both 
the councils’ critics and supporters, I argue for a revised understanding of their historical role 
and a new appreciation of their contemporary significance. I argue that it is not an 
institutional model, but a mode of democratic action that is the most lasting achievement of 
the councils and of relevance to current debates. I sketch a number of the defining 
characteristics of the councils’ form of democratic action as a resistance to elite domination 
and identify how this could shape our understanding of democracy. An analysis of the actions 
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of the council delegates and the political context of their struggles provides an illuminating 
example of the collective mobilisation of democratic actors against elites embedded in a 
hierarchical institutional order. I then turn to one particular domain – the workplace – in order 
to demonstrate how the councils sought to intervene in economic activities through the 
extension of principles of democratic control into this sphere. I recover a broader conception 
of democratic practices from the councils that includes the assertion of the necessity of 
democratic forms of organisation within the workplace. This expands the horizons of what we 
traditionally associate with democracy within the liberal tradition and offers a challenge to 
more restricted accounts of democratic government. Finally, I engage with other approaches 
in democratic theory to exhibit how the actions of the councils could be compared to the two 
contrasting poles of deliberative democracy and Jacques Rancière’s democratic politics.  
 
 
The Councils in Political Thought 
 
In this section, I briefly trace the influence of the councils on the subsequent development of 
political thought. Due to their emergence within working class political movements, the 
councils’ largest impact has been within the socialist tradition. Yet, even here advocates of the 
councils have never occupied a dominant position. A council communist ideology developed 
out of reflections on the Russian Revolution as a critique of the centralisation and 
bureaucratisation of the communist party. Adherents to this “council” or “left” communism 
challenged the purported universality of the Russian experience and the validity of the 
Leninist model of organisation. They were critical of the replacement of the self-organisation 
of the working class with a party leadership and advocated instead for workers’ councils as a 
new proletarian form of organisation for empowering the working class.664 The influence of 
this tendency was constrained by Lenin’s polemical critique in “‘Left-wing’ Communism: an 
Infantile Disorder,” ensuring supporters of the councils a heretical status within orthodox 
Marxism.665 Nevertheless, references to workers’ councils can be located in the work of 
influential figures such as Georg Lukács, Antonio Gramsci and Karl Korsch, as well as more 
prominently in marginal figures such as Anton Pannekoek, Otto Rühle and Paul Mattick.666 
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There is little coherence or unity to this council communist tendency. Adherents had 
numerous theoretical differences and came from diverse backgrounds. They also participated 
in a variety of groupings and organisations, particularly within the Dutch, Italian and German 
sections of the International. 
 
For a generation of writers, many of whom participated in the dramatic uprisings of the 1917-
1921 period, the councils played a decisive role in the development of their thought. The 
councils were viewed as exemplary institutions, which were the most advanced expression of 
working class consciousness and organisation. Following his conversion to Marxism in 1918, 
Lukács considered the councils an ideal institution for authentic proletarian political activity. 
Lukács was the Deputy Commissar of Public Education in the short-lived Hungarian Soviet 
Republic from April to August 1918 and participated in the political debates surrounding the 
council form. In his 1920 essay, “Question of Parliamentarianism,” he describes the councils 
as the “true index” of the proletarian revolution whose mere existence “points the way 
forward beyond bourgeois society.”667 However, Lukács never completely abandoned his 
admiration for a Leninist party. His writings in this early period contain a mixture of support 
for both councils and a vanguard party. During the 1920s there is a general erosion of support 
for the councils and an increasing predominance of the party in his work.668  
 
In contrast, Karl Korsch was a much firmer believer in the possibilities of the council system, 
serving as a delegate on one of the German soldiers’ councils in 1917 and on the Socialisation 
Committee in 1918.669 In his conception, the councils were sovereign organs representing the 
political and economic power of the proletariat. He called for a socialist republic of workers’ 
councils in which they would hold full executive, legislative and judicial power, thereby 
destroying the old bureaucracy and political structures of the bourgeois regime. In a 1921 
essay, “Evolution of the Problem of the Political Workers Councils in Germany,” Korsch was 
critical of the ideological confusions of those who preferred to exercise mere oversight and 
control over existing governmental apparatuses, since this failed to recognise what for him 
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were the true tasks of the councils.670 The majority of his practical activity focussed on the 
theme of the socialisation of the economy, which he argued should be carried out immediately 
through the expropriation of productive resources from the capitalist class, placing them 
under democratic control.671 Korsch would continually return to the problem of workers’ 
councils throughout his life as an authentic form of workers’ organisation. Antonio Gramsci, 
on the other hand, had a much briefer flirtation with the councils. Gramsci was a member of 
the Italian Socialist Party and in April 1919 began editing the weekly newspaper L’Ordine 
Nuovo. In a series of articles written for the newspaper, Gramsci advocated for workers 
involved in political disputes in Turin companies to convert their factory commissions into 
workers’ councils. He argued that such councils would be “organs of proletarian power which 
will replace the capitalist in all his useful functions of direction and administration.”672 
However, the political failure of the Turin councils led Gramsci to conclude that the working 
class required a Leninist vanguard party to avoid further defeats.673 
 
The councils were also an inspiration for members of the Frankfurt School, informing their 
conception of socialism as based on a collectively controlled society.674 In one of 
Horkheimer’s early essays, he declared that: 
 
the modalities of the new society are first found in the process of social transformation. The theoretical 
conception which, following its first trailblazers, will show the new society its way - the system of 
workers' councils - grows out of praxis. The roots of the council system go back to 1871, 1905, and 
other events. Revolutionary transformation has a tradition that must continue.675  
 
The influence of the councils is more pronounced, however, in the younger Marcuse, who 
became politicised through his involvement in the councils of the 1918-1919 German 
Revolution. His experience in the councils decisively shaped his political views and presented 
an image of a future classless society.676 Although Marcuse rejected demands for a precise 
institutional model of a post-revolutionary society, he viewed the councils as “a seminal 
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achievement of the revolutionary tradition” that pre-figured the “new adequate sources of 
initiative, organization, and leadership,” which he hoped would be enacted by the New 
Left.677 Central to Marcuse’s conception is the councils’ practice of self-government and self-
determination, which reveals their central political task of actualising the freedom of those 
oppressed under bourgeois rule. Following the decline of the Left in the late 1970s, there is a 
gradual receding of the councils from socialist thought as groups turn to new forms of a “third 
way” between state socialism and capitalism. Indicative of the changing fate of the councils, 
the leading representative of the next generation of the Frankfurt School, Jürgen Habermas, 
considered the idea of a society integrated through associations such as the councils “always 
utopian.”678 He contended that the “idea of workers’ self-governance had to fail” and that 
“today it is even less workable” given the growing social complexity and organisational needs 
of modern society.679 Admiration for the councils continues in certain forms of anarchism, 
socialism and Left Marxism, but they have become far less prominent in contemporary 
debates.680 There are only a small number of adherents to council communism for whom the 
councils still represent both a guiding ideal and a viable institutional form for class struggle 
today.681 
 
Although they continue to appear in the background of radical European thought, the 
prospects of council democracy have exercised very little hold over contemporary democratic 
theory. The one prominent exception is C. B. Macpherson’s Life and Times of Liberal 
Democracy.682 In this text, Macpherson advocates for a form of participatory democracy that 
is based on a pyramidal model of councils with direct democracy at its base and recallable 
delegates at every other level. While Macpherson distances himself from Russian state 
socialism, it is clear that the experiences of the democratic councils of the early twentieth 
century are the basis of his model. One could also refer to other theories of participatory 
democracy in the 1970s such as Carole Pateman’s Participation and Democratic Theory, 
although Pateman’s reference points are G. D. H. Cole’s guild socialism and Yugoslavian 
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worker self-management, rather than the councils of the early twentieth century.683 Yet, one 
must go back over forty years to find examples of prominent and widely read accounts of 
democratic forms of government influenced by the councils.684 It would not be an 
overstatement to say that council democracy has little to no influence on current debates 
within democratic theory. There is no part of the world where there is currently a strong push 
for the replacement of the institutions of liberal democracy with a system of councils.685 It is 
considered as an outdated and impractical alternative to liberal democracy that has since 
become irrelevant. 
 
 
Retrieving the Councils 
 
The perceived impracticality and undesirability of a council system has led to a neglect of the 
potential resources that could be gathered from an examination of the political struggles of the 
councils. For most democrats, the implausible nature of this system has led such proposals to 
be dismissed as unfeasible and utopian. For a much smaller minority of radical political 
thinkers, council democracy offers an alternative institutional model for a socialist form of 
government. The councils still function in the realms of certain Marxist and syndicalist 
discourse as a utopian ideal of an “other” of liberal democratic institutions, representing an 
emancipated beyond in which exploitation and domination will have ceased to exist. 
However, whether viewed from the perspective of the perils of a council dictatorship or the 
utopian possibilities of a council republic, this opposition has become a barrier to conceptual 
development. I contend that there is a more productive perspective on the history of the 
councils than either the critics or defenders of the councils acknowledge.  
 
Considering the councils as a wholesale replacement of the basic institutions of a liberal 
democratic society is only one possible interpretation of their contemporary significance. 
Certainly, there were political actors at the time who held such a view of the prospects of a 
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council republic. Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht of the Spartacus League and Richard 
Müller and Ernst Däumig of the Revolutionary Shop Stewards are examples of this 
perspective. For Däumig, the councils heralded a new era in which the institutions of 
bourgeois democracy, with its ballots, parliaments and system of private property, would give 
way to an emerging proletariat democracy, embodied in a fully functioning council system. 
The shift from bourgeois society to the more advanced form of human organisation found in a 
council republic was inevitable for Däumig because “the council system is, and has to be, the 
organizational structure of modern revolutions.”686  
 
However, this view of the historical task of the councils was contested then and continues to 
be debated today. A historical examination of the European councils of the early twentieth 
century reveals a more disputed legacy with a number of competing conceptions of the proper 
role of the councils. As we have seen in chapter two, the majority of participants in the 
councils tended to view them as democratic control organs of government action rather than 
as alternative governance structures. The ambiguity in the council form allows for multiple 
interpretations and competing attempts at reclaiming their legacy for the present. We 
misunderstand the intentions and actions of council delegates if we conceive of their project 
primarily as a striving for the institutions of an ideal council state. Instead of imagining a 
utopian beyond, the councils engaged in pragmatic experimentation with concrete solutions to 
immediate problems. They sought practical ways to radically transform society and the state 
by deepening and extending existing democratic freedoms towards their emancipatory 
horizons.687 
 
A problem with the radical socialist view of the councils as an appropriate institutional model 
for the present is that it overlooks the historical specificities that connect the councils to a 
particular historical epoch and socio-economic environment. Many of the reasons why the 
councils were initially so successful are based on historical conditions that no longer exist and 
political analyses with limited contemporary applicability. There have been important 
changes in capitalist modes of production and the organisation of labour that make workers’ 
councils a less relevant and suitable institutional form for contemporary politics. Very briefly 
stated, the majority of the workforce is no longer composed of a concentration of industrial 
workers in large factories, correlating to a potentially powerful and united proletariat that 
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could be organised through face-to-face interaction in a council organisation.688 Post-Fordist 
changes to production and labour have fragmented the workforce through measures of 
subcontracting and outsourcing. In its neoliberal variation, capitalism has also become more 
fluid, moving with greater ease across boarders and utilising more sophisticated forms of 
political and economic governance that defy simple control by workers’ councils.689  
 
Arguing for a direct reproduction of the exact institutions of a council system in this altered 
environment treats the councils as a universal form of political struggle that remains constant 
in spite of changing historical circumstances. This argument was first posed by Karl Korsch 
who was wary of the hypostatisation of any given political form of revolutionary organisation. 
A strong advocate of the councils when they arose, Korsch was sceptical of attempts at 
applying this model after it had been historically defeated in the early 1920s. He argued 
against seizing on to the councils, or any other particular institution, “as a singularly 
appropriate and potential form of the revolutionary proletarian class dictatorship.”690 Despite 
the fact that the councils were “a positive form of development of a revolutionary proletarian 
class will surging toward realization,” they must always be seen as the “organizational results 
of a certain historical phase of revolutionary class struggle.”691 The determination of the 
suitability of council-like institutions for a future socialist republic would have to be the result 
of an analysis of the concrete relations of a particular historical situation rather than on the 
basis of an abstract theory of politics as such.  
 
Moreover, there are good reasons internal to the structure of the councils that give us cause to 
doubt whether this model would be a more genuine realisation of democratic principles than 
current institutional arrangements. Following Marx’s criticisms of the doctrine of a separation 
of powers, advocates of a council democracy have usually called for a unified legislature and 
executive with complete power in the hands of a central council organ.692 However, the lack 
of an independent judiciary and constitutionally guaranteed rights would fail to safeguard 
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citizen’s civil liberties. The fear of critics is that the direct expression of the will of the 
proletariat through a government with undivided power would open the pathway to the 
violation of rights and the crushing of dissenting minorities. While the history of the Russian 
Revolution does not provide conclusive proof that such illiberal tendencies would eventuate 
in every council system, it does give added weight to concerns of the potential for rights 
violations. In the next section, I trace an alternative path for drawing resources from the 
councils through an analysis of their distinctive form of democratic action, which I 
characterise as a resistance to elite domination. 
 
 
Democratic Action as Resistance to Elite Domination 
 
The democratic actions of the councils were conceived as part of an ongoing struggle against 
the centralising flows of state power and the tendencies of elites to dominate less powerful 
political actors. Due to unequal power relations in social formations, political and economic 
elites are able to leverage their power to further entrench inequalities by inscribing them in 
political institutions. Elites at the apex of social hierarchies have tended to subvert political 
institutions to their own ends and to undermine attempts at challenging their power.693 The 
democratic practices of the councils sought to counter this predisposition of elites through a 
renewed emphasis on reversing relations of power and instituting more egalitarian forms of 
governance. In this sense, the strategy of the councils directs attention towards the 
oppositional and agonistic dimensions of democratic action. In addition to the more 
traditional activities of deliberating, organising and decision-making, the activities of the 
councils involved challenging established power structures and subverting systems of elite 
rule. They reveal the importance and necessity of these aspects of democratic politics that fall 
outside of processes of rational deliberation. 
 
The starting point of the councils’ political struggle was the existence of oppressive structures 
that reinforced systems of domination and exploitation. When the councils first arose across 
Europe in 1917-1918 they faced a bleak picture of monarchical regimes with deeply 
entrenched privilege and hierarchy. The creation of the German councils followed a decision 
                                                
693 C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1956); Robert D. Putnam, The 
Comparative Study of Political Elites (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1976); John P. McCormick, Machiavellian 
Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011). 
 170 
by the Imperial Naval Command on 24 October 1918 to launch a folly and suicidal final 
attack on allied forces in the English Channel. Facing imminent defeat, the German Admiralty 
refused to surrender without a final “honourable battle” to restore the tarnished reputation of 
the German navy.694 Not wishing to become a sacrifice to the German war machine, soldiers 
organised, resisted, rebelled and finally mutinied against their commanders. The planned 
attack eventually ground to a halt as workers self-organised and formed councils to direct and 
co-ordinate their activities.  
 
The first point to emphasise in this episode is the oppositional character of the councils’ 
actions as a resistance to the domination of political and economic elites.695 Democratic action 
takes place within a strategic relation of forces in which existing structures already shape the 
field of possible actions. To act is to negotiate this environment and challenge the way in 
which dominant institutions limit and constrain individuals within it. In this setting, actors 
must contest and democratise relations of governance from below. The most immediate task 
of the councils was to push back against existing forms of domination that controlled their 
lives. It was the council delegates’ desire for greater levels of freedom and self-determination 
that led them to oppose the plans of the old elite. When the soldiers’ councils began to 
organise and issued their first demands in the Kiel “Fourteen Points,” the military apparatus 
was their primary target.696 They sought to dismantle the complex systems that imposed strict 
discipline upon them and would have sent them to their senseless deaths. 
 
A second important aspect of the councils’ resistance to domination was its direct intervention 
into previously closed and hierarchical structures. The councils challenged entrenched 
powerful interests by attempting to intrude into spheres from which their voices had been 
excluded. Their strategy was therefore transformative and interventionist. They created novel 
political actions by claiming to have a right to exercise democratic control over institutions 
where no such right had existed. Unsurprisingly, the first targets of the council delegates were 
the immediate sources of their daily oppression: the factory and the barracks, which were 
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among the most rigid and authoritarian institutions in Europe. A soldier previously had no 
right to question an admiral’s commands, nor a worker the ability to organise and manage a 
factory. Extensive reforms were proposed that would have overturned and reconfigured these 
institutions. Along these lines, workers called for a range of measures, including an eight-hour 
working day, minimum wages, the socialisation of large industries and a transition from rule 
by factory managers to workers’ control. The radical program of the councils terrified the old 
elite whose power would be dramatically curtailed through such processes of democratisation. 
 
The councils also directly intervened into the affairs of the government and the conservative 
civil service. In Russia, one of the main functions of the councils was to act as “control organs 
of revolutionary democracy,” supervising the activities of the provisional government and 
ensuring its compliance with the democratic program of the workers.697 Similarly, in 
Germany, when a new provisional government was appointed in November 1918, the 
Executive Council of Berlin demanded a “right of control” over their activities.698 The 
councils did not stand aloof from or ignore the operation of the central institutions of power in 
their society. They attempted to open oppressive structures to forms of democratic control 
through coercing sceptical and recalcitrant elites. To this end, the councils attempted to utilise 
their strong power base to vigorously control government action. However, the councils were 
not always successful in this endeavour. The difficulties encountered in their attempts to 
control the central apparatuses of the state were viewed by a number of socialist 
commentators to be the principle reason behind the failure of the revolution to achieve its 
main objectives. Ernst Däumig would later lament the inability of the councils to democratise 
the bureaucracy, which left a significant amount of the structural power of the old regime 
intact.699 As a result, when the power of the councils was challenged and eroded, their 
political program disappeared with them, leaving the elites free to reassert their control. 
 
Third, the democratic actions of the councils were self-consciously class-oriented towards 
promoting the interests of the lower classes and restraining the dominating tendencies of the 
political and economic elite. This was reflected in the socio-economic composition of the 
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councils, the class-content of their ideology and their practical political programs. As a 
historically distinctive democratic organisational form, the councils were the only political 
institutions of the time that were composed of elements of the working class.700 An 
examination of the historical material reveals that it was “the workers,” “the soldiers” and 
“the proletariat” that were constantly evoked as the political subject represented by the 
councils, often in opposition to the bourgeoisie and the government bureaucracy. The 
perception of the councils at the time was that they were intimately connected to the lower 
strata of the population who lacked other institutional forms of political agency. The councils 
organised segments of society that had previously been marginalised and had no political 
voice in the old regime. 
 
The ideology of the councils was also attentive to socio-economic differences between classes 
and the class-driven nature of political conflict. This is demonstrated by the contest over the 
meaning of democracy during this period. 701 It would be anachronistic to believe that 
democracy had the same content for the revolutionaries as it does for us today.702 The way in 
which the language of democracy was employed in Russia in 1917 exhibited a strong 
influence of a socialist conception of class and antipathy towards the elite. Historian, Boris 
Kolonitskii, argues that during the February revolution in Russia “democratic was often used 
as the opposite not of dictatorship or autocracy, but of the upper and even middle classes, 
toward whom it was antagonistic.”703 Democracy had quite specific connotations during this 
period and was used as a term of self-identification by all of the socialist groups and often 
served as a synonym for the “democratic strata” or “democratic classes.” The term 
“democratic camp” [demokraticheskii lager] designated the forces of the working masses and 
the socialist intelligentsia who supported the councils. While there was much division 
between the various socialist groups in Russia, they all agreed on the term “revolutionary 
democracy” as that which distinguished them from the conservatives and the bourgeoisie.704 
From the Provisional Government, Alexander Kerensky was able to offer “a bow to all 
democracy: to workers, soldiers, and peasants.”705 Another example is the authors of the 
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Guide to Political Terms and Politicians published in Russia by a moderate liberal publishing 
house in 1917 who defined democracy as “all classes in a country who live by their own 
labor: workers, peasants, servants, intelligentsia.”706 It was liberals such as the Kadets and 
other propertied elements of society that were excluded through the use of this term. 
Liberalism was an unpopular political ideology at the time and was considered the language 
of the elite.707  
 
In Germany, there was also a struggle over the meaning and interpretation of the concept of 
democracy. The SPD, who were supporters of a call for a national assembly and the 
dismantling of the councils, preferred to frame the question as “democracy or dictatorship,” 
painting the councils as a dangerous flirtation with a Bolshevist dictatorship. When faced with 
the rise of the council system in Germany, all shades of reactionaries and conservatives were 
suddenly fervent believers in democracy and favoured the election of a national assembly for 
liberal parliamentary institutions. However, although there was a general consensus that the 
new republic would be a democratic regime, the true question concerned what form that 
democracy would take. At this stage, the bourgeoisie viewed parliamentary elections and the 
dissolution of the councils as the best method to transform their economic dominance into 
political power and restore the position of the old elites. By restricting struggle to electoral 
politics, it was hoped that the domain of contestation could be shifted away from more wide-
ranging demands of socialisation and positioned within the framework of a liberal political 
order. In light of this, the opposition of certain council delegates to the national assembly can 
be viewed not as a rejection of democratic principles, but as a desire to extend these beyond 
the limits of bourgeois democracy and parliamentarianism. As Gustav Landauer exclaimed, 
“[d]emocracy as self-determination of the people, and of individual groups among the people, 
is something entirely different to the nonsense of elections, which means abdication of power 
by the people and governing of an oligarchy.”708 Democracy, to the radical socialists, entailed 
a broader program of the democratisation of society and the economy. They did not view 
democracy in the sociologically anonymous terms of liberal discourse but through the 
understanding of the basic class antagonisms that would proliferate without more 
thoroughgoing reforms. 
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Fourth, the councils also structured their own internal affairs to offer a more accountable 
system to rank and file members. Democracy was not seen as something external to the 
movement that could be achieved from above through the correct procedures and 
governmental institutions. The movement itself represented the democratic ideals that it 
sought to create in broader society. Delegates in the councils worked under imperative 
mandates and were directly recallable by their electors. This mechanism ensured that if the 
delegate did not perform their function appropriately their mandate could be revoked and a 
new delegate elected in their place. There was an open channel of communication between 
electors and delegate, which allowed for the continual flow of information and for the 
delegate to accurately reflect the views of their electors. One of the clear benefits of this 
model was that a political class could not develop, which could then exercise power against 
the interests of the electors. It was important for genuine power to remain at the lowest levels 
of the councils and not centralise towards a single administrative organ. Däumig warned that 
“[t]he bodies of the council system cannot hold any powers long-term but must be under 
constant control by the voters who can recall councils or council members whenever they 
have lost their trust.”709 This situation occurred on several occasions, including when council 
delegates in Russia voted for a “Liberty Loan” to assist the Provisional Government to 
continue the war. This was deeply unpopular with many workers and led to several delegates 
being recalled.710 Internal forms of accountability to ordinary workers were seen as of equal 
importance to the broader role of the councils as maintaining a tight control over government 
activity. 
 
Fifth, the democratic program of the councils was connected to a deeper vision of human 
emancipation, which was couched in terms of ideological transformation and cultural 
rejuvenation. This transformation had to take place at every level of society and not be simply 
the result of the actions of elite political actors. Instead, the councils aimed for the 
involvement of all individuals in authoritative decision-making processes concerning the 
basic structures of society. Ernst Däumig argued that “it is mandatory to make it a true 
people’s movement that includes the bottom of society.”711 The creation of institutionalised 
spaces of democratic participation within the council structure permitted the cultivation of 
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new forms of democratic agency. This fostered the discussion and deliberation of political 
ideas, extending democratic agency beyond periodic participation in electoral institutions. In 
Russia, the soviets called for “the entire population to establish the people’s authority in the 
districts of Petrograd. We invite the entire population of the capital to rally at once to the 
soviet, to organize local committees in their districts, and to take into their hands the 
management of local affairs.”712 Däumig anticipated “a Germany whose affairs are really 
determined by active people doing more than running to the ballot box every two or three 
years.”713 Increased political activity was viewed as a vital element of the continuation of the 
revolution’s goals. “It can only be changed by a dedicated attempt to make and keep the 
German people politically active,” Däumig continued, “this can only happen in the council 
system.”714 The councils attempted to organise a transition to a more participatory society in 
which citizens would be accustomed to playing an active role in political life. 
 
A significant barrier to this rejuvenation of political life was the cultural and ideological 
limitations of people who were accustomed to centuries of despotism. The problem could not 
be addressed by establishing new political institutions as the oppressive relations were deeply 
rooted in the national psyche and could only be overcome through more profound changes of 
mentality. Gustav Landauer imagined “a new humanity and a new spirit” that would be born 
out of such “fundamental social transformations” to Germany society.715 He viewed the 
development of the German peoples’ spirit as a necessary requirement for realizing the 
political goals of the revolution. A striking example of the contradictions of the period is 
given by British diplomat, George Buchanan, who recalled a conversation with a Russian 
soldier in the early days of the revolution. The soldier noted: “Oh, yes, we must have a 
republic, but we must have a good tsar at the head.”716 This mixture of democratic sentiment 
and a monarchist mentality indicates that a change in political leadership does not 
automatically overturn the dominant culture of the expectation of rulership by a sovereign 
monarch. The question for the councils was how to overthrow such deep-seated mental 
structures that were maintained by the dominant culture and ideology. There were no doubts 
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that such a process would take time and could not be accomplished overnight. Däumig 
believed that “the German people have to get used to self-management instead of governance” 
and that “the new world can only be built by the political, economic, and cultural activities of 
the entire German people.”717 The battle for human emancipation, then, was not restricted to 
the institutional sphere but was also fought on the level of ideology, entailing a control over 
education, schools and the cultural forces that still aimed to stifle the revolution.  
 
Nobody was a keener observer of this problem than Anton Pannekoek, who saw that the 
problem of ideology lay at the centre of the revolution: 
 
In November 1918, state power slipped from the nerveless grasp of the bourgeoisie in Germany and 
Austria . . . the masses were in control; and the bourgeoisie was nevertheless able to build this state 
power up again and once more subjugate the workers. This proves that the bourgeoisie possessed 
another hidden source of power which had remained intact and which permitted it to re-establish its 
hegemony when everything seemed shattered. This hidden power is the bourgeoisie’s ideological hold 
over the proletariat. Because the proletarian masses were still completely governed by a bourgeois 
mentality, they restored the hegemony of the bourgeoisie with their own hands after it had collapsed.718 
 
The strength of the bourgeoisie, in Pannekoek’s view, did not emanate solely from their 
economic or political resources, but from their control of cultural institutions and political 
discourse. Pannekoek turned attention towards the question of a people’s “spirit” [Geist], or 
more precisely the role that class-consciousness and ideology played in political struggle. A 
true revolution would have to bring about a change of consciousness and a gradual 
development in the political ideology of the masses. He believed that the workers must 
combat the “spiritual superiority of the ruling minority” which “presides over all spiritual 
development, all science.”719 For Pannekoek it was this “spiritual dependence of the 
proletariat on the bourgeoisie,” which represented the “main cause of the weakness of the 
proletariat.”720 A culture that promoted human freedom and emancipation had to be 
incorporated into the new institutions of the political regime. 
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In the next section, I turn to the concept of economic democracy in order to focus on one 
specific domain targeted by the councils through their mode of democratic action.721 I 
examine the councils’ argument for the extension of democratic forms of control into 
workplaces and over productive assets in the economy. The transformation of workplaces and 
the economy is just one example of an argument that could be raised in relation to other 
hierarchical institutions and domains such as the judiciary, transnational governance bodies, 
financial institutions, universities and government bureaucracies. Here, I intend only to sketch 
the outline of their argument for an economic democracy in order to provide one important 
example of the democratic approach of the councils in more detail.  
 
 
Economic Democracy 
 
The liberal conception of democracy is based on a separation of the public, political sphere 
from the private, economic one. In liberal societies, citizens have equal civic and political 
rights in the public sphere and the freedom to engage in any economic activity without the use 
of force or fraud in their private lives. One of the most interesting and politically pertinent 
innovations of the councils was their introduction of democratic forms of organisation into the 
economic sphere. The councils’ demand for “revolutionary democracy” was not restricted to 
the establishment of parliamentary institutions and a national vote. It incorporated a broader 
vision of control over workplaces and the social ownership of the means of production.722 
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Council delegates connected questions of political power with control over productive 
resources and relations of economic dependence. They were acutely aware of the 
insufficiencies of formal political liberties when they had little influence over the structure of 
workplaces. Workers spent the majority of their lives in the factories, but they had barely any 
say in how they were managed and operated. Their political struggles therefore addressed 
forms of economic domination in addition to the pursuit of civic liberties. In this section, I 
pursue two primary tasks. First, I argue for the contemporary relevance of the councils’ 
attentiveness to the economic sphere as a potential source of domination. To this end, I 
compare the liberal conceptualisation of the relationship between the political and economic 
spheres with that of the councils in order to contribute to contemporary debates in democratic 
theory. Second, I contend that the councils deployed a two-tier model of structural domination 
operating at the level of the workplace and at the level of a market system of wage labour. 
The distinctive normative argument put forward by the councils is that workplaces and the 
economy must be transformed to remove these illegitimate forms of domination from 
workers’ lives. 
 
To better understand the arguments of the councils let me briefly begin with how the question 
of democratic relations in the economic sphere is currently conceived in mainstream liberal 
democratic theory. In liberal discourse, the workplace is viewed as a private realm in which 
employers and employees are free to enter into voluntary employment contracts in order to 
produce goods and services. The problem of the unjustified operation of power does not arise 
from this liberal perspective because in a voluntary relationship “the employee ‘orders’ the 
owner … to pay him money in the same sense that the employer directs … [the employee] to 
perform certain tasks. The employee can terminate the contract as readily as can the 
employer.”723 Liberal theorists argue that democratic control over the economy would remove 
the exercise of consumer choice necessary to produce price indicators, which establish the 
value of goods and sustain free markets.724 In this sense, democratic forms of organisation in 
the marketplace would hinder the efficiency and productivity of the economy. Political 
equality is guaranteed in liberal societies by universal suffrage and civic freedoms that 
establish a formal equality of rights and opportunities. The state maintains a system of 
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negative liberties that prevents other citizens and the state from interfering in citizens’ private 
lives. These basic political freedoms allow for the economic freedom of disposing of one’s 
property as one sees fit and entering into contractual agreements with other individuals or 
firms.725 While liberalism has a long tradition of egalitarianism, which seeks to redress 
economic inequalities through various forms of wealth redistribution, this concern does not 
usually extend to support for forms of workplace democracy.726  
 
In contrast, the councils drew attention to forms of domination that could occur in the 
economic sphere through the unequal control of economic resources in spite of notionally 
equal political rights. They challenged liberalism’s naturalised view of the economic sphere 
as a private realm of exchange between free agents and highlighted the pervasive structural 
inequalities that existed between workers and capitalists. Without sufficient economic 
resources to ensure their independence, citizens faced the possible arbitrary interference of 
their employers in the workplace. The reality for most workers was that they were “ruled by 
an economically privileged minority.”727 In order to realise freedom in both the political and 
economic spheres adjustments would need to be made to institutional arrangements and the 
organisation of work. Ernst Däumig asserted that we “need workers to be in charge of their 
shops and factories through the councils they trust.”728 This broader goal of freedom from 
economic forms of domination was expressed in different terms, sometimes as a “social 
democracy,” elsewhere as a “proletarian democracy,” but the underlying principles, if not the 
methods for achieving them, were reasonably similar.729 David Mandel argues that “[o]ne 
cannot avoid the conclusion that for the workers the February Days [in Russia, 1917] were 
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more than a political action directed against autocracy but equally an economic strike against 
capital.”730 In this way, the councils attempted to channel the worker’s demands for 
democratisation into dismantling the hierarchical structures of the workplace and replacing 
them with responsive and accountable democratic forms of control. 
 
Much could be gained from a return to this broader conception of democratic practices that 
incorporates economic as well political considerations into the necessary framework of 
democratic life. Questions of economic democracy are rarely considered relevant for liberal 
democratic theorists today. Diamond and Allcorn note that “workplace democracy is but a 
faint whisper among contemporary social science and management scholars.”731 Current 
democratic theorists focus on questions of political institutions and tend to elide economic 
considerations. Nor are these issues frequently attended to by republican democratic theory or 
new theories of democratic innovations.732 This criticism has been recently restated by Carole 
Pateman in her 2011 APSA Presidential Address. In this speech, she reiterated that “there is 
little discussion either of the feasibility or desirability of workplace democracy today … the 
institution of employment, one of the most central institutions of our society, remains 
undemocratic.”733 For Pateman, workplace or economic democracy is an essential ingredient 
in any process of democratising everyday life. It is important as an end in itself insofar as it 
provides citizens decision-making capacity over an institution in which they spend most of 
their lives, and for the instrumental reason of providing a space to learn important political 
skills that could improve their ability to participate in other political processes.  
 
The last wave of enthusiasm for economic democracy arose on the back of the student 
movements in the 1960s, influencing a generation of theorists who would propose various 
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forms of greater participation in the workplace.734 The demands of the councils overlap with 
this broader program of participatory democracy that has since waned in popularity. Among 
these theorists, Robert Dahl articulated a theory of economic democracy understood as the 
extension of democratic principles into the economic sphere through worker owned and 
controlled enterprises.735 As Dahl argues, “if democracy is justified in governing the state, 
then it is also justified in governing economic enterprises. What is more, if it cannot be 
justified in governing economic enterprises, we do not quite see how it can be justified in 
governing the state.”736 For Dahl, economic democracy is understood as a moral right of self-
government in terms of workers participating in fundamental decisions that affect their 
lives.737 There are now indications following the global economic crisis and increased focus 
on rising economic inequalities (i.e. Occupy Wall Street) that questions of economic 
democracy may be experiencing another revival.738 Tom Malleson’s After Occupy: Economic 
Democracy for the 21st Century, for example, argues for the implementation of formal equal 
decision-making power across workplaces, finance and investment institutions in order to 
reduce the exercise of unequal political power. But since mainstream liberal democratic 
theory has not seriously engaged with the historical arguments for economic democracy it has 
missed the conceptual possibilities for theorising democratic forms of control over 
workplaces and the economy. 
 
The distinctive arguments raised by the councils’ practice of democracy in the economic 
domain are worth examining in closer detail. The basis of the councils’ position is informed 
by Marx’s analysis and critique of capitalist relations of production and wage labour. In one 
of his earliest formulations of the problem in On the Jewish Question, Marx differentiates 
between mere political emancipation and human emancipation.739 The establishment of a 
liberal democracy following the American Revolution (eventually) led to every adult member 
of society becoming equal under the law and having a share of popular sovereignty. However, 
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the universality of the political state abstracts from the persisting economic inequalities 
between individuals in civil society. The modern state presupposes and depends on the 
institution of private property and the domination and exploitation of a certain class of 
citizens without sufficient economic resources to guarantee their independence and liberty. By 
declaring economic inequalities as immaterial for citizens’ political existence, the state 
reaffirms these differences and reinforces such relations of domination in civil society. In 
place of the modern political state, Marx demands a more complete social emancipation that 
would destroy the basis for conflicting economic interests between citizens and overcome 
these forms of exploitation.  
 
The problem of exploitation in capitalist societies can be understood partly through the 
operation of a system of wage labour. In Wage Labour and Capital, Marx analyses the 
systemic inequalities between labourers and capitalists in relation to employment contracts. 
On the face of it, an employment contract may seem like a reciprocal exchange in which a 
“worker sells their labour-power to the capitalist in exchange for wages.”740 Yet, Marx 
emphasises this economic exchange rests upon an unequal social relationship between two 
classes of people with different levels of structural power. Capitalist relations of production 
require “the existence of a class which possesses nothing but the ability to work.”741 In their 
bargaining over contracts the worker is in a position of structural disadvantage: “the worker, 
whose only source of income is the sale of his labour-power,” might be able to choose 
between different employers, but they “cannot leave the whole class of buyers.”742 Despite a 
small margin of freedom, the worker is still bound by a general dependency on the class of 
capitalists as a whole. To be sure, capitalists are also constrained insofar as they can only 
increase profits through the exploitation of labour, but the consequences of a refusal of a 
contract are far graver for a labourer than a capitalist. 
 
Following from Marx’s analysis, the councils identified two major forms of structural 
domination in workers’ lives.743 The first problem emanated from the lack of genuine control 
over their own work activity and the organisation of their workplaces. They had no say either 
in the arrangement of their own workday or in broader structural and organisational questions 
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of the firm. In a functional sense, workers were essentially servants for their employers. By 
purchasing their labour power, an employer could command them for the period in which 
they were being paid wages. The range of duties that a worker could be expected to carry out 
were limited by the law, but an essential component of a workers’ responsibilities within a 
firm was to follow their employers’ orders. While conditions and circumstances varied across 
workplaces and some workers would have suffered more than others, all were subject to the 
discretionary powers of their employers. The councils responded to this challenge by 
elaborating new forms of “self-managed communities” and democratic control by workers 
over basic organisational questions of the workplace.744 The workers’ councils were organised 
through workplaces and elected delegates based on the composition of large enterprises. One 
of their primary roles was to allow workers to manage and control their workplaces. Although 
the councils encountered mixed results in their implementation of workers’ control, this was 
one of the central demands of the council movement. 
 
In addition to demanding democratic authority at the level of the organisation, the councils 
identified a second source of potential domination based on the system of wage labour. 
Däumig argued that this related to the workers’ lack of control over productive assets and the 
resulting necessity of “workers forced to sell their labor to capital in order to survive.”745 In 
Introduction to Political Economy, Rosa Luxemburg outlined a Marxist critique of the 
structural domination that exists in the labour market due to economic inequalities and the 
system of wage labour. Due to the “separation of labour-power from the means of 
production” the worker has no commodity to bring to the marketplace to exchange, nothing 
that is, “but to bring himself to market as a commodity, i.e. to bring his own labour-power.”746 
When productive assets are owned by a narrow elite there is no genuine choice for a worker. 
They are compelled to sell their labour to capitalists in exchange for a wage to sustain 
themselves while the capitalists retain the surplus value of their labour as profit. While there 
may be some competition between employers, workers face serious cultural and economic 
pressure to get a job and have significantly less bargaining power than employers. Luxemburg 
argues that this situation represents one of structural domination in which individually 
uncoordinated, cumulative but unintentional actions lead to a condition of unfreedom for 
workers forced into selling their labour. The councils came to identify wage-labour and the 
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lack of control over the means of production as a central concern in their struggle to 
democratise society. They required that control over productive assets be transformed to 
release workers from this form of domination. What set them apart from the moderate 
socialists of their time was their desire to swiftly implement a program of socialisation of key 
industries without delay. These arguments raised by the councils still provide a normative 
justification for the consideration of forms of economic democracy today. Although I am 
unable to offer a full elaboration and defence of economic democracy here, the point I wish to 
stress is that an extension of democratic forms of control into the economic sphere was an 
essential aspect of the councils’ form of resistance to elite domination. The question of how to 
implement different forms of economic democracy today is an area that would benefit from 
further research to identify practical proposals for reform. 
 
In the next section, I compare the councils’ mode of democratic action with other approaches 
in democratic theory. I deploy the framework of the councils to address the deficiencies of 
two opposing poles of democratic theory: deliberative democracy and the radical democratic 
perspective of Jacques Rancière. The democratic actions of the councils highlight the 
limitations of both these perspectives and provide fresh insight into neglected aspects of 
democratic practices. In particular, they reveal the importance of engaging directly with the 
central political institutions of a state and in mobilising political collectives in order to 
equalise power between democratic citizens. 
 
 
Deliberation and Democratic Politics 
 
Since the deliberative turn in the 1990s, deliberative democracy has not only become the 
dominant approach in democratic theory, but according to John Dryzek, “the most active area 
of political theory in its entirety.”747 Its popularity is evinced by the sheer number of sub-
disciplines it has drawn into its orbit, from political science to law, development studies, 
policy analysis, political communications and social psychology. It has become so diffused 
that it is now difficult to encapsulate all of the different approaches and applications within a 
single definition. Yet, in one of the classic works, Joshua Cohen defined deliberative 
democracy as providing an account of legitimacy based on those subject to a decision having 
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the capacity and opportunity to have meaningful deliberation about its content.748 What 
matters for deliberative democrats is not votes or the aggregation of preferences, but a 
decision emerging from a process of real deliberation and debate. Despite its growth over the 
years, the core claims of deliberative democracy still relate to a theory of democratic 
legitimacy.749 The focus is on how genuine deliberation between free and equal participants 
can generate a legitimacy that is lacking in raw aggregative methods of decision-making. A 
crucial difference from the aggregative approach is that the interests of democratic agents are 
considered amenable and subject to transformation through dialogue and deliberation. 
Deliberative democracy claims the benefits of greater levels of participation, higher levels of 
government legitimacy and overall better decision-making as a result of the deliberative 
process. 
 
Expanding on this initial definition, Gutmann and Thompson provide four key characteristics 
of deliberative democracy.750 The first and most important characteristic is a reason-giving 
requirement. Decision-makers and those involved in meaningful deliberation must give 
reasons for decisions based on publically available grounds of justification.751 A reason 
cannot simply refer to an administrative rule or rely on forms of argumentation that would be 
unconvincing to the broader public such as the revelation of a holy text or undisclosed 
personal grounds. A second characteristic is that these reasons have to be expressed in such a 
way that they are intelligible to their addressees and not intended to coerce or manipulate 
them. Acts of bargaining, trade-offs and barter can take place within deliberative democracies, 
but they are not strictly considered part of a pure deliberative process unless justified in some 
way. Third, processes of deliberation must lead to a binding decision as a result of a period of 
free and un-coerced deliberation. Finally, this decision must be open to potential challenge in 
the future allowing for the adjustment of opinions due to continuing dialogue. It is essential 
that all potential interests affected by a decision are taken into account and that, ideally, all 
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opinions be included. In earlier versions of the theory, particularly those associated with 
Jürgen Habermas, participants reaching consensus was thought to be a primary goal of the 
activity of deliberation. However, a greater appreciation of pluralism and deep difference has 
led most contemporary approaches to consider consensus no longer as an essential end point 
of deliberation.752  
 
There have been a number of stages in the development of the discourse of deliberative 
democracy since its emergence in the early 1990s. The first statements of the theory tended to 
focus on establishing the normative criteria according to which deliberative democracy could 
be defended against reasonable philosophical objections. Then, in the late 1990s and early 
2000s, theorists began to focus on empirical applications of the theory that tested its 
normative claims in practice and investigated how deliberation could be embodied in specific 
institutional contexts.753 As a result of this “practical” or “institutional” turn in deliberative 
democracy, studies examined how deliberation functioned in real world situations involving 
difficult policy questions and multiple actors negotiating complex environments.754 These 
works were less concerned about normative justifications for deliberative democracy and 
more interested in showing how these theories could be applied in practice. Some of these 
works focused on particular forums or institutions such as “mini-publics,” composed of a 
small number of citizens selected to take part in a controlled deliberative environment on a 
select issue. The most recent turn in deliberative democracy has been towards a focus on 
“deliberative systems” which analyses the operation of a variety of interrelated deliberative 
activities within a larger system. In the most definitive statement of this new approach set out 
in Deliberative Systems, an impressive number of deliberative theorists argue that deliberative 
democracy is best conceived as operating across multiple sites and within a variety of 
institutions which are interconnected to form a complex whole.755 This acknowledges that a 
number of different activities from everyday speech to parliamentary institutions accomplish 
political work in furthering the aims of a deliberative system.  
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Most theorists of deliberative democracy view it as an approach to democracy within the 
framework of liberal constitutionalism, although there are some notable dissenting voices who 
continue to hold deliberative discourse at arms’ length from this paradigm.756 Perhaps the 
most well-known design of deliberative democracy is Habermas’ two-track model in which 
one level of deliberation is carried out in the public sphere and another in the empowered 
realm of the state legislature.757 Opinions formulated in the deliberation of the informal public 
sphere are transmitted to the legislature through elections and general public opinion. The 
parliament is then able to form rules and regulations through legislation and administration, 
which should bear a resemblance to the informal deliberation of the broader public. 
Nonetheless, deliberative democrats can range from elite deliberative theorists, who are 
concerned with better dialogue between elite political actors, to radical direct deliberative 
theorists, who prefer that everyone affected by a decision should genuinely have a voice in 
how this decision is made.758 It is therefore difficult to say that deliberative theory is beholden 
to one particular ideology or political persuasion.  
 
However, there is a basic shared standpoint from which deliberative democrats interrogate 
democratic questions. Their focus is on ensuring the legitimacy of decision-making through 
authentic dialogue and debate. It is this perspective that I worry has come to dominate 
discussions of democracy at the expense of other significant issues.759 This is not to deny the 
importance of democratic legitimacy or to criticise prominent accounts of how it has been 
formulated within deliberative theory. Rather, it is important to question whether deliberation 
should be considered the perspective from which to interrogate democratic politics. In 
“Deliberation, and What Else?” Michael Walzer points to a number of other valuable 
activities that are undertaken in democracies aside from deliberating: education, organisation, 
mobilisation, fund-raising and scut-work, among others.760 Deliberation figures in a 
democratic political process that is predominantly non-deliberative in nature. Democratic 
activity can often result from people organising together to act more effectively in pursuing 
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their political objectives rather than in the quiet, reflective weighting of evidence and 
choosing of the best alternative. Yet, the problem is not simply that we have paid insufficient 
attention to other democratic activities, but that deliberation and legitimacy have become the 
most important values against which we judge democratic institutions and the lens through 
which we understand politics.  
 
Liberal representative democracy is increasingly in crisis and deliberative democracy sees 
itself to one degree or another as offering a solution.761 As I outlined in the introduction of the 
thesis, representative institutions appear unable to prevent falling rates of participation and the 
rising elite dominance of political life. Deliberative theorists cast deliberation as a potential 
source of rejuvenation of democracy and a panacea for the current separation of governments 
from their citizens. Framed in these terms, deliberative democracy suffers from a theoretical 
overstretch concerning what democratic problems can genuinely be solved through a greater 
attention to deliberation. This can be understood in two distinct ways. Firstly, it relates to the 
diagnostic question of whether a “deliberative deficit” could be said to be among the most 
important political problems of our era. Secondly, it raises questions over whether 
deliberation promises too much in terms of its remedial qualities for troubled democracies. 
The overall concern is that a narrow emphasis on deliberation has crowded out other aspects 
of politics to the detriment of our understanding of democratic practices. In the following, I 
contrast deliberative democracy with the democratic practices of the councils. I locate my 
criticisms of the deliberative approach within the radical democratic camp of critics such as 
Iris Marion Young, Lynn Sanders and Ian Shapiro who have questioned deliberative 
democracy’s egalitarian and democratic credentials.762 The democratic actions of the councils 
assist in revealing the limitations of the deliberative approach and help us to raise other 
valuable questions and perspectives.  
 
Guttman and Thompson claim that the purpose of deliberative democracy arises due to “the 
need for ongoing discussion of moral disagreement in everyday political life.”763 In the face 
                                                
761 Stephen Elstub and Peter McLaverty (eds.), Deliberative Democracy: Issues and Cases (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 2014) 1. 
762 Iris Marion Young, Inclusion and Democracy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); Young, “Activist 
Challenges to Deliberative Democracy”; Lynn Sanders, “Against Deliberation,” Political Theory (1997) 35 (3), 
347–377; Ian Shapiro, “Enough of Deliberation: Politics is about Interest and Power,” in Macedo (ed.), 
Deliberative Politics: Essays on Democracy and Disagreement, 28–38. For a response to these critics see Alison 
Kadlec and Will Friedman, “Deliberative Democracy and the Problem of Power,” Journal of Public 
Deliberation (2007) 3 (1), Article 8. 
763 Gutmann and Thompson, Why Deliberative Democracy?, 11. 
 189 
of seemingly intractable moral conflicts, deliberation responds by “encouraging citizens to 
take a broader perspective” and “to recognize the moral merit in their opponent’s claims.”764 
The problem of politics, as framed by Guttman and Thompson, concerns moral disagreement 
between citizens over contentious policy issues and how these could be transformed through 
deliberation. Ian Shaprio has persuasively argued that this perspective does not adequately 
acknowledge the extent to which political conflict is shaped primarily by unequal power 
between citizens and the clashing of different interests.765 For Guttman and Thompson, 
deliberation aims to reduce disagreement and promote accommodation between conflicting 
parties. But this perspective presupposes that disagreements in politics are primarily over 
moral matters on which one’s views can be altered rather than over mutually incompatible 
conceptions of democratic governance. There is little room for compromise or 
accommodation between a minimalist model of elite rule and a participatory vision of a 
democratic society. Deliberative theorists have demonstrated that there is much benefit that 
can be gained in attempting to submit moral disagreements to rational deliberation. However, 
it is a much broader and more contentious claim whether deliberation of the sort advocated 
would provide an adequate resolution to major political conflicts in contemporary 
democracies. 
 
Consider the challenges currently faced by democratic states: rising levels of economic 
inequalities, governments dominated by special interests and private lobby groups, a 
dismantling of the welfare state by powerful corporations on the advance, and supranational 
governance structures run by unaccountable technocratic elites. It is difficult to see which of 
these problems could be adequately addressed through the establishment of a deliberative 
forum or a higher quality of debate in current discussions. One of the most frequently raised 
objections to processes of deliberation is that it would be ineffective or undermined in 
societies with large inequalities in resources and power between citizens. A significant 
limitation of deliberation is that the very terms of the debate would be framed by powerful 
interests with sufficient political influence to control the process. Even if certain aspects of 
power imbalances could be redressed through institutional design, Iris Marion Young argues 
that those deliberating would still be embedded in dominant hegemonic discourse, “which 
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itself is a complex product of structural inequality.”766 To claim that the formal inclusion of 
all voices in a deliberative process would guarantee an equal playing field ignores the 
structural bias in favour of affluent and networked parties. An excessive focus on deliberation 
in this context conceals the ongoing political conflict over power and resources and the ability 
of elites to frame the common interest to suit their own particular purposes. 
 
One question to consider is what perspective would deliberative democracy bring to bear on 
the council movements in Russia and Germany. Would this draw attention to significant 
aspects of the councils or limit our understanding of them by failing to attend to their crucial 
dimensions? Certainly, the councils could be described as deliberative forums that permitted 
discussion and debate of political ideas and fostered interaction and mutual awareness 
between their members. In council deliberations, delegates gave reasons for pursuing 
particular courses of action, educated one another and decided on collective action based on 
these accounts. But would the councils still be worth examining today had they only focussed 
their energies on creating more ideal speech situations within their assemblies and 
encouraging more debate with their adversaries? Moreover, was a crucial deficiency of the 
councils that they did not seek a mutually acceptable way of resolving their moral 
disagreements with the bourgeoisie and state bureaucracy?  
 
I contend that the councils were confronted with more immediate problems relating to other 
nondeliberative parts of the political process and that it was the councils’ emphasis on these 
aspects that are of importance for contemporary politics. For the councils, the most crucial 
task was the organisational question of mobilising opposition forces against the institutional 
hierarchies of the old regime. What gave the councils their decisive influence was not the 
sophistication or eloquence of their arguments but the legitimacy generated through the 
mobilisation of large segments of the population in support of a transformative democratic 
program with the political power to enforce it. Democratic politics for the councils involved 
the ongoing challenge to hierarchies that continually threatened to reassert themselves. It 
required an appreciation of the perspective, enunciated by council delegate Richard Müller, 
that “all political questions remain, in the end, questions of power.”767 The challenge of 
restraining elites who threaten to dismantle democratic controls cannot be met by introducing 
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greater levels of deliberation within democratic institutions. The framing of the central 
political questions in terms of reaching a mutually amenable agreement was a strategy of the 
elites to create parliamentary institutions that they could then dominate. 
 
At certain points in the political process, citizens seeking “fair terms of cooperation” in which 
to “reason together” is an important goal, but so too are actions that achieve substantive 
results in implementing democratic forms of control.768 A narrow focus on how decisions are 
made and how citizens communicate with each other risks missing what is, from the council 
delegates’ perspective, the substantive activity of politics, i.e., collective action that 
challenges consolidated hierarchies and equalises power between citizens. Such issues are 
simply not able to be addressed within the framework of procedural reforms to decision-
making. An examination of the history of the councils provides a revealing example of the 
limitations of the deliberative perspective and the necessity of broadening the study of 
democratic practices to a variety of other approaches.  
 
 
Jacques Rancière and Institutional Politics 
 
I now turn from the mainstream of democratic theory to the margins in order to consider 
radical democratic perspectives. At first glance, the approach of radical democrats appears 
more commensurable with that of the councils. Radical democratic theorists are more 
attentive to the agonistic dimensions of democratic politics and celebrate practices of 
resistance and contestation as integral parts of the democratic process. They confront the 
oppressive and disciplinary nature of political regimes and examine the nuanced forms of 
power that operate within political institutions. I will examine the democratic politics of 
Jacques Rancière as an influential approach within the radical democratic camp. While the 
councils provide a different perspective on democratic politics to the mainstream approach of 
deliberative democracy, they also demonstrate the limitations of Rancière’s political vision.  
 
In contrast to most deliberative democratic theorists, Rancière focuses on the margins of 
traditional concerns of politics. He analyses processes that occur at the periphery of the 
central institutions of political life: new political movements, mobilisations and protests that 
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break with the status quo.769 Rancière shares with other radical democrats a focus on 
momentary and disruptive acts that challenge established hierarchies and institutions.770 This 
perspective leads to a vision of politics as irruptive, episodic and essentially non-
institutionalisable. In this section, I interrogate Rancière’s aversion to institutionalised forms 
of political struggle and contrast this with the interventionist approach of the councils. The 
attention Rancière pays to the moments of rupture in politics tends to overshadow the ongoing 
egalitarian political struggles of groups once they are recognised within existing democratic 
societies and makes it difficult to consider partial cases of those recognised in marginal or 
inconsequential forms.  
 
Against Rancière’s suspicion of all forms of institutional politics, council delegates sought to 
transform institutions through opening them to democratic forms of control. The history of the 
councils reveals the importance of an engagement with public institutions for democratic 
politics and political freedom. From the councils, we acquire a more useful and convincing 
account of the dynamics of institutional struggle and its relationship to democratic action. 
They provide an illustrative example of the organisation of democratic forces that challenge 
the domination of elites and assert democratic control over the central institutions and forces 
within society. 
 
Rancière’s interventions into debates concerning the meaning of democracy are now well 
known: democracy, for Rancière, is neither a political regime nor a form of social life – it 
designates the singular rupture of a social order by the staging of a political disagreement over 
the distribution of parts and roles within society.771 This interruption is the assertion of an 
axiom of equality by a new political subject, a “part of those without part,” who struggles 
against its exclusion. This excluded subject undermines the logic of the regime of the visible 
and throws the established principles of rulership and political division back into contingency. 
Politics properly understood is always democratic as it involves the creation of a political 
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dispute that acts as a mode of subjectification for an excluded subject and reconfigures a 
particular field of experience according to a principle of equality.  
 
The past two decades have witnessed a substantial exploration of the implications of 
Rancière’s engagement with political theory and its possible application to contemporary 
political movements.772 A number of criticisms of Rancière have emerged, the two most 
important of which assist in framing my own discussion. The most oft-heard criticism of 
Rancière is that his understanding of politics is too ephemeral, fleeting and sporadic to offer 
the resources required for supporting the organisation and sustenance of long-term 
oppositional political movements.773 There is little sense in Rancière’s work of an 
acknowledgement of the incremental nature of political mobilisation beyond the moment of 
rupture or how political victories could be held and built upon. Politics happens “very little,” 
Rancière explains; it is destined to only momentary occurrences, after which new political 
subjects are incorporated into the existing “police” order. On this reading, Rancière is 
susceptible to a similar charge levelled at Sheldon Wolin’s concept of a “fugitive democracy,” 
which conceives of democracy not as a form of government but as the eruption of a political 
experience that is intermittent, rare and destined to only temporary existence.774 The problem 
with this tragic vision of politics that could be attributed to Rancière is that it necessarily 
excludes the possibility of more enduring and sustainable forms of egalitarian political 
practice.775 Secondly, Rancière is accused of establishing a new dualism between his concepts 
of politics and the police that maintains the purity of political resistance as a permanent 
outside to any police order.776 Of all Rancière’s texts it is perhaps Disagreement that remains 
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most vulnerable to falling into this Manichean schema of purified oppositions resolved of 
their internal contradictions and ambiguities.777 It is here where Jodi Dean, in her polemic 
against Rancière, sees “a kind of hysterical pure politics of resistance,” which avoids the 
messy engagement with the historical entwinement of power and the people within political 
conflicts.778  
 
How much traction these criticisms have on Rancière’s work depends in part on how 
sympathetically one reads him. In addition to Rancière’s own responses to these criticisms,779 
a number of his supporters have attempted to explore some of the complexities of his work 
that have evaded the narrow readings of his critics. Most notably, Samuel Chambers has 
devoted considerable effort to uncovering the nuances of a “politics of the police” within 
Rancière’s writings. Such an impure politics reveals the entanglement of politics within police 
orders and instigates the necessary task of critiquing and transforming them.780 Aletta Norval, 
on the other hand, seeks to bridge the divide between the initial articulation of a democratic 
demand and the reconfiguration of an existing order by re-examining the role of practices of 
inscription in Rancière’s work.781 Drawing from Rancière’s historical rather than theoretical 
writings, Norval elucidates the power of exemplars, exploring how moments of rupture can 
become institutionalised and inscribed into a new order. While Chambers and Norval both 
offer subtle and nuanced readings of Rancière that extend our understanding of his 
engagement with democratic politics, the limitation of these approaches lies in an aspect 
readily admitted by both authors: how underdeveloped such themes are in Rancière’s own 
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writings. Rancière clearly gestures towards broader processes of political transformation 
through his discussion of the reconfiguration of a given order. For instance, processes of 
subjectification are said to “redefine a field of experience,” while democracy is seen as that 
which “modifies the regime of the visible.”782 He also seems to suggest that such inscriptions 
within an existing order would then be available for future struggles.783 It would be difficult 
for his critics to assert that there is not therefore some enduring element of political action. 
But the nature and outcomes of such processes of transformation often fall from Rancière’s 
field of vision. Similarly, Rancière frequently remarks on the impurity of politics and its 
emergence through the confrontation of a logic of equality with a police order. However, this 
does not prevent him from defining them in Disagreement as two distinct logics or from 
describing them largely in oppositional terms. 
 
A possible response to some of the more severe critics of Rancière is to direct attention to his 
historical writings where his approach has much in common with Arendt’s use of historical 
examples.784 Rancière deploys specific historical examples of individuals and groups who had 
concrete conceptions of their own emancipation beyond how these were represented in the 
works of theorists and philosophers.785 Archival texts are of great importance to Rancière 
because they provide access to the actual writings of working-class actors whose voices can 
counter dominant narratives within political theory. Rather than outlining a general theory of 
politics as such, Rancière engages in his historical works with neglected figures and texts, 
aiming to recapture forgotten political practices. By allowing workers to speak of their own 
desires, Rancière could even be said to go further than Arendt in returning to these forgotten 
political episodes, since Arendt still frames (and arguably distorts) these experiences from the 
interpretive position of her political theory. One prominent example Rancière utilises in The 
Nights of Labour is the joiner and floor-layer, Gabriel Gauny, who complicates Marxist 
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accounts of working-class culture by living as a manual labourer who philosophised in his 
time away from work.786 Similarly, Rancière recounts the story of Joseph Jacotot to serve as 
an example of an emancipatory form of pedagogy that proceeded on the basis of a radical 
equality of intelligence between thinking beings.787 It is difficult for Rancière’s critics to 
incorporate these historical examples within the same charge of a desire for a purified form of 
politics. However, it is worth noting that the majority of examples Rancière deploys are 
individuals, whereas the focus of my inquiry in this thesis is institutional politics.  
 
The reason for rehearsing these familiar criticisms of Rancière is that they set the stage for the 
principal task of a critical interrogation of the role of institutions within his work. If politics 
were only episodic and fleeting then it would be unnecessary and fruitless for it to be 
institutionalised. Such an undertaking would be similarly futile if political action consisted 
solely in modes of resistance that were opposed to any organisational form. As the above 
discussion demonstrates, it can be easy to read Rancière in just this way. There is a tendency 
in his work to emphasise the sporadic and eruptive moments of politics and to view forms of 
institutionalisation and reform as oppressive, hierarchical and part of a police logic.788 This is 
most notable in Rancière’s claim that “democracy cannot consist in a set of institutions,” or in 
the similar assertion that the “power of the people … can never be institutionalized.”789 In one 
sense, given the definitional manoeuvres Rancière makes, such an incompatibility should not 
be surprising. If democracy is defined as the moment of “a singular disruption of this order of 
distribution of bodies” then it certainly couldn’t also be a regime or a form of government.790 
Rancière also claims that politics involves a repartitioning of political space and a calling into 
question of the boundaries of the political. For such a politics that always occurs, “out of 
place,” as Rancière says, it is understandable that this would not frequently unfold within 
traditional institutions of power.791  
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Yet, he appears at times to go one step further towards a generalised aversion to all 
institutions and a profound scepticism of their role in political struggle. Institutions are most 
commonly depicted in Rancière’s work as mechanisms of hierarchy and domination. From 
“national states” as well as “inter-state power,” to “governments, of the left as well as right,” 
institutional politics is conceived of as applying everywhere “the same programme of 
systematic destruction of public services.”792 Parliaments, representative bodies or indeed any 
form of democratic government is “organized by the play of oligarchies.”793 Similarly, 
political parties and financial interests are part of a collusion “between a small oligarchy of 
financiers and politicians.”794 In sum, institutions are associated with the police activity of 
partitioning the sensible into functions and roles. This is the task of any “constitutional form” 
or “mode of public life,” which is achieved through its constitution, laws, public offices and 
social mores, all of which tame the excesses of politics. The ordinary practices and procedures 
of institutional politics form part of such an oppressive and largely unequal order. Rancière 
generally displays a disinterest in institutions as spaces of political struggle. In his own terms, 
“democracy is always beneath and beyond these forms.”795 Politics is either seen as a praxis 
of political collectives, or, in more abstract terms, as the transformation of symbolic orders, 
redistribution of boundaries and the creation of new fields of visibility.796 It is impossible that 
such forms of collective action could ever be embodied in more ongoing and permanent 
structures because “the community of equals can never achieve substantial form as a social 
institution.”797 The problem with such a totalising view is that it fails to capture the nuances 
of forms of contestation that occur within institutions and denies that they can play any role in 
advancing egalitarian struggles. 
 
However, in spite of Rancière’s largely hostile view of institutions, there is a minor current in 
his work where he provides a different perspective on the possibilities of institutional 
struggle. These brief comments are located mainly in his interviews where perhaps the 
proximity to empirical events or the opportunity to step away from the schema of his 
theoretical work produces a different account of institutional politics. We should take 
seriously Rancière’s claim that he can be differentiated from radical political thinkers such as 
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Badiou and Žižek based on his refusal to completely dismiss the realm of institutional 
politics. Speaking of the ability of political actors to intervene in political processes Rancière 
maintains: 
 
This is why, against the Marxist opposition of real and formal democracy, I emphasized the part played 
by all the inscriptions of the democratic process in the texts of the constitutions, the institutions of the 
states, the apparatuses of public opinion, the mainstream forms of enunciation.798 
 
In referring to democracy’s displacement of established identities and creation of new 
political subjects, Rancière claims that their appearance will “have an effect on the 
institutional mechanisms of politics.”799 He states that such political interventions “produce 
inscriptions of equality” which “are in no way oblivious to elected assemblies, institutional 
guarantees of freedom of speech and expression, state control mechanisms.”800 There are 
certain points in his work where he sees the transformation of a state institution as the object 
of a political struggle.801 For example, in an interview with Todd May he argues that the state 
is a terrain of struggle, which “produces effects of the redefinition of rights and the 
transformation of institutions.”802 These moments are most pronounced when he addresses the 
topic of social and political movements. Although Rancière’s main line of argument is that 
the power of the people “can never be institutionalized” and can only be “practiced, enacted 
by political collectives,” he goes on to explain that “these subjects intervene in places other 
than those of executive and representative power (the street, workplace, school, etc.) … 
Therefore there is indeed an institutional inscription of the ‘power of the people.’”803 Rancière 
focuses here on the possibility of the development of alternative institutions, ones that are not 
bound to a state logic and that can take part in political interventions. Based on this brief 
sketch one could imagine social centres, alternative schooling systems and perhaps 
democratic councils being included among these alternative institutional forms. Elsewhere, 
Rancière highlights the necessity that such autonomous forces be developed independently of 
state and representative systems, although not completely oblivious to their power and 
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effects.804 Nevertheless, Rancière’s account remains limited. He does not do enough to flesh 
out the possibilities of what forms of institutions are useful or explain the different roles such 
institutions would be expected to play in confrontations with the state. When given the 
opportunity he fails to give convincing formulations beyond the usual post-structuralist 
platitudes of experimenting with “new forms of thinking and acting.”805 Nor does Rancière 
have a particularly convincing account of how institutions are integrated into processes of 
political transformation. As Ella Myers has argued, when Rancière discusses institutions he 
tends to conceive of them as objective “artefacts” or “texts” that can be challenged and 
reinscribed, but not as part of the dynamic of everyday political life.806 There are thus serious 
limitations of Rancière’s political theory if it is to be used in service of the creation and 
development of the egalitarian politics that his work implores. 
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Beyond the Councils 
 
 
Hannah Arendt’s distinctive argument for a council democracy sets her apart from 
mainstream democratic theory. Her writings on the councils defy conventional thinking on 
democracy and pose a radical challenge to contemporary democratic regimes. Against the 
dominant liberal interpretation of her thought, I have criticised the view of her councils as 
either a corrective or supplement to traditional liberal parliamentary institutions. I contend 
that at several key moments in her texts, Arendt envisaged the transformation of liberal 
democratic nation-states into federal council states. Turning to the neglected institutional 
dimensions of her work, I excavated the origins of the council concept in Arendt’s thought 
and demonstrated its importance as a guiding ideal for the possibilities of modern politics. 
The councils are the embodiment of Arendt’s political value of political freedom and should 
be interpreted alongside political action and judgment as a central concept in her work. As a 
result of this renewed attention to the position of the councils, I offered a significant 
reinterpretation of her political theory as situated in the empowered and participatory 
democratic tradition of Rosa Luxemburg. 
 
In this thesis, I deployed the political perspective of Hannah Arendt’s council democracy as 
the critical lens through which to interrogate fundamental questions about democracy. 
Undertaking this task necessitated arguing with and against Arendt in several important 
respects. On the one hand, Arendt offers perceptive insights into our current democratic 
malaise. She highlights the tendency of democratic regimes to systematically disempower 
their citizens and maintain decision-making power in a narrow circle of elites. Her criticisms 
call into question a number of the central pillars of liberal democracy such as the role of 
political parties, the operation of parliamentary institutions and the overall framework of the 
sovereign nation-state. She raises the possibility of the need for broad systemic change to the 
framework of current democratic institutions in order to better actualise democracy’s central 
values of freedom, self-government and political equality. In this respect, Arendt continues to 
offer valuable guidance for critical projects aimed at revealing the weaknesses and 
shortcomings of contemporary democratic regimes. 
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Arendt also advances an alternative set of political principles through which to conceptualise 
the possible transformation of present institutions. In this way, her writings enrich our 
political imagination with new perspectives on democratic politics. She is attentive to the loss 
of genuine practices of self-government in contemporary regimes and seeks to rehabilitate a 
more active and positive conception of political freedom beyond the mere protection of 
negative rights and civil liberties. She mourns the loss of empowered political spaces in which 
citizens could engage in deliberation and decision-making. Her arguments seek to expand the 
boundaries of political space beyond the narrow confines of elite parliamentary politics. 
Arendt’s perspective multiplies the possibilities of political action through the 
institutionalisation of more direct and immediate forms of participation in council institutions. 
Her decentralised federal model of the organisation of political power is opposed to the more 
centralised visions that have characterised parliamentary regimes and the modern nation-state. 
Arendt’s principles are a prescient and timely reminder that liberal democracy does not 
exhaust the possibilities of democratic government. 
 
On the other hand, Arendt’s representation of the councils also proves limiting and distorting 
in certain key respects. She mischaracterises the structure and actions of the councils by 
interpreting them through her own political categories and distinctions. I showed that she 
seeks to imprint a fundamental division between the political and economic on to the council 
form. Against Arendt, I sought to uncover the ways in which the councils utilised a political 
strategy of intervention in workplaces in order to transform their economic structure through 
the introduction of democratic forms of organisation. Beginning from Arendtian insights into 
the possibilities of the council form, I returned to the historical actions of the council 
delegates, which eventually led to distinctly non-Arendtian conclusions. However, the path by 
which these results were obtained was not one with which Arendt would have entirely 
disagreed. I attempted to retrieve the partially forgotten democratic practices of the councils 
in order to reveal what resources they made available for contemporary politics. I suggested 
that the councils are important not simply as a footnote in Arendt scholarship, but as an 
important historical period in which political actors crafted novel forms of political action and 
institutions that deserve renewed attention and evaluation. 
 
I proposed that we could turn to the councils not for a working institutional model for the 
present, but as exemplary of a certain mode of democratic action. This involves a recognition 
that the councils do not provide sufficient answers to the problem of adequate institutional 
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arrangements for a democratic socialist polity. Neither the councils nor any other past 
institutional form present a ready-made alternative that could replace current representative 
structures or guarantee a more substantive realisation of democratic values. Although the 
councils are generally ignored in mainstream democratic thought, they still occupy a 
privileged position in certain minority strands of socialist discourse. To supporters of council 
institutions, I believe my analysis should serve as a disenchantment of the councils and other 
similar utopian schemes that would stand in as placeholders for a fully emancipated post-
capitalist society. The exigencies of contemporary politics necessitate that we go beyond the 
councils to experiment with new forms of democratic practices and institutions that are 
adequate to present political struggles. However, this does not mean that the councils are only 
of mere historical interest. The ways in which council delegates mobilised political collectives 
and contested hierarchies of power still remains an important political example from which 
much can be learnt. 
 
I conclude by reflecting on two general implications that follow from my analysis of the 
councils. First, I offer some concluding reflections on democracy. I have drawn attention to 
the deep contests over the concept of democracy in the era of the councils, disagreements that 
continue to this day. We are accustomed to considering democracy as an institutional 
arrangement of competitive elections in which citizens select responsive and accountable 
political leaders.807 I have contended that the councils’ understanding of democracy embodied 
a distinctive class element in which democracy referred implicitly to the workers or the lower 
strata of society in opposition to the elite class.808 One of the motivations of this thesis has 
been to revive this class-conscious understanding of democratic practices for contemporary 
politics.809 
 
Drawing from the political struggles of the councils, I will briefly expand upon my 
substantive account of democratic practices as those which equalise power relations between 
democratic citizens and resist the elite domination of political life. First, this view of 
democratic practices involves a more demanding definition than traditional liberal 
conceptions because it requires that equal power in decision-making should be enhanced in 
                                                
807 Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, 267. 
808 Kolonitskii, “‘Democracy’ in the Political Consciousness of the February Revolution,” in Wade (ed.), 
Revolutionary Russia: New Approaches, 75. 
809 For a similar project see Hanson, “Democracy,” in Ball, Farr and Hanson (eds.), Political Innovation and 
Conceptual Change, 68–89.	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the political sphere and extended to other domains of society. This expansion of the domain of 
democratic politics attempts to overcome the liberal separation of the public and private that 
protects a system of private property and an unlimited right of wealth accumulation.810 Such a 
separation has always been a cornerstone of the liberal rather than the democratic tradition of 
political thought. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, these two ideologies found a 
temporary, although uneasy and perhaps disintegrating, alliance.811 However, there is a 
profound tension between these two political traditions since liberalism has often expressed a 
suspicion of the masses and a scepticism towards the collective exercise of political power. 
Property rights rather than popular sovereignty has been the central motif of liberal political 
thought. Democratic practices in the sense understood here aim for a more equal distribution 
of political power between democratic citizens, which can be hindered by immense 
inequalities in the economic sphere.812 
 
Second, democratic practices challenge current systems of representation through a more 
participatory conception of politics that involves active citizens exercising public power in 
significant ways over the central institutions of their societies. This is based on a recognition 
that the function of existing representative institutions is often to obstruct and hinder 
democratic rule rather than to actualise it. The more robust form of democracy considered 
here cultivates the democratic actions of citizens over mere symbolic forms of representation 
through the invocation of the name of “the people” by political elites. Democracy entails 
more than simply formal rights and negative liberties. It consists of a striving for more 
immediate forms of popular control over decision-making. This is accomplished through the 
implementation of more direct channels of participation and tighter forms of control over 
elected delegates. It rests on a faith in the political capacities of ordinary citizens rather than 
the guardianship of elites. The precise institutional mechanisms by which more adequate 
forms of representation could be achieved would be the result of pragmatic trials and 
experimentation. 
 
                                                
810 For a classic liberal defence of such a system see John Locke, The Second Treatise on Civil 
Government (New York: Prometheus Books, 1986) 29. For a discussion of the Lockean proviso that wealth 
accumulation can continue only so long as there is enough left in common for others see Robert Nozick, 
Anarchy, State and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1971) 165. 
811 Barber, Strong Democracy: Participatory Politics for a New Age, 3–6. 
812 This definition has more in common with what Constant defined as the liberty of the ancients. See Benjamin 
Constant, “The Liberty of the Ancients Compared with that of the Moderns,” in The Political Writings of 
Benjamin Constant, ed. Biancamaria Fontana (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988) 309–328, 320. 
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Third, democratic practices involve an ongoing resistance to the reassertion of hierarchies and 
undemocratic forms of power that continually threaten social relations. There is a certain 
inevitability of some degree of inequality and hierarchy within democratic polities. Moreover, 
a structure of government will always involve the creation of elites who have more power, 
influence and control than average democratic citizens. A basic requirement of a democratic 
government is that the exercise of this political power should be accompanied by forms of 
democratic control and accountability. Elites should be continuously patrolled through extra-
electoral institutions and practices. In this way, democratic practices could be described in the 
oppositional sense as the exercise of political power against the imposition of forms of 
domination. The quality of a society’s democracy could be measured by the degree of 
reversibility of power relations and the extent to which ordinary citizens felt that they could 
exercise substantive forms of control over their government and political institutions. 
 
A second general implication raised by the example of the councils is the question of what 
would be an effective strategy of political transformation under current conditions. How can 
we mobilise political collectives and reform economic and political institutions to bring about 
meaningful change in the interests of ordinary citizens? An examination of the practices of the 
councils suggests an approach that can be differentiated from the three possible alternatives of 
liberal reformism, new forms of left authoritarianism and neo-anarchist anti-state political 
movements. For liberal reformists, the traditional values of democracy can be advanced 
within the basic framework of a liberal state through a series of minor institutional reforms.813 
There are a variety of new democratic innovations that have attracted increased attention over 
the past two decades such as mini-publics, deliberative innovations, citizens’ assemblies, co-
governance schemes and participatory budgeting.814 While each innovation is accompanied 
by its own particular set of advantages and limitations, many of these new institutions are 
short-term, small-scale, often temporary devices that fail to address the deeper structural 
problems of inequalities of political power between citizens.815 
 
A second approach is offered by contemporary Marxists, Alain Badiou and Slavoj Žižek, who 
call for the seizure of state power to be utilised for communist ends. Badiou and Žižek were 
                                                
813 Archon Fung and Erik Olin Wright (eds.), Deepening Democracy: Institutional Innovations in Empowered 
Participatory Governance (London: Verso, 2003). 
814 For an overview see Graham Smith, Beyond the Ballot: 57 Democratic Innovations from Around the World 
(London: Short Run Press, 2005). 
815 Pateman, “Participatory Democracy Revisited,” 8–10.	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the two most prominent figures in a series of well-attended events, beginning in London in 
2009, around the idea of communism and its revival.816 Žižek advocates for a radical political 
act in which the Left would traverse its revolutionary fantasies and enact a total revolutionary 
overhaul of existing society.817 This act would suspend the ordinary operation of democratic 
politics and replace it with an entirely different social composition based on a new political 
decision. There are good reasons to be critical of Žižek’s open support for dictatorial methods 
aimed at reshaping society in the Left’s image. Although it is difficult to know Žižek’s precise 
political position, in the past decade he has called for a violent revolutionary act and 
advocated forms of terror, dictatorship and vanguard politics.818 
 
Third, there is growing support for a neo-anarchist ideology that is expressed through a 
spontaneous and disruptive form of anti-statist politics.819 Many commentators noted the 
strong anarchist influence behind contemporary political movements such as Occupy Wall 
Street and the Spanish Indignados.820 Neo-anarchist political actors privilege local and 
autonomous forms of political action that struggle against the state and operate outside of its 
central institutions and structures. The final goal for this vision of politics is a utopian ideal of 
a non-state society in which voluntary collectives organise their lives without the use of the 
police, army or other coercive apparatuses. The problem with some of these anarchist political 
projects is that they evade the central political terrain of state power and thus fail to address 
how systematic forms of oppression that occur within these institutions could be addressed. 
 
The preceding history suggests that attempts at democratic transformation must engage with 
current institutions, both to defend gains already made and to extend them in new 
emancipatory directions. But would this mean resigning ourselves to the limits of liberal 
parliamentary institutions and to the currently dominant minimalist conception of democracy? 
Without the horizon of a fully emancipated society are we in some way committed to a 
defence of the status quo? The challenge posed by the councils, I suggest, is how to begin 
from the reality of present institutions and transform them through eliciting the energies and 
capabilities of democratic citizens. In considering these questions, it is important not to 
                                                
816 Costas Douzinas and Slavoj Žižek (eds.), The Idea of Communism (London and New York: Verso, 2010). 
817 Slavoj Žižek, In Defence of Lost Causes (London: Verso, 2008). 
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819 Duane Rouselle and Sureyyya Evren (eds.), Post-Anarchism: A Reader (London: Pluto Press, 2011); Jacob 
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underestimate the considerable barriers that capitalist modes of production and state power 
pose to the pursuit of democratic ideals. However, political reform is best conceptualised as 
an ongoing practice rather than a radical discontinuity and rupture. The dominant institutional 
framework of representative democracy must be engaged with rather than dismissed or 
ignored. Ultimately, there is no telling whether this would end in the reorganisation of 
institutions into new political forms beyond recognition from the perspective of the old order. 
This study of the council system draws attention to the historical context in which politics 
occurs. Progressive changes are always the result of difficult struggles and their outcomes are 
not certain. They are in constant danger of being wound back by anti-democratic forces intent 
on reasserting the control of market forces, political hierarchies and elite rule. An examination 
of the councils’ practices provides an exemplary account of the conditions under which 
democratic action takes place. It treats an example in which agents respond to specifically 
modern forms of domination. The councils engaged in a radical reformism that sought 
concrete political objectives as a means of opening the path to deeper structural changes. It is 
on the basis of a renewed commitment to equalising power relations between citizens and 
attempting to control political and economic elites that the legacy of the councils can be 
advanced in contemporary democratic societies. 
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